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ABSTRACT
This doctoral dissertation is about economic policy making in a repre-
sentative democracy. This dissertation comprises of the introductory
chapter and three original essays.
The introductory chapter provides a literature review, and a frame-
work for the three individual essays included in this dissertation. The
introduction discusses the role of incentives in the public choice view
to political economics, the importance of institutions, and the prob-
lems related to theory of collective decision making. It furthermore
presents an overview of public elections as the most important insti-
tution in a representative democracy, both from the candidate/party
and the voter perspectives.
Each of the three essays included in this dissertation present a the-
oretical model of economic policy making. All the three essays look
at the politician-voter relationship from different perspectives. Central
themes in the essays are the information the players possess, the ability
of the citizens to hold policy makers accountable, and the motivation
of the policy makers.
Essay 1 in this dissertation studies the tendency of a policy maker
to pander to the public opinion. It presents a model of political ac-
countability with a heterogeneous electorate under asymmetric infor-
mation. The results show how the strength of the players’ beliefs play
a role in determining the condition for the incumbent to disregard
his private information and set a policy the majority of the electorate
thinks is the optimal one. Furthermore, this essay considers how some
of the pandering outcomes can be avoided by enriching the voter be-
haviour by voter sophistication and expressive voting motives.
Essay 2 presents a framework for parliamentary politics, where par-
ties are setting their political agendas prior to elections. The parties
wish to be in the governing coalition to be able to affect policy out-
comes directly, but they also value their true political ideologies. This
essay analyses especially the role of minor parties in multiparty sys-
tems, and their ability to be part of governing coalitions. The results
show the importance of secondary policy dimensions for minor par-
ties, in this case the importance of a salient environmental dimension
for green parties.
Essay 3 analyses the delegation of a long-term public policy to one
of two alternative policy making regimes, an elected politican or an
appointed bureaucrat. The two policy makers have different incen-
tives to perform well. The results show that while a bureaucrat can set
a lower tax rate that benefits the citizens when he is motivated by a
highly competitive private sector, the problem with bureaucracy is the
inability of citizens to get rid of low quality bureaucrats. A politician,
on the other had, might have insufficient incentives to set a lower tax
rate, but the benefit of an elected policy maker is that the citizens can
vote out a bad performing politician.
Keywords: Electoral accountability, asymmetric information, coalition
formation, agenda-setting, electoral incentives.
TIIVISTELMÄ
Tämä väitöskirja käsittelee talouspoliittista päätöksentekoa edustuk-
sellisessa demokratiassa. Väitöskirja koostuu johdantoluvusta ja kol-
mesta itsenäisestä esseestä.
Johdantoluku esittelee kirjallisuuskatsauksen ja taustakehikon väi-
töskirjan kolmelle erilliselle esseelle. Johdantoluku käsittelee kannus-
timien merkitystä poliittisen taloustieteen tutkimuksessa, instituutioi-
den tärkeyttä, sekä haasteita joita liittyy kollektiivisen päätöksenteon
mallintamiseen. Lisäksi johdantoluku esittelee yhteenvedon yhdestä
edustuksellisen demokratian tärkeimmästä instituutiosta, eli kansan-
vaaleista, sekä ehdokkaiden/poliittisten puoleiden että kansalaisten
näkökulmasta.
Tämän väitöskirjan sisältämät kolme erillistä esseetä esittelevät ku-
kin teoreettisen tavan mallintaa talouspoliittista päätöksentekoa. Jo-
kainen esseistä tarkastelee päätöksentekijä-kansalainen -suhdetta eri
näkökulmista. Esseitä yhdistäviä keskeisiä teemoja ovat osapuolten
saaman informaation merkitys, kansalaisten kyky saada päätöksenteki-
jät vastuuseen tekemästään politiikasta, sekä päätöstentekijöiden kan-
nustimet.
Väitöskirjan ensimmäinen essee tarkastelee päätöksentekijän alt-
tiutta populistiseen päätöksentekoon, kun äänestäjäkunta on hetero-
geenista ja informaatio on epäsymmetristä. Populismilla viitataan ti-
lanteeseen, jossa päätöksentekijä asettaa politiikan sen mukaan mitä
äänestäjäkunnan enemmistö pitää optimaalisena politiikkana vastoin
omaa parempaa uskomustaan optimaalisesta vaihtoehdosta. Tulokset
osoittavat että päätöksentekijän alttius populismiin riippuu eri osa-
puolten uskomusten vahvuudesta. Lisäksi esseessä tarkastellaan äänes-
täjäkunnan tietoisuuden ja ekspressiivisten äänestysmotiivien vaiku-
tusta politiikkalopputulemiin.
Toinen essee tarkastelee parlamentaarista päätöksentekoa, kun po-
liittiset puolueet asettavat vaaliohjelmansa ennen vaaleja. Puolueet ha-
luavat paikan koalitiohallituksesta, koska voivat sitä kautta vaikuttaa
suoraan poliittisiin päätöksiin, mutta haluavat myös pitää kiinni to-
dellisista ideologista arvoistaan. Tässä esseessä tarkastellaan erityises-
ti pienpuolueiden asemaa monipuoluejärjestelmissä, ja pienpuoluei-
den mahdollisuutta päästä mukaan koalitiohallituksiin. Esseen tulok-
set osoittavat toissijaisten poliittisten dimensioiden merkityksen pien-
puolueille, kuten ympäristöpolitiikkadimension merkityksen vihreille
puolueille.
Kolmannessa esseessä tarkastellaan pitkäaikaisen politiikan dele-
goimista kahdelle erilaiselle päätöksentekijälle, vaaleilla valitulle po-
liitikolle tai julkiseen virkaan valitulle virkamiehelle. Näitä kahta pää-
töksentekijää erottaa erilaiset kannustimiset hoitaa tehtäväänsä tehok-
kaasti. Tulokset osoittavat, että riittävän kilpailukykyinen yksityinen
sektori kannustaa virkamiestä hoitamaan tehtäväänsä tehokkaasti, mut-
ta ongelmaksi kansalaisten näkökulmasta osoittautuu tilanne jossa vir-
kamies osoittautuu taidoiltaan huonoksi, jolloin kansalaisilla ei ole
mahdollisuutta erottaa virkamiestä. Poliitikolla, toisaalta, ei välttämättä
ole riittäviä kannustimia asettaa veroastetta kovin alhaiseksi, mutta tu-
lokset osoittavat kansanvaalien tärkeyden, sillä matalan osaamisen po-
liitikko voidaan tarvittaessa vaihtaa vaaleilla uuteen poliitikkoon.
Avainsanat: Vastuuvelvollisuus, epäsymmetrinen informaatio, koali-
tion muodostus, vaaliohjelma, vaalien kannustinvaikutus.
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INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DECISION-MAKING
This dissertation is about economic policy making in representative
democracy. It comprises of this introductory chapter and three indi-
vidual essays. This introductory chapter has two goals. First, I set the
background for this dissertation by presenting a review of the previous
literature. Since the chapters of this dissertation are mainly theoreti-
cal, I look at the previous literature mostly from the theory perspective.
Second, I briefly summarise the individual essays that comprise this
dissertation and put them into the context of the earlier research.
Each of the individual essays presents a model of economic policy-
making in representative democracy, with the main research questions
being:
i) What is the impact of voters’ information and instrumental or ex-
pressive voting motivations on electoral outcomes, and the incum-
bent’s incentives to pander to the voter opinion.
ii) How parties’ political power is determined, what is their ability to
affect policy outcomes, and what is the role of partisan politics.
iii) How and to whom policy making power is delegated, and how
to hold policy makers accountable; what are the implications on citi-
zens’ utility of delegating decision-making power to alternative policy
regimes.
This introductory essay proceeds as follows. The first section pro-
vides a broader framework for this dissertation by discussing the im-
portance of incentives, the interrelatedness of economic and political
institutions, and the challenges related to constitutional design. I also
review literature on institutional research. In section 2, I focus on
one important institution of representative democracy, namely public
elections. I consider voting both from the perspective of voters and
candidates. Furthermore, I discuss the basic Downsian electoral com-
petition, and the problems related to it. Finally, I extend discussion to
multidimensional policy problems and multi-party systems. Section 3
summarises the individual essays included in this dissertation.
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1 INCENTIVES, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
OUTCOMES
Political economics is a field of study in the intersection between eco-
nomics and politics. The main focus is on the analysis of the interac-
tion of economic and political institutions, with key research themes
focusing on the distribution of power, the functioning of societies, the
individual-level welfare, as well as the distribution of welfare within
society. Drazen (2000, p. 6) defines politics as the study of power
and authority, with power being defined as an individual’s ability
to achieve outcomes that reflect his objectives. Questions of power
and authority become relevant when there is a conflict of interest be-
tween economic actors in society (Drazen, 2000, p. 6). In representative
democracy, citizens allocate decision-making power to policy makers,
whose preferences do not necessarily coincide with those of their con-
stituents.
Positive political economics aims at understanding and explaining
the role and interrelatedness of economic and political institutions and
their impact on policy outcomes, whereas normative research makes
attempts at how the existing institutions could be made better. To
be able to achieve the normative aspect to political decision making,
one needs a positive theory of the political institutions that constrain
political and economic decision making.
There is a clear connection between economics and politics, when
one looks at the rationality of agents, their self-interested nature, and
the importance of incentives. While much of economic theory assumes
a benevolent government or a leader, who is willing to implement the
best possible policy alternative - as long as they have policy exper-
tise or advisors telling them what these optimal policies are, see e.g.
Drazen (2000, p. 6) - the political economy approach, on the other
hand, is to assume both the citizens and the incumbent leaders alike
to possess private economic interests. There is a game played between
them. The self-interested nature of the decision makers is central in the
analysis of politician-voter relationship. As noted by Downs (1957b,
p. 136)
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’Any attempt to construct a theory of government action
without discussing the motives of those who run the gov-
ernment must be regarded as inconsistent with the main
body of economic analysis.’
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) take an individualistic approach to the
political process, where the individual actor is similar to that of the
economic actor in that he always prefers ’more’ to ’less’. Buchanan
(1989, p. 20) writes ’individuals must be modeled as seeking to fur-
ther their own self-interest, narrowly defined in terms of measured
net wealth position, as predicted or expected’, or, as noted by Downs
(1957b, p. 137)
’Every agent in the model - - behaves rationally at all times,
that is it proceeds towards its goal with a minimal use
of scarce resources and undertakes only those actions for
which marginal return exceeds marginal cost.’
Due to individuals’ conflicting preferences, and the uneven distribu-
tion of power, there is a need for institutions to define the rules of the
game, constrain the self-interested behaviour of policy makers, and
provide players with incentives to behave well. North (1991) defines
institutions as the humanly devised constraints that structure political,
economic and social interaction; they create order and reduce uncer-
tainty in exchange.
Institutions can be either informal or formal. Formal institutions
contain constitutions, laws and property rights. Institutions such as
formal economic constraints or property rights help in reducing trans-
action costs or raising costs of defecting in cooperative relationships.
These rules and constraints are specified and enforced by political in-
stitutions. To understand economic performance, one needs to un-
derstand the evolution of economic and political institutions (North,
1991). Good political institutions are essential for there to be good
economic institutions, and thus there is a linkage from political incen-
tives to economic incentives, and subsequently to economic outcomes.
17
1.1 Theory of collective decision making
Constitutions contain the most fundamental laws concerning the pro-
cess of policy making, in that they dictate the rules for collective deci-
sion making. For instance, the rules for organising the society, how
power is distributed in the society, and who can vote are dictated
by constitutions (Drazen, 2000, p. 64-65). Even though constitutions
present the fundamental laws with more stringent amendment proce-
dures than other laws (Drazen, 2000, p. 65), institutional reforms are
frequently on agenda, and thus there is a need both for frameworks
as well as empirical studies to analyse and judge them (Besley and
Case, 2003). Institutions can be studied at three distinct but interre-
lated levels. First is the study of existing institutions, second is com-
parative institutional analysis, and the third and the deepest level of
institutional analysis is to explain how and why institutions have been
structured in a particular way, and why some survive while others do
not (Weingast and Wittman, 2006).
Therefore, to understand the whole picture, one needs a mapping
from institutional rules to policy outcomes. Furthermore, since the
policy advice by economists is mediated through the political system -
what is optimal purely from the economics perspective might be sub-
optimal once we take into account the political equilibrium, and vice
versa. This shifts the focus from analysing policy changes themselves
to the rules by which policies are formed (Besley and Case, 2003).
Besley and Case (2003) refer to Buchanan who has suggested a
two-stage policy analysis. The first stage is the constitutional design,
which comprises of two components; a procedural constitution dictat-
ing the terms by which decisions are being made, such as term limits,
separation of powers and so forth; and a fiscal constitution setting
constraints for policies that can be adopted within the framework of
procedural constitution. Once the constitution is chosen, policies can
be chosen. The key role for the policy advisor is then to set stage one
by anticipating what will take place in the second stage (Besley and
Case, 2003). Drazen (2000, p. 78) presents a similar view on the pol-
icy procedure; representative democracy is a profound example of a
principal-agent problem, by citizens allocation decision-making power
18
to delegates whose preferences may not completely comply with those
of the citizens themselves. Thus one needs to look both at the choice of
representatives and the choice of policy by these representatives, and
how these two interact.
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) is among the first ones to formalise a
theory of collective decision making by providing a model of collective
action that would be similar to orthodox economic theory of markets.
As they write, if all men were equal in interest and endowment, there
would be no organised economic activity that needs to be explained.
In the political sphere, if each individual’s preferences are to be consid-
ered to represent his endowment, then if all individuals would share
the same preferences, full information would lead to full support by
all men, and thus some sort of truth would be achieved. However, the
problem is that the preferences are not the same across individuals,
and therefore there is a need for a theory of collective decision.
When analysing constitutional design from a normative perspec-
tive, one runs immediately into problems. First, as noted by Downs,
an implicit assumption in the work of welfare economists and public
finance theorists is that the ’proper’ function of government is to max-
imise social welfare. There are two problems with this; it is unclear
what is meant by ’social welfare’, and there is no agreement on how
to ’maximise’ it (Downs, 1957b). First, Downs (1957a, p. 18) refers to
Arrow who has noted that when there are more than two alternatives,
and the citizens have sufficiently diverging preferences, no unique and
transitive general welfare function can be constructed.
Besley (2006, p. 21-22) further discusses the choice of the social wel-
fare function. While the concept of Pareto efficiency is useful in many
economic applications to be used as a criterion for good policy, the
definition for a common good hinges strongly on the degree on value
judgements. For instance, there is no universally agreed upon level
of inequality aversion, whereas there are potentially many Pareto effi-
cient policies with varying degree of inequality associated with them.
When it comes to the issue of maximising the social welfare, one
obvious question is, do the politicians have sufficient incentives to act
in the public interest? There are two ways to approach this issue.
19
First, the starting point in majority of reseach in economic theory
as well as in public economics is to assume a benevolent government.
The focus is for instance on the optimal level of taxation, whether
the government should mandate health insurances and so forth, as
discussed in Drazen (2000, p. 6) and Besley and Case (2003). The idea
is that once economists find out the optimal policy, there is a policy
maker willing to implement it. From a welfare economic point of view,
state is seen as a benevolent provider of public goods, regulator of
externalities, as well as re-distributor of resources (Besley, 2006, p. 20-
22).
The second approach is to view politicians as self-interested actors,
with private motivations of doing policy. The self-interested nature
of politicians has long been acknowledged; it has been mentioned for
instance in Downs (1957b), and discussed in more length in Buchanan
and Tullock (1962), and it is at the heart of the public choice approach.
Majority of research in political economics takes this public choice
view on the nature of the government with selfish intentions, and
highlights the importance of sufficient incentives for decision makers.
Thus, in addition to considering the optimality of alternative policies,
one needs to take into account the optimality of policy makers and
policy-making institutions as well.
Another inherent problem in the design of collective choice, as
noted by Buchanan and Tullock (1962, p. 5) is that the selection of
the decision making rule is itself a collective decision, and thus we are
confronted with a problem of infinite regression. Unlike in the mar-
ket context, where the ultimate decision maker is the individual him-
self, in the political context the individuals cannot competently choose
between collective and individual action until the results of alterna-
tive choices are analysed. The theory of political choice is therefore
plagued with the problem of fundamental interdependence of indi-
vidual actions; a problem that seems to be absent in the analysis of
market activity.
Finally, the endogenous nature of institutions poses a challenge on
the analysis of their impact on policy outcomes. It is possible that de-
cision making institutions are chosen strategically by incumbents to
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affect future election outcomes (Besley and Case, 2003). In the follow-
ing, I summarise some of the previous research taking institutions as
given, as well as research analysing the endogeneity of institutions.
1.2 Effects of constitutions on economic policy outcomes and
comparative research
As already mentioned, institutional analysis takes place at different
levels; the first two levels covering the analysis of the impact of an ex-
isting institution on policy outcomes, and comparative research analysing
policy outcomes under different existing institutions. Here I review
some of this literature.
Both theoretical and empirical comparative analyses of constitu-
tions are presented for instance in Persson and Tabellini (2000), Pers-
son and Tabellini (2003), Persson and Tabellini (2004a), and Persson
and Tabellini (2004b). Persson and Tabellini (2003, p. 11-12) focus on
two aspects of constitutions; the rules for elections and the form of
government. Electoral rules determine both how the voters’ prefer-
ences are aggregated and how political representatives acquire powers
to make decisions about economic policy. The two main electoral rules
are plurality rule and proportional representation. Choice of the form
of government, on the other hand, determines how the powers can be
exercised and conflicts among representatives can be solved. The main
forms of government are presidential and parliamentary systems.
When thinking about an optimal constitution, there are two de-
sirable attributes of the political system: representativeness and ac-
countability (Persson and Tabellini, 2003, p. 12). The former refers to
the incumbent administration’s ability to set policies that reflect pref-
erences of a large amount of voters, whereas the latter refers to the
electorate’s ability to identify who is responsible for policy choices,
and to reward or punish them accordingly. The problem is to find a
combination of these two attributes, since achieving both at the same
time is challenging.
According to Persson and Tabellini (2003) the tradeoff between the
two is especially stark in the choice of the electoral rule; while plu-
rality rule is geared towards holding politicians accountable, propor-
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tional representation manages to represent a wider spectrum of voters.
A similar, although a less stark tradeoff can be found in the form of
the government as well. A presidential system makes accountability
easier by allocating powers into a single office directly accountable to
citizens. Parliamentary regimes, on the hand, lean towards representa-
tiveness through potentially having to hold together a heterogeneous
coalition government.
In addition to theoretical analysis, there is a robust empirical liter-
ature showing how the constitutional rules affect economic outcomes.
In a proportional system, each district chooses more than one repre-
sentative, whereas under plurality rule, each district elects one rep-
resentative. The electoral rule is thus directly related to the number
of parties gaining seats in national parliaments, so that proportional
systems tend to feature multiple parties, whereas the plurality rule
usually results in two-party systems.
There is a vast empirical research focusing especially on the rela-
tionship between the electoral rule and economic policies. Persson and
Tabellini (2004a) and Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) show how countries
with proportional electoral systems tend to provide more public goods
and have a larger government with larger redistributive programmes
than countries employing plurality rule. Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006)
find that countries with higher number of parties in the government
typically have higher spending, but also lower inequality: levels of
public spending that may appear inefficient in the short run may be
beneficial in the longer term.
Results in Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) further indicate that propor-
tional systems tend to target spending more to social groups which
allows representation of a greater variety of interests, whereas plural-
ity systems are more likely to spend on public goods, which makes
them to be more grounded in local interests. Galasso and Nunnari
(2010) relate this effect to electoral incentives of the incumbent, which
in turn are related to the chosen electoral rule. Depending on the size
of the electoral district, and the intensity of electoral competition the
incumbents tend to favour broader transfers and general public goods,
or focus on pork-barrel spending instead.
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1.3 Endogeneity of institutions and state capacity
Research presented in the previous subsection has been mainly com-
parative in its nature. While Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Pers-
son and Tabellini (2003) acknowledge the fact that institutions change
over time, they take them as given and do not analyse how they have
evolved over time. The third level of institutional analysis, on the other
hand, focuses specifically on the endogeneity of institutions.
One relatively recent strand of research within economics that anal-
yses the endogenous nature of institutions is that of state capacity. Re-
search on state capacity is based on the observation that strong states
and strong market economies tend to evolve in symbiosis. While re-
search in economics has focused mostly on the latter, literature on
state capacity analyses the former, and formalises the co-evolution of
economic and political institutions. Theoretically, state capacity has
been formalised in e.g. Besley and Persson (2009) and Besley and
Persson (2010). They define state capacity to comprise of two aspects;
i) legal capacity that refers to property rights and legal enforcement,
and ii) fiscal capacity that refers to government spending and taxa-
tion. The key is that the power of the state to raise revenue and to
support markets are investments under uncertainty; building a state
capacity is thus a strategic play by the incumbents, and the capacity of
the present day policy makers to make policy choices is restricted by
the investments done by past incumbents.
This framework brings insight on the interdependence of the two
forms of state capacity, and on why strong states and strong markets,
or weak states and weak markets seem to coexist. Furthermore, it
helps to understand the endogenous nature of political and economic
institutions. Like noted by North (1991), the existence of today’s eco-
nomic and political organisations is dependent on the opportunities
provided by yesterday’s institutional framework.
The importance of institutions on economic development has at-
tracted a lot of interest in the literature. For instance, the very diver-
gent development paths in North America vs. South America have
been contributed to the economic and political institutions that were
imported and implemented in large part at the time of colonialism.
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North (1991) writes that while in the U.S. we observe an institutional
framework that allows impersonal exchange that is necessary to polit-
ical stability, as well as the potential to capture economic benefits of
modern technologies, in the Southern American countries there exists
a culture where political and economic exchange is based largely on
personal relationships.
Empirically, the relationship between sound institutions and eco-
nomic outcomes has been tested in e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2001) and
Acemoglu et al. (2002). They analyse the importance of sound political
institutions as a precondition to having good economic institutions, by
looking at the institutions and economic development in two distinct
groups of former European colonial countries. In the first group are
countries such as the U.S, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand,
whereas in the second group are countries in the Latin America, sub-
Saharan Africa and India. The foundations for prosperity in former
group of the countries were laid in how these economies have been
organised. The introduction of inclusive economic and political insti-
tutions in the form vast property rights, and universal suffrage1 en-
abled for instance the Northern America to prosper by providing the
citizens incentives to work, own land and decide on they own things.
In contrast, the introduction of extractive institutions in Latin America,
much of Africa or India led to suppression and poorness of citizens,
by centralising all the wealth to the hands of the small elite.
1.4 Discussion of collective decision making
In this section I have discussed the importance of providing both po-
litical and economic actors with incentives to perform well. How these
incentives are provided is ultimately a question of the design of col-
lective choice.
I have further reviewed some literature showing significant vari-
ation in policy outcomes due to different constitutional rules. The
importance of constitutional design is thus obvious. While this section
has highlighted the importance of economic and political institutions
1At the time of colonialism, only men were allowed to vote; universal suffrage
referred to the extension of voting beyond the members of the elite.
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at a broader level, in the next section I focus on the role of elections as
the most important institution of representative democracy.
2 VOTING AND ELECTORAL OUTCOMES
Public elections is the most important institution of representative
democracy. The idea of a representative democratic system is to elect
candidates into the public office to represent their constituents’ pref-
erences. It is important to note that elections take always place in an
environment of incomplete information on both sides of the politician-
voter game. On the one hand, the candidates may not know the true
preferences of voters, they are dealing with imperfect incentives to give
their best effort, and are put to face uncertainty regarding their polit-
ical future when subject to re-election every few years. Voters, on the
other hand, do not know the true competence of candidates, effort or
partisanship, or their true motivations to run for office. Alternatively,
the voters simply cannot assess the optimality of policy alternatives to
be able to vote for the best candidate accordingly. Therefore, voting
and electoral outcomes are plagued by problems caused by both in-
formational asymmetries as well as informational incompleteness on
both sides of the voter-candidate game.
In this section, I discuss the role of elections, first on a more general
level, and then from the perspective of both the voters and the candi-
dates. Moreover, I discuss the role of commitment to proposed policy
platforms, and the problems related to analysing multiple policy di-
mensions. I briefly present two alternative approaches to modelling
voter-candidate game, deterministic and probabilistic voting models.
Finally, since majority of research on voting has focused on the two-
party systems, I extend discussion to multi-party systems.
2.1 Role of elections
There is a vast literature related to voting with the two most impor-
tant questions being: i) Why do voters vote? ii) What is the role of
elections? The answer to the first question has been addressed in the
literature of voter turnout, trying to explain who votes, why and what
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are the factors driving the decision to show up at the election day. The
answer to the second question is much broader, taking two broad ap-
proaches; first is to take an ex ante approach by considering elections
as a mechanism to either aggregate voters’ preferences, or to aggregate
information, and select the best possible candidates into the public of-
fice. The second approach takes an ex post approach by considering
elections as a way to hold public policy makers accountable for their
actions at the office.
First, public elections function to aggregate voters’ preferences.
This has been first formalised by Downs (1957b), and is also known
as the spatial voting model of electoral competition. Downs’ median
voter theorem is still widely used and cited in the literature; it is based
on the earlier work by Hotelling (1929) on spatial competition between
firms, with Downs analogising political parties to firms of the original
model (Dewan and Shepsle, 2011) by replacing the utility maximising
individuals in the market context with vote maximising candidates in
the political context.
Although the Downsian framework of voting is a simplified ver-
sion of the actual voting process, it offers an important and broadly
used basic result of voting behaviour by stating that in a unidimen-
sional policy framework with two candidates or parties, the policy
will converge to the median voter’s preferred policy outcome.
The model assumes that the voters care about policy outcomes and
that their utility functions representing their preferences are single-
peaked; there exists an ordering of all possible platforms so that each
voter’s utility function is a single-peaked function of it (Wittman, 1973),
and thus there is one clearly preferred policy in the set of possible poli-
cies.2 This ordering of one-dimensional policy platforms can be con-
sidered to represent the left-right continuum (Wittman, 1973), or voter
preferences on money supply or government spending Ansolahebere
(2006, p. 30).
Second, elections aggregate dispersed pieces of information. Piketty
(1999, citing Hayek), writes that information that is needed for indi-
2More specifically, each function has a local maximum, which is also the global
maximum. See discussion of this, and of single-crossing property in Persson and
Tabellini (2000, p. 21-24).
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vidual decisions is never in a concentrated or integrated form, but
individuals possess dispersed bits of incomplete and even contradic-
tory information. Political institutions, such as voting, then provides a
means to achieve efficient use of this information. The recent research
on voting as a means of aggregating information has been extended
from the study of jury decisions to study strategic behaviour in large
elections (Dewan and Shepsle, 2011).
Although voters may know their own preferences, there is still
some uncertainty related to elections; either concerning the optimal
policies or the competence of candidates. Also, such information is
dispersed in the economy, and therefore elections can function as ag-
gregating the unequally dispersed pieces of information that individ-
ual citizens hold. It is assumed that citizens do not know the true state
of the economy, but receive private, and possibly noisy, signals of the
true state. Then, citizens make a voting decision based on the informa-
tion they possess, and these votes are aggregated under some decision
rule (Dewan and Shepsle, 2011). One problem is, whether individuals
will cast their vote sincerely. It is also unclear, whether aggregating
private signals will result in correct decision3
Finally, elections function as a selection mechanism and provider
of incentives. Electoral accountability refers either to the electorate’s
ability to select the best candidates into office, or based on the incum-
bent’s performance in office to reward them with re-election, or punish
by not re-electing them. There are two main approaches to the elec-
toral accountability; prospective voting based on electoral promises,
and retrospective voting based on the incumbent’s performance in the
office. The former is a selection problem, whereas the latter is a moni-
toring problem (Besley, 2006).
2.2 Voter motivation
A voter has two decisions to make. First, whether to vote or not, and
second, how to cast one’s vote. Literature on voter turnout starts from
the calculus of voting approach (Riker and Ordershook, 1968), and
3The aggregation of information roots in the famous Condorcet jury theorem, see
for instance Piketty (1999) on this.
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has been further enriched by considering voting motivations, with the
main lines focusing on instrumental and expressive aspects.
The basic ’calculus of voting’ approach (Riker and Ordershook,
1968) states that the decision on whether to cast one’s vote or not can
be expressed as
R = BP− C
where R is the benefit of voting, B is the measure of the distance be-
tween one’s utility of the preferred candidate’s policy platform and the
utility of the less preferred candidate’s platform, P is the probability
of affecting the outcome, and C is the cost of voting. It reasonable to
vote if R > 0, and not to vote if R < 0. In mass elections, the probabil-
ity of being the decisive voter, P, becomes arbitrarily small, meaning
that the costs of casting one’s vote must be greater than the benefit of
it. This suggests that rational people would choose to abstain in mass
elections.
Furthermore, informing oneself of the state of the economy and
the proposed platforms is time-consuming and costly, and thus it is
rational to be ignorant about politics. Therefore, if individuals are
assumed to be private utility maximising agents, then the outcome
of public elections would be rational non-participation and rational
ignorance (Ansolahebere, 2006, p. 30). However, this is not what we
observe in reality; people do bother to take the time and effort to go
voting - this is the paradox of voting.
Since pure material utility of casting one’s vote cannot explain vot-
ing in mass elections, and since voters’ irrationality is not a sufficient
explanation to why people vote, there must be some other ingredi-
ents to the voting decision than the material utility. Downs suggested
that rational citizens understand that if nearly everyone chose absten-
tion, it would lead to the inevitable destruction of democracy (Fiorina,
1976). Riker and Ordershook (1968), in turn, enrich the basic calculus
by adding social-psychological ingredients, with D denoting the fixed
benefits of voting, such as the voter’s sense of citizen duty, affirma-
tion of allegiance to the political system, or satisfaction of affirming a
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partisan preference. Now the calculus of voting can be rewritten as
R = BP− C + D
While the basic formulation contains only an instrumental component
- the voter votes only to get his preferred candidate elected - the latter
formulation contains both instrumental and expressive components
(Fiorina, 1976). By casting his vote, a voter can identify himself as be-
ing a good citizen, and derive utility of this (Drinkwater and Jennings,
2007).
Fiorina (1976) adds to the Riker-Ordershook framework the pos-
sibility that expressive pay-off varies across strategies. Furthermore,
he allows voters to derive expressive utility of conforming to one’s
party allegiance. In Fiorina (1976) a partisan citizen gets some psy-
chic gain of affirming to one’s party identification, and a psychic cost
from a departure from this; whereas an independent citizen does not
make such a distinction between partisan ideologies. Therefore, the
expressive factor D of the Riker & Ordershook model is not identical
for both voting strategies. There are two classes of citizens; consis-
tents, whose party identification and party differential are mutually
reinforcing, and cross-pressureds whose party identification and party
differential are in conflict.
As an example, consider a presidential election with a republican
and a democrat candidate. The stronger the party identification of
a citizen, the more likely he votes for the candidate of his preferred
party and to vote for him if voting at all. However, a citizen with
strong party identification is less likely to vote at all if he dislikes the
proposed platform of the preferred party’s candidate (Fiorina, 1976).
While the decision of whether to vote or not may contain both in-
strumental or expressive motivations, so does the decision on who to
vote for. More recent analysis of expressive voting motivations focus
more on the latter question, for instance Brennan and Hamlin (1998),
Drinkwater and Jennings (2007) and Hillman (2010). Brennan and
Hamlin (1998) see instrumental voting as a revelation of preference
over alternative electoral outcomes, whereas expressive voting is akin
to cheering at a football match; it is to show support to one of the
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policy alternatives.
The identity of expressive voters is further discussed in Drinkwa-
ter and Jennings (2007), who find that voters with moderate political
views are more likely to vote expressively than voters with more ex-
treme political views. It is important to note that expressive voting
is not necessarily non-rational. As Hillman (2010) notes, people are
behaving rationally when voting against their material welfare in the
sense that they seek expressive utility from acts or decisions that con-
firm personal identity. Or, as Ansolahebere (2006) notes, involvement
in politics is rather a ’consumption’ benefit than pecuniary benefit.
While theoretical literature has looked at the voting decision from
the instrumental and/or expressive perspective, empirical literature
has focused more on the voter characteristics in explaining voter turnout.
For instance education, age, gender, or marital status can explain vot-
ing, as discussed for instance in Aidt (2000) and Matsusaka (1995).
Furthermore, the importance of being informed has been linked to
higher propensity to vote, both theoretically in Feddersen and Pe-
sendorfer (1997) and McMurray (2013), as well as empirically e.g. in
Lassen (2005) and Banerjee et al. (2010).
2.3 Candidate motivation
Elections can be also considered from the candidate perspective. It
is especially important to consider candidate motivation. Office mo-
tivated candidates derive utility either of winning, or of maximising
vote share Duggan (2006). In the Downsian model, candidates are
pure office-seekers - they do not seek office to carry out specific poli-
cies or to serve some specific interest groups, they formulate policies
strictly to gain votes (Downs, 1957b).
Candidate motivation can be linked to voter strategies; if voters use
a prospective voting strategy, then political competition is close to what
Downs depicted: candidates choose their policy platforms in order
to maximise electoral success (Downs, 1957b), voters choose the plat-
forms closest to their preferences, and the role of elections is to choose
the platform that will be implemented. In two-party competition the
voters make their voting decision based on the party differential in the
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expected utility; if the electorate votes for the incumbent, it is a man-
date to continue the current policy, whereas replacing the incumbent
indicates a wish for change (Downs, 1957a, p. 38-42). This view hinges
on the assumption that electoral promises are binding and enforceable
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000, p. 10).
Another approach to candidate motivation is to assume that can-
didates derive utility of policy success, or they have partisan or ide-
ological motivations. In Duggan (2006), policy motivated candidates
have policy preferences represented by strictly concave, differentiable
utility functions. With candidates who are not pure office-seekers,
prospective voting according to Downs is not a very realistic depic-
tion (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Furthermore, when the assumption
of binding electoral promises is dropped, the role for elections is to
reward or punish the incumbent based on his performance in office,
which can be based on his competence, effort or ideology. The voters
thus employ a retrospective voting strategy.
The quality of candidates of running for political office is related
to the rewards associated to the political career. Caselli and Morelli
(2004) analyse the importance of providing politicians with sufficiently
high compensation for trading private sector career and losing private
life. Rewards can be financial and/or psychological, and who runs
for a public office is a matter of self-selection. Under the assumption
that market skills and political competence are correlated, low compe-
tence candidates have a lower opportunity cost of running - they have
a comparative advantage at running for a political office. High qual-
ity candidates, on the other hand, gain less of holding office, which
lowers the average quality of candidates. This brings the importance
of sufficient compensation; high enough rewards motivate high qual-
ity candidates to run, and since they tend to win office more likely,
the comparative advantage of low quality candidates is offset to some
extent (Caselli and Morelli, 2004).
Candidate motivation, performance in office and rewards to perfor-
mance have been empirically studied by Diermeier et al. (2005), Mat-
tozzi and Merlo (2008) and Keane and Merlo (2010). To understand
electoral incentives, it is important to study how politicians are com-
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pensated for the effort they take, as well as how well rewards relate to
personal attributes such as ability and effort. In addition to monetary
compensation, political office provides ego rents that are rewards as-
sociated with social status and power (Caselli and Morelli, 2004). Dier-
meier et al. (2005), Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) and Keane and Merlo
(2010) analyse politicians’ response to both monetary incentives, such
as salary or other pecuniary perks of office, and to non-pecuniary in-
centives, such as desire for public service or legislative achievements.
First, Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) make a distinction between ca-
reer politicians and policy makers with political careers. They define
career politicians as those who strive from politics, and who leave pol-
itics only to retire. They enter politics not only for monetary rewards
but also for non-pecuniary rewards such as ego rents or the power of
influencing policies. Policy makers with political careers, on the other
hand, are those who use the political career to increase their chances of
getting better paid jobs either in the private or in the public sector af-
ter they leave politics. They use politics as a showcase, where talented
people get a chance to display their true talent, thereby increasing their
chances of getting well-paid private sector jobs.
Diermeier et al. (2005) quantify the returns to a congressional ca-
reer in the U.S. congress. Estimating the effect of a congressional career
on private and public sector wages shows that most members of the
congress leave politics to pursue careers in the private sector. Keane
and Merlo (2010) apply the Diermeier et al. (2005) framework to as-
sess congressmen’s career choices. By defining politicians according to
their ’political skill’, and categorising them into ’achievers’ and ’non-
achievers’, they study how changes in wages, other monetary rewards
or non-pecuniary rewards affect congressmen’s future career choices.
Results indicate that a reduction in wages induces ’skilled’ politicians
to exit the congress, however, this effect does not exist for ’achiever’
type politicians.
While majority of theoretical work depicts candidate motivation
very straightforwardly to comprise of either office or policy motiva-
tion, results of empirical research suggest that depending on the mo-
tivation to run for the public office, politicians respond to different
32
incentives differently. It seems that policy success and ideological mo-
tivations play a role, however the idea of a purely office-motivated
candidate does not seem to get much support in the empirical litera-
ture.
2.4 Commitment and policy convergence vs. divergence: de-
terministic and probabilistic voting models
A well-known problem in the voting literature is that with three or
more policy alternatives, the voter preferences may be such that the
outcome is a voting cycle under majority rule, known as the Condorcet
paradox.4 One of the main accomplishments of the median voter the-
orem, is in providing conditions under which the voting cycle can be
avoided.5 With one policy dimension, an equilibrium exists and it is
unique, where candidates converge to the median voter’s preferred
policy. Duggan (2006) reviews the literature showing the uniqueness
of the electoral equilibria both under office motivated or policy moti-
vated candidates.
The Downsian framework is a deterministic voting model, in the
sense that voters choose the candidate who is the closest to the voter’s
preferred policy with certainty. If the initially less preferred candidate
moves closer to the voter’s ideal point than the initially more favoured
candidate, the voter is immediately ready to change his voting be-
haviour. The candidates, on the hand, choose their policy platforms so
as to maximise their probabilities of winning the election (Persson and
Tabellini, 2000, p. 50). Thus, in the basic formulation of the Downsian
two-party competition in one policy dimension, political competition
results in policy convergence towards the political centre under the
existence of normally distributed6 voter preferences (Downs, 1957b).
Furthermore, policy change can be only expected as a result of change
4Intransitive voter preferences, see Wittman 1973.
5See a discussion of the conditions and the literature related to this e.g. in Cough-
lin (1992, p. 4), and Duggan (2006).
6Much less attention has received Downs’ notion that with polarised voter prefer-
ences political competition does not result in policy convergence, but either in chaos
if power is repeatedly shifted from one extreme to the other, or in tyranny if power
remains in one extreme (Downs, 1957b, p. 143)
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in the median voter’s preferences. Therefore, the model in itself cannot
predict policy change.
It is worth noting that expected policy convergence hinges on the
importance of commitment to proposed policy platforms, and motiva-
tion of the policy makers (Dewan and Shepsle, 2011). As Besley and
Case (2003) note, the results of the basic paradigm are very vulnera-
ble to any deviations from them; convergence takes place only if the
elected politician always implements the promised policies. Wittman
(1973) proposes a model where the utility for the party is a sum of
the utility of winning and the utility of implementing its preferred
platform. So unlike in the Downsian competition, where parties only
maximise the expected plurality, in the Wittman competition winning
the election is a means to an end in implementing its preferred plat-
form.
Formally, Alesina (1988) shows how the policy convergence hinges
strongly on the assumption of policy commitment, and on the can-
didate motivation. In a one-shot electoral game without precommit-
ment, there is no policy convergence when candidates care about pol-
icy outcomes. Instead, there is policy divergence; the elected politician
simply ignores his promises as a candidate and implements his most
preferred policy. However, when the game is extended into an infinite
horizon the electoral outcome is full convergence, even without pre-
commitment when reputational considerations make it too costly for
elected policy makers to deviate from the cooperative policy.
Whether electoral competition results in policy convergence or pol-
icy divergence, provides two completely opposite views on the role of
elections. These two opposing views also see the importance of elec-
toral strength in a very different way, as discussed in Padovano (2013)
who reviews theoretical literature, and Lee et al. (2004) who empiri-
cally test the claim; do voters affect policy choices, or elect policies. On
the one hand, competition for votes induces politicians to move to-
wards the political centre, thereby elections providing some degree of
policy compromise. On the other, if politicians cannot credibly com-
mit to set more moderate policies, then elections are a means to decide
which of the two opposing policies will be implemented.
34
In the case of policy convergence, a higher support for say a left-
wing candidate would allow him to pursue his preferred policy more
freely than if his support was weaker when he would be induced to
choose a more moderate policy. In the policy divergence case, the elec-
toral strength plays a lesser role, since either candidate will implement
his most favoured policy in any case. With data on U.S house elections,
Lee et al. (2004) find that electoral strength of the winning candidate
does not result in less moderate policy outcomes, meaning that voters
merely elect policies - not affect them.7
A perhaps more serious problem related to deterministic voting
models, is that if more dimensions are added, there is no equilibrium,
or if an equilibrium exists, it is usually unstable (Burden, 1997), see
a survey of literature discussing this in Coughlin (1992, p. 6).8 As a
response to this, a class of models called probabilistic voting models
evolved. The idea in probabilistic voting theory is to place unpre-
dictability on the voter behaviour from the candidates’ perspective;
after learning the candidates’ positions, there is still uncertainty re-
garding the voter response.
Duggan (2006) presents two alternative models of probabilistic vot-
ing. First, is stochastic partisanship model. While voter preferences are
known to the candidates, voters also have partisan preferences that are
unrelated to their policy positions. Voters place a bias towards one of
the candidates, and the intensity of the bias is unknown to the can-
didates. The second one is the stochastic preference model, where the
assumption of voters’ partisanship is dropped, but instead the voter
preferences are not perfectly observable to the candidates.
In comparison to deterministic models, electoral competition be-
comes less stiff, since the probability of winning is a smooth function
of the distance between candidates’ platforms (Persson and Tabellini,
2000, p. 54). Assuming a less than perfect ability to predict voters’
ultimate choices has more realism in large elections (Coughlin, 1992,
7The two-party system in the U.S. allows for direct testing of policy conver-
gence/divergence, whereas in multiparty system matters become more complicated
when it comes to testing the same thing.
8Despite the problems related to deterministic models in mass elections, they may
well be suited to analysing voting in small committees etc., as noted by Coughlin
(1992, p. 21).
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p. 21). Furthermore, probabilistic models are relevant when candidates
care about policy, not only of winning office (Persson and Tabellini,
2000, p. 58). The uncertainty inherent in probabilistic voting mod-
els raises the questions of how the candidates can secure winning the
elections, and hence what are the optimal candidate strategies. Dug-
gan (2006) reviews the conditions for the existence of equilibrium in
these two classes of probabilistic voting models, and under alternative
candidate motivations. While equilibria can be proven to exist in prob-
abilistic models, they are sensitive to the formulations of the objective
functions of the candidates. Furthermore, while probabilistic voting
models may deal better with more dimensions than the Downsian
framework, it seems that adding more than two dimensions results
often in unstable equilibria.
2.5 Multiparty systems
Political parties emerge as a response to policy preferences of different
constituencies in the society. One important role for political parties is
to allow compromise over conflicting policy objectives, since a single
candidate cannot alone provide a satisfying compromise over multiple
dimensions, as shown by Levy (2005). The number and significance
of parties depends on the chosen electoral rule, which determine how
votes are aggregated and who is elected. As already discussed, the
two most prominent electoral rules are plurality rule and proportional
representation (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). The former tends to re-
sult in two-party systems, whereas the latter results in multiparty sys-
tems. The connection between electoral rules and the effective number
of parties was noted by Maurice Duverger, so that the first result is
known as Duverger’s law and the second as Duverger’s hypothesis
(Riker, 1982).
So far, most discussion has concerned two-party systems with two
candidates. This is due to the fact that majority of theoretical research
starting in Downs on political competition assumes a two-party sys-
tem with two competing candidates, with each candidate trying to
maximise the expected plurality of votes. Empirical research testing
the hypotheses generated by theory focuses mostly on two-party sys-
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tems as well, most notably using data on U.S elections. The benefit of
analysing two-party or two candidate competition is that one can make
clearer predictions about candidate behaviour, which makes empirical
testing somewhat easier. Research on proportional representation sys-
tems, on the other hand, is somewhat scarcer. Proportional electoral
systems are, however, quite common in Europe as is for instance in
Israel, New Zealand, Australia or Japan. Therefore, analysis of voter
and candidate behaviour, as well as of electoral outcomes in multiparty
systems is important.
One obvious difficulty in analysing political competition or can-
didate behaviour in multiparty systems is that maximising expected
plurality becomes more complicated, since no party can usually ex-
pect to win a clear majority of seats, and the final seat shares depend
not only on the vote share for one party, but on vote shares for all
parties, and on the rule used to allocate the seats to parties based on
their vote counts. Secondly, predicting the governing coalition that
will form after the elections is difficult, although pre-electoral coali-
tion formation takes place in some countries (with different degrees of
commitment though).
Uncertainty of the post-electoral coalition might also induce some
voters to vote strategically if they wish to affect the potential coalition
formation. The role of strategic voting especially in multiparty systems
was discussed already in Downs (1957a, p. 47). Finally, contributing
policy changes to individual parties is plagued by problems of omitted
variable bias or reverse causality etc. The link from proposed policy
platforms to voter response to post-electoral commitment is thus not
very straightforward to model, let alone to identify empirically.
Perhaps related to these problems, majority of research on mul-
tiparty systems starting in Hibbs (1977) has focused on analysing the
role of the largest party in the parliament or in the governing coalition,
or grouped parties into party blocs on the political left-centre-right di-
mension, see survey in Cusack and Fuchs (2002). It seems that the role
of minor parties, which are characteristic of proportional systems has
been ignored to some extent. The role of minor parties, is perhaps not
so obvious when the aim is to study the size of the government bud-
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get or the amount of public debt, which makes the use of party blocks
a sufficient measure to studying the relationship between economic
outcomes and the colour of the political leadership. However, when
it comes to the analysis of secondary policy dimensions, such as im-
migration issues, environmental or religious issues, the role of minor
parties becomes more obvious, since typically minor parties emerge as
single-issue parties.
In two-party systems, secondary policy outcomes are many times
portrayed as a result of an interaction between decision makers and
various interest groups. The literature on lobbying and its impact on
secondary policy outcomes is reviewed in e.g. List and Sturm (2006).
While this may be a natural approach in two-party systems,9 where
the candidate competition focuses more on broader economic issues
that can be analysed as a one-dimensional policy problem, multiparty
systems, on the other hand, provide a natural framework to study
the determination of secondary policy issues directly as a result of
electoral competition. There is a growing literature analysing the role
of individual parties, and their importance especially on the secondary
policy issues, most notably with Scandinavian data by Folke (2014)
and Fiva et al. (2013) or with German data by (Freier and Odendahl,
2012). The results do suggest that also individual parties are important
players both in local and national parliaments.
2.6 Discussion on voting
This section has discussed voting both from the perspective of voters
and candidates/parties. Majority of previous research has focused on
two-party systems both in theoretical and empirical literature.
To understand the whole picture of electoral competition from voter
preferences to policy outcomes one needs to take into account two as-
9Another approach is provided by Roemer (2006) who models two-party compe-
tition in two-dimensional policy; redistribution and a non-economic issue, such as
religion or immigration. Each party consists of three factions; i) Downsian office-
seekers; ii) the reformists who maximise the expected utility of the average party
member; and iii) the militants who are concerned only about the ideology. While
parties compete against each other strategically, factions within these parties bargain
with each other over policy. Empirical evidence on this, see Roemer et al. (2007).
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pects. First, there is a need for a theory of pre-election politics; plat-
form setting, voter preferences and voter behaviour and the resulting
seat allocation to parties. Second, one needs a theory of post-election
politics with coalition formation and final policy outcomes. Achiev-
ing a unifying theory is especially challenging in multiparty systems.
In two-party systems, the winner of the election can commit to pro-
posed policy platforms, which makes it easier to empirically test how
changes in power distribution affect policy outcomes.
When it comes to modelling multiparty systems, there is much
more uncertainty in the whole electoral process, for instance due to
strategic voting, or unpredictability of who forms the governing coali-
tion. Also empirically identifying how changes in policy outcomes can
be attributed to individual parties is less straightforward in multiparty
systems. Finally, as discussed, adding more policy dimensions results
in the non-existence of equilibria or unstable equilibria.
Perhaps due to these reasons, majority of literature on multiparty
systems has focused on one stage of the electoral process at the time
taking other stages as given. For instance research on coalition for-
mation takes parties’ seat shares as given, whereas research on politi-
cal competition focuses on strategic agenda-setting at the pre-electoral
stage, and ignores what happens after elections when seat shares are
realised.
3 SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS
In the following I provide short descriptions of the essays, after which
I briefly discuss the essays in the light of the literature review provided
in this introductory chapter.
Essay 1: Political accountability with voter heterogeneity: the
role of information and voting motives
The first essay analyses a model of political accountability with a het-
erogenous electorate. There is asymmetric information between the
politician and the electorate, but also within the electorate. The politi-
cian’s task is to set a state-dependent policy, and he is motivated both
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by making good policy and holding office. When the electorate uses
a simple instrumental retrospective voting strategy, the condition to
pander to the public opinion depends on the accuracy of the players’
information. The more accurate the incumbent’s private information
is, the higher is the utility of policy success, and the higher the of-
fice benefits have to be for him to deviate from what he thinks is the
optimal policy. Furthermore, the results show how the existence of
educated and informed voters is enough to reduce the incumbent’s in-
centives to pander to the opinion of a non-educated majority, even if
their share is not high enough to ensure the incumbent’s re-election.
Finally, I show how some of the pandering equilibria of the baseline
model can be avoided by enriching the voter behaviour with sophisti-
cated instrumental voting and expressive voting.
Essay 2: Minor party’s political power and policy outcomes -
application to green parties and environmental policies
The second essay studies the role of a minor party in parliamentary
politics by assessing how changes in its programmatic policy posi-
tions affect its political power, and subsequently ideological policy
outcomes. First, I show the importance of agenda-setting in a two-
dimensional policy framework, where policy outcomes are determined
at the post-election stage. The results show that while minor parties
find it difficult to compete against major parties at agenda-setting on
the frontline dimension of overall political ideology, the inclusion of
the secondary dimension helps them gain political power. Thus the
secondary dimension that defines the minor party, such as environ-
mental policy dimension for a green party, is of importance regard-
ing their role in coalition politics. Then, I calculate parties’ political
power based on their left-right positions to empirically test the rela-
tionship between green parties’ programmatic positions and environ-
mental policy outcomes with data from 9 European countries in 1990
to 2010.
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Essay 3: Delegation of long-term public policy: elected vs. ap-
pointed policy makers
The third essay analyses long-term decision making with two alter-
native policy-making regimes. Decision making is allocated either to
an elected politician or to an appointed bureaucrat. The incumbent’s
task is to finance a long-term public good, and the policy choice in
each period is to set the income tax rate. There are high and low com-
petence policy makers. An incumbent of high talent can set a lower
tax rate, but he also has incentives to engage in excessive rent-seeking.
The politician and the bureaucrat are distinguished by having differ-
ent incentives to perform well. The aim is to look at how the different
accountability mechanisms affect policy choices, and the utility of the
citizens. The results show that having different incentives do play a
role, when it comes to finding such conditions that the incumbent can
be induced to set a lower tax rate that benefits the citizens. While a
highly competitive private sector can motivate a bureaucrat to set a
low tax rate, a problem emerges if the bureucrat proves to be of low
competence, since the citizens have no means to get rid of him. Thus,
while it may be difficult to motivate a politician to set a very low tax
rate, the direct disciplining mechanism of public elections is important
when there is uncertainty of the incumbent’s competence.
Discussion of the essays
The three essays in this dissertation all present a model of economic
policy-making in representative democracy. They all look at the politician-
voter relationship from different perspectives. A common theme is the
ability of the electorate to hold policy makers accountable, which is
related to their ability to understand policy processes.
The first essay analyses the voter-politician relationship from the
perspective of voter information and voting motivations. It focuses on
the election stage, and considers politician’s incentives to make good
policy, or to pander to the electorate’s opinion under asymmetric in-
formation. Since the idea of majority voting is an important analytical
tool in the literature of political economy tracing all the way back to the
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famous ideas by Condorcet, see for instance Austen-Smith and Banks
(1996) and Piketty (1999), and is also a widely used in reality, it is im-
portant to consider the identity of the decisive majority, their ability
to understand the relationship between policy alternatives and policy
outcomes, as well as their voting motivations. The first essay thus fo-
cuses on analysing the role of information and voter sophistication on
incumbent behaviour and final policy outcomes.
The second essay, in turn, takes the election stage as exogenous,
and focuses on the post-electoral stage when parties negotiate on the
coalition formation. The basic model of Downsian competition sug-
gests that party leaders are immediately ready to respond to changes
in the electorate’s preferences, or more specifically, in the median
voter’s preferences, to gain electoral support (Downs, 1957a). In con-
trast to Downsian electoral competition, an underlying assumption in
this essay is that the party leaders acknowledge the electorate’s inabil-
ity to fully understand pre-election politics, and the strategic play is
shifted from the politician-voter play to the strategic game between po-
litical parties. Instead of party leaders responding to changes in voter
preferences, shifts in parties’ programmatic positions are regarded as
strategic moves by party leaders in their expectation of the winner of
the election in a hope to become members of the governing coalition.
This essay considers especially the role of a minor party, and its ability
to affect policy outcomes.
Finally, the third essay looks a the the politician-voter relationship
from a slightly different perspective by considering whether the alloca-
tion of some long-term policies should be shifted away from politically
elected policy makers. The idea is to look at the incumbent perfor-
mance at the public office, when there are two types of available policy
making regimes that are distinguished by having difference incentives
to perform well. The role for the decision maker is very simplified;
there are no ideological bias or pre-electoral promises he needs to ful-
fil. Instead, the only question is in setting the rules of the game such
that taking full advantage of the authority over the public finances is
restricted. This essay then analyses the importance of the electorate to
retain well-performing incumbents, and the implications on the voter
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utility of the alternative policy-making regimes.
The idea of the median voter, or the existence of the representative
voter in holding the incumbent accountable is dropped in the first two
essays, while the median voter is present in the third essay. Essays 1
and 3 look directly at the politician-voter relationship, with the elec-
torate employing a retrospective voting strategy. For instance, Persson
and Tabellini (2000) find retrospective voting strategy to feature more
realism since electoral promises are not enforceable. Even though in
reality voters might not use a purely retrospective voting strategy, it is
useful in the sense that voters look at information of past behaviour to
make predictions about candidate’s future behaviour as noted in Ash-
wort (2012) and Besley (2006). Especially the results of essay 3 suggest
the importance of public elections as a provider of incentives, and as
a mechanism of getting rid of bad-performing incumbents. Essay 1,
in turn enriches the basic retrospective voting with voters possessing
both instrumental and expressive voting motivations.
The essays are also related to research on candidate objectives. In
the first essay, the policy maker is motivated both by good policy and
staying in office. The incumbent is thus balancing between his desire
to make good policy, and staying in office. The motivations for politi-
cal parties are similar in essay 2. The parties, and thus their members,
derive utility of the two policy dimensions, and of being in power.
Their problem is reduced to the comparison of gaining direct political
power but having to make ideological compromises against the utility
of staying in the opposition and keeping to their ideological values.
Finally, in essay 3, the policy makers derive utility only of staying in
power, i.e. they are maximising the expected utility of extracting rents
by taking into account their accountability mechanisms. All the es-
says relate to the importance of compensation of holding public office.
While in all the papers the office benefits are for simplicity assumed to
comprise of ’rents’ of office, it is important to recognise that in reality
the compensation of holding office takes many forms; in addition to
monetary rewards, the incumbents derive utility of policy success, or
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Abstract
This paper presents a model of political accountability with a
heterogenous electorate. There is asymmetric information be-
tween the politician and the electorate, but also within the elec-
torate. The politician’s task is to set a state-dependent policy,
and he is motivated both by making good policy and holding
office. When the electorate uses a simple instrumental retrospec-
tive voting strategy, the condition to pander to the public opinion
depends on the accuracy of the players’ information. The more
accurate the incumbent’s private information is, the higher is the
utility of policy success, and the higher the office benefits have to
be for him to deviate from what he thinks is the optimal policy.
Furthermore, the results show how the existence of educated and
informed voters is enough to reduce the incumbent’s incentives
to pander to the opinion of a non-educated majority, even if their
share is not high enough to ensure the incumbent’s re-election.
Finally, I show how some of the pandering equilibria of the base-
line model can be avoided by enriching the voter behaviour with
sophisticated instrumental voting and expressive voting.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper studies electoral accountability and electoral outcomes in a
framework where the incumbent politician has to make a policy choice
that affects directly citizens’ economic welfare, but also features an
ideologically sensitive aspect. The framework is a political economy
agency model featuring asymmetric information not only between the
politician and the voters, but also within the electorate, thus adding
voter heterogeneity into the common accountability problem. The aim
is to analyse the role of information and different voting motivations
on electoral outcomes.
In this framework, the condition for the incumbent to pander to
the majority’s opinion boils down to the amount of office benefits, the
exact level of which depends on the difference between the expected
utility for the incumbent of following his private information, and the
utility of pandering to the electorate. The utility for the incumbent
of following his private information depends on the strength of the
player’s beliefs, so that the stronger is the incumbent’s own belief of
the optimal policy, the higher the office benefits have to be for him to
discard his private information, whereas the stronger is the electorate’s
belief, the incumbent panders for lower office benefits.
The previous literature has looked at the asymmetric information
problem from the perspective of adverse selection, either in the form
of uncertainty of the politician’s competence as in Prat (2005), Canes-
Wrone et al. (2001) and Fox and van Weelden (2012), or his ideological
congruence with the electorate, as in Fox (2007) and Warren (2012), or
from the perspective of moral hazard, i.e. whether the incumbent is
corrupt or not, as in Frisell (2009) and Jennings (2011). With electoral
incentives, popular but inefficient policies are chosen as the incum-
bent attempts to act like a competent or non-corrupt policy maker is
expected to act to ensure re-election. This kind of behaviour is what
Morelli and van Weelden (2013) define as pandering; the policy maker
is induced to ignore policy-relevant information, and takes an action
that is ex ante preferred by the majority of voters to increase his re-
election prospects.
In contrast to previous literature, this paper shows how the exis-
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tence of pandering equilibria or populist policy outcomes do not have
to hinge on the assumption of incumbent quality. Here the incumbent
panders to the voter opinion simply because the electorate’s voting
decision is based on their insufficient ability or ignorance to properly
assess the underlying state of the economy, when the voters fail to
understand that in fact they all have the same policy preferences.
The key here is that none of the players have a perfect understand-
ing of the optimality of policy alternatives. The policy maker, how-
ever, has policy expertise the electorate lacks, which arises for exam-
ple through the existence of political advisers. He has a better under-
standing of the underlying state of the economy than the electorate,
which translates into his ability to make more informed policy deci-
sions. When analysing electoral accountability, the assumption of a
policy maker possessing policy expertise is obviously of relevance. If
the voters had better knowledge than the incumbent then pandering
to voters would improve social welfare, and the whole game would
become uninteresting, as noted by Frisell (2009).
In this framework, the incumbent disregards his own private in-
formation if he knows the electorate’s beliefs do not match his beliefs,
and if he values office holding more than making optimal policy. The
electorate, on the other hand, has incentives to replace the incumbent
if they know that the incumbent cannot perfectly evaluate the state of
the economy due to his incomplete information, but they do not know
how incomplete it is; i.e. the voters cannot observe the accuracy of
the incumbent’s private information. Furthermore, the electorate does
not know how much the incumbent values the utility of office-holding
against the utility of making optimal policy. Thus, there is a classic
coordination problem in government policy, even if everyone would
agree on the optimal policy under full information.
Second, the previous literature on this type of agency problems
has assumed the existence of a representative voter,2 while this paper
introduces an electorate where all voters are not equally able to assess
the optimality of the chosen policy. There is voter heterogeneity, in
that the electorate consists of educated and non-educated citizens with
2Ashwort (2012) reviews the literature of electoral accountability.
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the former having more accurate information than the latter. As is
known in the literature on voting, collective decision is better than any
individual decision.3 How good the collective decision is, depends on
how informed the individuals are.
In addition to informational asymmetries within the electorate, some
voters may have biased beliefs about optimal policy. Voting can thus
feature both instrumental and expressive motivations. An instrumen-
tal voting motive is based on what the voter believes is economically
best for him, whereas with expressive voting, e.g. Jennings (2011),
Hillman (2010), voter votes according to some ideology even if this
conflicts with his material welfare. To get benchmark results of in-
cumbent behaviour, I first present the electoral outcomes when the
electorate uses a simple instrumental retrospective voting rule, and
then I enrich the framework to include sophisticated and expressive
voters. The idea is to analyse the role of the educated and informed
voters, as well as expressive voting motivations in re-electing or re-
placing the incumbent.
Immigration policy is an example of a policy choice that can fea-
ture both voting motivations, and the principal-agent problem in this
paper is centred around a choice of optimal immigration policy under
uncertainty of the true underlying state of the economy. The idea is
that to be able to make optimal choice regarding immigration policy,
one needs to make a correct assessment of the underlying state of the
economy. Consider the following cases. In a growing economy, im-
migration can be seen as having a positive impact on the economy,
for instance as a response to sector-specific unemployment, or as a
positive contribution to the state treasury. On the other hand, if the
economy is doing bad, increasing immigration may result in worsen-
ing economic conditions, by burdening public finances or increasing
unemployment.
Optimal immigration policy is thus dependent on the underlying
state of the economy, but it may also be an ideologically sensitive issue
for some voters weighing into their voting behaviour. The voters may
oppose immigration due to ideological reasons, for instance a fear that
3Known as the Condorcet jury theorem.
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increasing immigration leads into immigrants stealing jobs from the
natives resulting in higher unemployment among the natives.4 Elec-
toral incentives may induce the incumbent government then to tighten
immigration policies, if the public sentiment is against immigration,
and opposing immigration seems like an effective campaign strategy.
For instance, before the 2011 parliamentary elections in Finland, the in-
cumbent prime minister Kiviniemi accused opposition parties of ’flirt-
ing with racism’ as a way of gaining electoral support.
While the previous literature on electoral incentives has largely fo-
cused on explaining populist equilibria through the incumbent’s desire
to look competent, ideologically congruent or non-corrupt in the eyes
of the electorate, this paper focuses on showing the role of information
asymmetries concerning optimality of policy alternatives in inducing
the incumbent to choose popular policies over the optimal one. The
results show that the stronger is the incumbent’s own belief on the op-
timal policy and the stronger is the support for the incumbent through
the electorate’s beliefs, the less inclined the incumbent is to choose a
populist policy. Moreover, the role of the educated voters in affecting
the incumbent’s incentives to pander is shown.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents previous liter-
ature, section 3 presents the theoretical framework with the players
and their information and strategies. Section 4 presents the electoral
outcomes and section 5 concludes.
2 PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Politician-voter relationship is often represented as a principal-agent
problem, with asymmetric information between the electorate and the
incumbent policy maker with the latter possessing more accurate in-
formation called policy expertise. The electorate, on the other hand,
votes oblivious to either the competence of the policy maker, the ef-
fort his exerting at office, or purely unable to assess the consequences
of the policy actions. Asymmetric information is central in all expert-
4According to Jean and Jimenez (2011) this a common belief held especially by
Europeans. Empirical evidence on immigration having an adverse impact on domes-
tic labour markets, however, is weak.
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principal problems, as shown for instance by Prat (2005), and Fox and
van Weelden (2012).
First, it is important to distinguish between different types of avail-
able information for the principal: i) information on the agent’s action,
and ii) information on the consequences of the agent’s action. Prat (2005)
shows that when the principal cannot observe the state of the world,
and there is uncertainty of the expert’s competence, transparency of
action can be detrimental in some cases. If the principal observes the
action, the agent may have incentives to disregard some useful pri-
vate signals, and act instead as a competent expert is a priori expected
to behave. Principal’s welfare may be reduced and the agent’s true
competence becomes impossible to detect. In Prat (2005) information
of consequence is always beneficial, whereas Fox and van Weelden
(2012) consider cases when this type of information may decrease the
principal’s welfare. When the optimal policy depends on the under-
lying state of the world, there is a strong prior on some of the states,
and some mistakes are more costly than others, then transparency of
the consequence induces a low type agent to disregard his signal and
act according to the prior belief which reduces the principal’s wel-
fare. This result is sensitive to the assumption of asymmetric costs,
whereas when mistakes cost the same, transparency always increases
the principal’s welfare.5 In this paper, there is full transparency of
action, however the consequences are not yet known when the voters
make their voting decision. Furthermore, the accuracy of information
the players possess is interpreted to reflect their understanding of the
probable consequences of each policy alternative.
In both Prat (2005), and Fox and van Weelden (2012), the expert is
the only active player, who wishes to appear competent to the princi-
pal. The politician-voter relationship, where the principal is also an ac-
tive player has been analysed by Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), Fox (2007),
and Frisell (2009). In these papers information is crucial in determin-
ing the electorate’s ability to hold policy makers accountable for their
5An example of asymmetric costs of making mistakes is the belief on Iraq pos-
sessing weapons of mass destruction, and whether to invade in Iraq or not. The costs
are different if after invading it turns out they did not possess WMD vs. after of not
invading finding out they did possess WMD.
52
policy actions. In Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) the policy maker has better
knowledge about the consequences of different policies. If he knows
that a popular policy is not optimal, he can either practise true leader-
ship by following his private information, or he can pander to public
opinion and disregard this information. Fox (2007) shows that when
there is uncertainty on whether the incumbent is biased or not, an in-
cumbent with re-election wishes who would choose the voter welfare
maximising policy behind closed doors, fails to do so if policy mak-
ing is made public. Therefore, with systemically biased voters’ beliefs,
more transparent policy process can negatively affect voter welfare.
Frisell (2009) provides an explanation for populism as a self-fulfilling
prophesy, in a framework with corrupt and normal politicians. When
voter expectations and politician’s incentives are mutually reinforcing,
populism improves re-election chances by signalling that the incum-
bent does not serve special interests, but is responsive to voter inter-
ests.
The baseline agency problem has been enriched by Warren (2012),
and Ashwort and Shotts (2010), who show how the presence of a third
party (media) can mitigate the problems related to asymmetric infor-
mation. In Ashwort and Shotts (2010) when pandering to voter opin-
ion arises due to an asymmetric burden of proof for the incumbent -
voters re-elect the incumbent who chooses the popular action, unless
proven wrong, but the incumbent who chooses the unpopular action,
will be re-elected only if proven right - the presence of a newspaper
can affect pandering incentives by revealing information on the under-
lying state of the economy, or on the policy choice by the incumbent.
In Warren (2012), voters try to discriminate between politicians with
congruent and non-congruent interests, and media may or may not
reveal what information the politician actually had at the time a policy
choice was made, and it can aid the voters to maintain political control
over the politicians.
Similarly to the previous literature, this paper analyses the incum-
bent’s responsiveness to electoral incentives under asymmetric infor-
mation. Whereas in the previous literature inefficiencies and populist
equilibria hinge on the assumption of incompetent, ideologically in-
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congruent or corrupt politicians, this paper shows that electoral game
can result in populist equilibria for the simple reasons of voters’ igno-
rance, or their inability to assess the underlying state of the economy.
The main shortcoming of the previous literature is in the assumption
of a representative voter, who given his (incomplete) information of
the state of the economy and the incumbent action, is able to infer
the incumbent’s competence or ideological congruence, and reward or
punish him at the election day. What is missing in the literature on
electoral accountability, is that in reality, voters’ ability to assess op-
timality of different policy alternatives is less than perfect, and they
may possess biased beliefs about policies.
First, the ability to assess optimality of policies is not equal among
the electorate. It is more realistic to assume asymmetric information
not only in the politician-voter relationship, but also within the elec-
torate. Not all citizens are equally capable or interested in assessing
the optimality of alternative policies. For instance Aidt (2000) dis-
cusses how the voter knowledge not only on economic facts but also on
economic systems is poor on average. Bendor et al. (2011), in turn, dis-
cuss the poor voter knowledge of politics and ideologies. In addition
to citizens who do not understand economics or politics, many choose
to abstain; information is the key in formal models of voter turnout,
such as Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), and McMurray (2013), and
also has empirical support in e.g. Banerjee et al. (2010), and Lassen
(2005) that educated and informed citizens vote more likely than non-
educated citizens.
Second, majority of previous work assumes voters to possess un-
biased beliefs about the public policy. In reality rational voters’ be-
liefs may be biased concerning the optimality of public policy; voting
may feature expressive motivations. The idea that casting one’s vote
has both instrumental and expressive motivations, goes back to Riker
and Ordershook (1968) and Fiorina (1976). Expressive voting has been
further defined and discussed e.g. in Schuessler (2000) and Hillman
(2010). The former argues that voting is used to express political pref-
erences and beliefs, and to reaffirm one’s political identity. The latter
discusses expressive behaviour in a more general setting, by defining
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it as a self-interested quest for utility through actions and declarations
confirming one’s identity. Hillman further surveys different expressive
aspects of behaviour.
In Jennings (2011), expressive voters are fully informed voters who
vote expressively even if it leads to outcomes that are against their in-
strumental interests. In a market context people choose instrumentally
because the costs of choosing expressively are too high, whereas in
mass elections, due to the very low probability of casting the decisive
vote, people vote according to their expressive interests even if they are
in conflict with instrumental interests. Both theoretical and empirical
evidence on voting against one’s material interest is in Roemer et al.
(2007), who show how it takes place especially in multidimensional
policy issues.6
Closest to this paper in its formulation of the politician-voter re-
lationship is Jennings (2011). By relaxing the assumption of a fully
informed and instrumentally rational electorate, he provides an ex-
planation for populism and electoral inefficiency as a result of some
voters possessing emotional attachments towards some policies, and
acting against their instrumental well-being knowing the negligible
impact of an individual vote in mass elections. He further shows how
the government can provide credible information on the optimality of
policy alternatives. However, in Jennings (2011), the optimal policy is
not state-dependent, and therefore it is not clear where the optimality
of policy alternatives comes from. Also, in his framework, the edu-
cated voters perfectly understand the link between the optimal policy
and their own welfare, whereas this paper more realistically assumes
none of the players to possess complete information.
The existence of a representative voter who is both able and will-
ing to analyse the incumbent behaviour and to make inferences of his
competence has dominated the literature of electoral accountability.
However, taking into account all the before-mentioned aspects of voter
6For instance, in the U.S people who would benefit from redistribution and thus
would vote for the Democrats, end up voting for the Republicans because the lat-
ter’s views on immigration are closer to their own. Moreover, even though the actual
share of immigrants is relatively low, e.g. around 7 per cent in Denmark, their pres-
ence can cause very strong reactions in the natives thus resulting in voting behaviour
that may contradict purely material interests.
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behaviour makes the concept of a representative voter insufficient to
capture the preferences of the electorate as a whole.
This paper has somewhat less faith in the electorate’s ability to
truly understand the policy mechanisms than majority of the previous
literature, and explains why populist equilibria take place so easily. It
is important to analyse the electoral outcomes when there are differ-
ent types of voters with different levels of ability to understand the
political game, and this is the research gap this paper is trying to fill.
3 FRAMEWORK
3.1 Basic set-up
The framework features a two-period t = 1,2, principal-agent problem
where the incumbent politician represents the agent, and the electorate
represents the principal. The size of the electorate is normalised to 1.
The electorate has allocated policy making power to the politician,
whose task is to set a state-dependent policy in period 1 that affects
players’ utilities in both periods.
In period 1, the economy can be in one of two possible exogenously
given states; s1 ∈ {0,1}, where s1 = 1 is ’good times’, and s1 = 0 is ’bad
times’. There are two policy choices x1 ∈ {12 ,1}. The policy choice
has an instrumental aspect by correlating with the underlying state
of the economy thus directly affecting voter welfare. Moreover, the
policy choice is interpreted to be an ideologically sensitive issue such
as immigration policy, thus bringing an expressive aspect to voting.
Policy choice x1 = 12 is interpreted as a moderate immigration policy,
and x1 = 1 as increasing immigration. The first period utility function
for the electorate reads as
v1(s1, x1) = x1s1 + (1− x1)(1− s1) (1)
It is easy to see how policy choices are correlated with the underlying
state of the economy; in good times, the optimal policy choice is x1 = 1,
and in bad times optimal policy is x1 = 12 . All the policy-state outcomes
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(4)
v1(0,1) = 1 · 0 + (1− 1)(1− 0) = 0 (5)
As it is clear, the moderate policy choice x1 = 12 produces a fairly good
economic outcome independent of the underlying state of the econ-
omy, whereas the policy choice x1 = 1 is more risky. While in good
times the latter policy results in a good performance of the economy,
choosing this policy in recession results in bad economic performance.
Assuming that each citizen has the same level of utility depending on
the chosen immigration policy is of course a simplification; in real-
ity different policies affect individuals in a different way. However,
if the immigration policy is regarded as a broader policy aiming for
instance at achieving economic stability, increasing employment, or
affecting public finances, it should hold a unanimous appeal within
the electorate; a similar argument is made in McMurray (2013).
The first period policy has a long-term impact; if the correct state-
matching policy is chosen in the first period, the next period state of
economy is good, s2 = 1, whereas the incorrect policy results in bad
state of economy, s2 = 0. The second period utility is directly given by
the second period state, v2(s2) = s2 so that v2(1) = 1 and v2(0) = 0.
A similar kind of set-up with a binary state and a binary policy
choice is common in the literature; e.g. in Canes-Wrone et al. (2001),
Prat (2005), Fox (2007), Frisell (2009), Ashwort and Shotts (2010), and
Fox and van Weelden (2012). Despite the similarity in the formula-
tion of the policy problem to previous literature analysing asymmetric
information in principal-agent relationship, there are four main differ-
ences, however, in comparison to previous work.
First, this paper assumes an asymmetric consequence of state-dependent
policy action. For instance, in Prat (2005) or Canes-Wrone et al. (2001)
succeeding/failing in either state has a symmetric benefit/cost. In Fox
and van Weelden (2012) the asymmetric cost is related only to making
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a mistake, whereas in this paper, there is asymmetry of both actions in
either state. In Jennings (2011), the policy choice is continuous, how-
ever, in his model it is not dependent on the state of the economy, and
thus it is not clear why one policy choice would be preferred over an-
other, whereas in this paper the optimality of each alternative depends
on the underlying economic conditions.
Secondly, in this framework none of the players possess complete
information; the key factor driving pandering outcomes in the model
is the incompleteness and asymmetry of information between players.
For instance, Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) and Ashwort and Shotts (2010)
assume the existence of ’perfect’ politicians who always observe a per-
fect signal of the state of the world. Thirdly, there is no uncertainty of
the incumbent competence, unlike in Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), Prat
(2005), Fox and van Weelden (2012) who all assume the pool of politi-
cians to comprise of high quality and low quality candidates. Finally,
this paper assumes a heterogeneous electorate, which has been absent
in the previous electoral accountability models. The features of the
electorate will be described in the following subsection.
3.2 Electorate
Share a of the electorate is educated, and share b is non-educated, so
that the size of the electorate is E = a + b = 1 with a < b. The dis-
tinguishing factor between these two subgroups is in the information
they possess regarding the state of the economy; the educated voters
are assumed to have more accurate information than the non-educated
voters about the underlying economic conditions. The information is
described in more detail in section 3.5.
Furthermore, share α of the former and share β of the latter show
up a the election day, whereas the rest abstain so the part of the elec-
torate who votes is expressed as Ev = αa + βb. All a, b, α and β are
exogenously given, with α > β so that the share of citizens who vote is
higher in the group of educated voters, whereas the share of absentees
is higher among non-educated citizens. This assumption is in line with
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), and McMurray (2013), who show
that information is one of the main determinants of voter turnout.
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3.3 Politician
The incumbent politician is motivated by doing good policy, i.e. match-
ing policy to the underlying state, but also of holding office according
to the utility function for the politician
u1(s1, x1;ρ) = v1(s1, x1) + ρ (6)
where ρ is a payoff of being in the office. The incumbent gets the same
utility as an ordinary citizen depending on the state of the economy,
and the policy choice, as well as a payoff of ρ of being in the office. It
is important that the incumbent’s payoff depends both on the policy
outcomes, and on office benefits to see how his behaviour is driven
by electoral incentives. For instance, in Fox and van Weelden (2012)
politician’s payoff does not depend on the chosen policy, which makes
it unclear how the politician’s incentives to perform well and enjoy
office benefits are related.
As will be discussed shortly, the incumbent is making the first pe-
riod policy decision based on his own private incomplete information
about the first period state of the economy with the true policy conse-
quences not unfolding until the next period. If the incumbent politi-
cian is re-elected, he will enjoy office holding benefits ρ in the second
period as well. If he is not re-elected his second period utility is that
of the common citizen. The politician discounts the next period by a
factor δ. Since the first period policy choice x1 determines the utility
in both periods, and forms the basis for the citizens’ voting decision,
the objective function for the politician can be written as
max
x1
v1(s1, x1) + ρ + δ(v2(s2) + Pρ) (7)
Since policy-making takes place only in the first period, with noth-
ing active taking place in the second period, voting is used purely to
either reward or punish the incumbent. If he is replaced at the end of
the first period, a new incumbent will be elected into office. The role
of the challenger is not specified in more detail. It is important to note
that the electorate is indifferent between the identity of the incumbent
vs. a prospective challenger; if they do not agree with the incumbent’s
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policy choice, he will be voted out of office.
Thus, while the model refers to a politician as a single decision-
maker, a more realistic interpretation for the incumbent in this paper
is to take him to represent the incumbent administration at a broader
level. As s real-life example think of 2008 presidential elections in
the U.S. People were dissatisfied with the second Bush/Republican
administration and replaced him with the Obama/Democrat admin-
istration. Obama inherited the legacy of the previous administration,
and could not immediately change the course of the policy-making.
Similarly, in this model the new incumbent inherits the economy from
his predecessor if the electorate is not satisfied at the performance of
the first period incumbent.
3.4 Timing
Period 1:
1. s1 ∈ {0,1} is exogenously given with a common prior belief Prob(s1 =
1) = π and Prob(s1 = 0) = 1− π.
2. A public signal σp ∈ {0,1} is received by the educated electorate
and the incumbent politician with accuracy of Prob(σp = 1 | s1 =
1) = Prob(σp = 0 | s1 = 0) = q > 12 .
3. A private signal σi ∈ {0,1} is received by the incumbent politician
with accuracy of Prob(σi = 1 | s1 = 1) = Prob(σi = 0 | s1 = 0) =
p > 12 .
4. Educated voters update their information according to the public
signal, the incumbent updates twice according to the public and
private signals.
5. The incumbent politician makes the policy choice x1.
6. Electorate observes x1, and makes a voting decision P; re-elects
the incumbent or elects a challenger.
7. First period state is revealed and the related utilities are realised.
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Period 2: Based on x1 and realisation of s1, the second period state of
the economy s2, and the related utilities for both the electorate and the
politician are realised.
Because of this timing, the voters are making the election decision
based on observing the policy choice - before the outcome of the policy
choice is realised. In a sense, the voting rule is retrospective since it
is based on the incumbent’s policy action, however, it is done under
uncertainty of how the incumbent in fact performed. See discussion
on Key’s (1966) ideas about retrospective voting in Bendor et al. (2011,
p. 109-111); voters’ electoral response to the incumbent behaviour is
based on how the voters see their own welfare has been affected by
the current administration.
3.5 Information
The common prior states that with probability π the first period econ-
omy is in the good state, s1 = 1, and with probability 1 − π it is in
the bad state, s1 = 0. There are two independent signals, one public
received by the educated voters and the politician, and one private re-
ceived only by the politician. The public signal σp ∈ {0,1} corresponds
to the true state of the world with Prob(σp = s1) = q > 12 . The educated
electorate and the incumbent politician update their beliefs according
to the Bayes rule, giving them posterior beliefs denoted by πp(s1 | σp).
After receiving a signal σp = 1, the posterior belief that the economy
is in the good state is
Prob(s1 = 1 | σp = 1) =
qπ
qπ + (1− q)(1− π) = π
p(1 | 1)
and with complementary probability the economy is in the bad state
πp(0 | 1) = 1− πp(1 | 1). After receiving a signal σp = 0 the posterior
belief that the economy is in the bad state is
Prob(s1 = 0 | σp = 0) =
q(1− π)
q(1− π) + (1− q)π = π
p(0 | 0)
and the complementary probability that the economy is in the good
state is πp(1 | 0) = 1− πp(0 | 0).
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Since the incumbent politician observes the public signal, he knows
what the educated electorate knows. He further updates his private
information according to a private signal σi ∈ {0,1}, which is correct
with Prob(σi = s1) = p > 12 . His posterior belief of the state given the
two independent signals is denoted by πi(s1 | σi,σp). First, if the in-
cumbent’s private signal coincides with that of the public signal stating
σi = σp = 1, the posterior beliefs for states s1 = 1 and s1 = 0 are
Prob(s1 = 1 | σi = 1,σp = 1) =
pπp(1 | 1)
pπp(1 | 1) + (1− p)(1− πp(1 | 1))
=
pqπ
p(q + π − 1) + (1− q)(1− π) = π
i(1 | 1,1)
and πi(0 | 1,1) = 1− πi(1 | 1,1) respectively. Similarly the posterior
beliefs after receiving signals σi = σp = 0 are
Prob(s1 = 0 | σi = 0,σp = 0) =
pπp(0 | 0)
pπp(0 | 0) + (1− p)(1− πp(0 | 0))
=
pq(1− π)
p(q− π) + (1− q)π = π
i(0 | 0,0)
and πi(1 | 0,0) = 1− πi(0 | 0,0).
The second possible case is when the private and the public signals
do not coincide. After receiving a signal σi = 1 when the public signal
states σp = 0, the posterior beliefs held by the incumbent for states
s1 = 1 and s1 = 0 are
Prob(s1 = 1 | σi = 1,σp = 0) =
p(1− πp(0 | 0))
p(1− πp(0 | 0)) + (1− p)πp(0 | 0)
=
p(1− q)π
p(π − q) + q(1− π) = π
i(1 | 1,0)
and πi(0 | 1,0) = 1−πi(1 | 1,0) respectively. The posterior beliefs after
receiving a signal σi = 0 while the public signal states σp = 1 are
Prob(s1 = 0 | σi = 0,σp = 1) =
p(1− πp(1 | 1))
p(1− πp(1 | 1)) + (1− p)πp(1 | 1)
=
p(1− q)(1− π)
p(1− q− π) + qπ = π
i(0 | 0,1)
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and πi(1 | 0,1) = 1− πi(0 | 0,1).
To sum up the information the players possess; the non-educated
citizens’ information is restricted to the prior belief on the state of the
economy π, the educated electorate updates their prior beliefs once,
according to which their posterior beliefs are πp(s1 | σp), and the in-
cumbent politician who updates the prior twice giving him the poste-
rior belief of πi(s1 | σi,σp).
In contrast to previous work, this paper assumes that while all the
players have some information, none of them has complete informa-
tion. For instance, in Prat (2005), or Fox and van Weelden (2012) the
principal does not know the state of the world, but is trying to in-
fer the expert’s competence based on his actions. In Jennings (2011),
on the other hand, well-informed voters fully understand the connec-
tion between a policy and its outcome, and hence understand which
would be the optimal policy. Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), or Ashwort
and Shotts (2010), in turn, assume high quality experts to always ob-
serve a perfect signal, whereas here also the incumben’t information is
less than complete. I believe this information structure features more
realism.
3.6 Strategy for the electorate
The electorate has different abilities to assess the optimality of avail-
able policy choices. Better knowledge on the first period state of the
economy can be interpreted as the electorate understanding the justi-
fications for the incumbent’s policy choice. If they do not understand
the current state of the economy, they cannot make correct inferences
about the optimality of the policy alternatives. The information for
the non-educated voters is given by the common prior π, whereas the
educated voters receive the public signal σp according to which their
posterior beliefs are πp(s1 | σp).
First, consider the simple instrumental election rule, when the elec-
torate re-elects the incumbent politician if his policy choice x1 matches
with the electorate’s beliefs on what is optimal, otherwise they vote
for the challenger. More formally, the re-election rule for the the non-
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educated electorate is based on the prior belief
Pβ =
{
1 if x1 = 1 | π ≥ 12 or x1 =
1








1 if x1 = 1 | πp(1 | σp) ≥ 12 or x1 =
1




If the beliefs of the educated and the non-educated voters are in con-
flict, they vote differently. To be re-elected, the incumbent needs at
least half of the votes. This simple re-election rule is used in section
4.1.
Section 4.2 presents electoral outcomes when a share of the ed-
ucated electorate uses a more sophisticated voting strategy; they up-
date their beliefs based on the public signal and on the observed policy
choice x1. Let us denote the beliefs of the educated and sophisticated
voters as πps = (1 | σp, x1). The voting rule is otherwise similar to Pα.
The non-educated are assumed to vote as in the baseline section.
It is important to note that since the electorate is indifferent be-
tween the current incumbent and a potential challenger, they will in-
deed replace the incumbent if they disagree with the incumbent’s pol-
icy choice in period one.
3.7 Strategy for the incumbent politician
The incumbent politician benefits from making good policy and hold-
ing office according to his utility function (6); he is balancing between
his desire to make good policy under asymmetric information on the
true state of the economy and ensure re-election, which holds espe-
cially when there is conflicting information between the politician and
the electorate on the optimal policy choice. If he is not re-elected, his
second period utility is that of the common citizen. Before proceeding
to write down the optimal strategy for the incumbent politician, let us
consider the expected state-policy utilities based on the information
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the incumbent possesses.
The politician updates the common prior belief of the true un-
derlying state of the economy according to the two signals he re-
ceives. Since the posterior belief does not reveal the true state per-
fectly πi(s1 | σi,σp)< 1, the incumbent is making the first period policy
choice under uncertainty.
The expected first period utility depends on the chosen policy ac-
tion given the incumbent’s posterior belief of the state of the economy
expressed as v1(s1 | x1,πi(s1 | σi,σp)), which can be rewritten for the
two policy alternatives as
E(v1(s1 | 1,πi(1 | σi,σp))) = πi(1 | σi,σp)v(1,1) + (1− πi(1 | σi,σp))v(0,1)
= πi(1 | σi,σp) · 1 + (1− πi(1 | σi,σp)) · 0




,πi(0 | σi,σp))) = πi(0 | σi,σp)v(0, 1
2
) + (1− πi(0 | σi,σp))v(1, 1
2
)
= πi(0 | σi,σp) · 1
2






Where (8) represents the expected utility of choosing policy x1 = 1
given his posterior belief on s1 = 1. If the incumbent believes that the
economy is more likely to be in the good state, πi(1 | σi,σp) ≥ 12 then
the expected utility acting according to this belief is greater than half.
However, if the private information for the incumbent states that the
bad state is more likely, πi(1 | σi,σp) < 12 , then choosing policy action
x1 = 1 produces an expected utility less than half for the incumbent.
(9) represents the utility of choosing the moderate policy choice given
his posterior belief that the economy is in the bad state, s1 = 0. As it
can been, independent of the incumbent’s private beliefs, policy choice
x1 = 12 produces an expected utility of exactly half.
The second period expected utility is conditional on the probability
with which the incumbent sets the correct policy in the first period,
since the choice of x1 together with the realisation of s1 determines the
second period state of the economy s2. The second period expected
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outcome can then be expressed as v2(s2 | x1,πi(s1 | σi,σp)).
E(v2(s2 | 1,πi(1 | σi,σp))) = πi(1 | σi,σp)v(1) + (1− πi(1 | σi,σp))v(0)
= πi(1 | σi,σp) · 1 + (1− πi(1 | σi,σp)) · 0




,πi(0 | σi,σp))) = πi(0 | σi,σp)v(1) + (1− πi(0 | σi,σp))v(0)
= πi(0 | σi,σp) · 1 + (1− πi(0 | σi,σp)) · 0
= πi(0 | σi,σp) (11)
Where (10) and (11) represent the expected utilities of setting policies
x1 = 1 and x1 = 12 respectively, given the posterior beliefs of the first
period state s1 = 1 and s1 = 0.
In addition to the utility of making good policy, the incumbent
is guaranteed to get the office-holding benefit ρ in the first period.
The second period utility depends on the discount factor δ, and the
probability of being re-elected P. Knowing how his utility in the two
periods is determined by the policy choice made in the first period,
the objective function for the politician (7) can be rewritten as
max
x1
v1(s1 | x1,πi(·)) + ρ + δ(v2(s2 | x1,πi(·)) + Pρ) (12)
The politician knows the share of the educated electorate, a, and
the non-educated electorate, b, and what they know. Furthermore,
he knows the share of the electorate that votes (αa + βb), and the re-
election rule that the two groups of voters use.
4 ELECTORAL OUTCOMES
In this section, I present how the electoral outcomes of the politician-
electorate game depend on the information the different players pos-
sess, and on the different voting motivations for the electorate. The
role of information is important; under instrumental voting, all voters
would re-elect the incumbent for choosing the correct state-matching
policy if everyone had the perfect ability to assess the underlying state
of the economy and thus understand which of the policy choices is op-
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timal. However, since (parts of) the electorate may be poorly informed
about the true underlying state of the economy, they cannot perfectly
assess the optimality of the incumbent’s policy choice, and therefore
electoral incentives can drive the incumbent to choose a popular but
non-optimal policy.
This section proceeds as follows. First, in section 4.1, as a baseline
case I consider the electoral outcomes under simple instrumental vot-
ing, when the electorate uses the simple re-election rule to re-elect the
incumbent only if his policy choice matches with the electorate’s belief
on what is the optimal policy choice. The idea is the get benchmark re-
sults of the incumbent’s tendency to pander to the electorate’s opinion,
or to follow his private policy-relevant information against what the
electorate believes. In section 4.2, I include more sophisticated voters
who can make further inferences of the optimal policy than the voters
of the simple instrumental voting case. In section 4.3, I add expressive
voting motivations, and in section 4.4, I discuss the results.
4.1 Simple instrumental voting
In this subsection I review electoral outcomes, when the electorate
uses a simple voting strategy by re-electing the incumbent who sets
the policy according to what the electorate thinks is the optimal policy,
and replacing him if they see a deviation from that policy.
4.1.1 Electorate and politician agree
The most straightforward case is when all the players agree on the
optimal policy, i.e. when everyone’s beliefs coincide about the under-
lying state of the economy. Politician knows he will be re-elected with
certainty, P = 1 if he sets the policy according to what the electorate be-
lieves. The only uncertainty is related to the possibility that everyone
holds incorrect information thus leading to a bad state of the economy
in the second period.
First, if everyone believes that the economy is in the good state s1 =
1, i.e. π ≥ 12 , πp(1 | σp) ≥
1
2 , and π
i(1 | σi,σp) ≥ 12 , so that incumbent
will be re-elected P = 1 for setting x1 = 1, and incumbent’s expected
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two-period utility (12) can be written as
πi(1 | σi,σp) + ρ + δ(πi(1 | σi,σp) + ρ) (13)
If the incumbent, on the other hand, sets x1 = 12 resulting in being
replaced, P = 0, (12) can be written as
1
2
+ ρ + δ(1− πi(1 | σi,σp)) (14)
It is easy to see that whenever the electorate and the incumbent agree
on the optimal policy, there is no incentive for the incumbent to deviate
from the policy x1 = 1 by setting x1 = 12 , since when π
i(1 | σi,σp) ≥ 12 ,
πi(1 | σi,σp) + ρ + δ(πi(1 | σi,σp) + ρ) ≥ 1
2
+ ρ + δ(1− πi(1 | σi,σp))
(15)
holds for any ρ ≥ 0.7
It is easy to note that the payoff to the politician is increasing in the
strength of his belief. Consider for instance the following case. When
the the two signals confirm the prior belief on the likelihood of one of
the states, e.g. πi(1 | 1,1), then the more accurate the prior belief and
the public and private signals are, the higher is the payoff of setting the
policy according to what the incumbent thinks is the optimal policy,
whereas if the public signal states in the opposite direction, resulting
in belief πi(1 | 1,0), it is easy to show that πi(1 | 1,1)> πi(1 | 1,0) holds
whenever p ≥ q.
4.1.2 Electorate and politician disagree
The case of more interest is when the information the incumbent politi-
cian possesses contradicts with the information the electorate pos-
sesses. The electorate as a whole can have information that contradicts
the incumbent’s information, or one of the subgroups can have contra-
dicting information, while the other subgroup’s information matches
7Similarly, when the information states that the more likely state is s1 = 0; the
incumbent follows his information πi(0 | σi,σp) ≥ 12 , and sets policy x1 =
1
2 instead
of x1 = 1 since 12 + ρ+ δ(π
i(0 | σi,σp) + ρ)≥ 1−π(0 | σi,σp) + ρ+ δ(1−πi(0 | σi,σp))
holds for any ρ ≥ 0.
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that of the incumbent’s. Then it is the subgroup that forms a ma-
jority that matters. Let us start with the case when the information
the electorate as a whole possesses differs from that of the incumbent
politician.
Let us consider the case when the electorate believes s1 = 0 is more
likely, i.e. π < 12 and π
p(1 | σp) < 12 , whereas the incumbent’s private
information states that s1 = 1 is more likely, πi(1 | σi,σp) ≥ 12 . The
incumbent politician knows the electorate’s beliefs of the underlying
state of the economy, and thus knows that setting a policy according
to the public opinion, x1 = 12 will secure his re-election P = 1, and (12)
can be written as
1
2
+ ρ + δ(1− πi(1 | σi,σp) + ρ) (16)
Acting according to his private information but against the public
opinion, on the other hand, will result in being replaced, P = 0, so
that (12) can be written as
πi(1 | σi,σp) + ρ + δπi(1 | σi,σp) (17)
The condition for the incumbent politician to pander to the public
opinion by choosing the popular policy and securing his re-election
while disregarding his private information is then given by
1
2
+ ρ+ δ(1−πi(1 | σi,σp)+ ρ)≥πi(1 | σi,σp)+ ρ+ δπi(1 | σi,σp) (18)
Solving the minimum level for the office-holding benefit ρ such that
the incumbent finds it beneficial to disregard his private opinion and
pander to the electorate’s opinion from (18) gives
ρ ≥ 1 + 2δ
δ
(πi(1 | σi,σp)− 1
2
) (19)
The condition to pander, given as the minimum amount of office ben-
efits, depends on the difference between the expected utility of policy
x1 = 1, and the utility of policy x1 = 12 , as given within the brackets
in (19). Since the former is given by the incumbent’s posterior belief
πi(s1 | σi,σp), which comprises of the prior belief, the public and the
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private signals, let us look more closely how the politician’s incentives
to pander to the public opinion depend on the accuracy of each of
these.8
I. With beliefs π < 12 , π
p(1 | σp) < 12 , and πi(1 | σi,σp) ≥
1
2 , the
condition for the incumbent to pander to the opinion of the whole
electorate depends on the accuracy of the signals as follows.
a) For all public and private signals σp = σi = 1 with accuracies of
p,q > 12 , and q < 1− π so that the posterior beliefs are πp(1 | 1) <
1
2
and πi(1 | 1,1) ≥ 12 . The smaller is π, the stronger is the prior belief
that s1 = 0. Now the accuracy of the public signal q is low enough
to keep the public posterior belief on the likelihood of state s1 = 1
less than half. The politician’s posterior, after his private signal of
accuracy p, however, turns the likelihood of state s1 = 1 to be over half.
The incumbent’s updated belief is πi(1 | 1,1) = pqπp(q+π−1)+(1−q)(1−π) ,
and the RHS of (19) is increasing in the accuracy of both signals, and
decreasing in the strength of the prior belief.
b) For a private signal σi = 1, and a public signal σp = 0 with the
accuracy of the private signal strictly higher than the accuracy of the
public signal, p > q, and q > π, so that the posterior beliefs are πp(1 |
0)< 12 and π
i(1 | 1,0)≥ 12 . The closer π is to half, the weaker is the prior
belief of the likelihood of state s1 = 0. When the accuracy of the public
signal q confirming the prior is sufficiently weak, whereas the accuracy
of the private signal for the politician p contradicting the electorate’s
beliefs is high enough, the incumbent’s posterior belief of s1 = 1 is over
half. The incumbent’s updated belief is πi(1 | 1,0) = p(1−q)πp(π−q)+q(1−π) , and
the RHS of (19) is increasing in the accuracy of the politician’s private
signal, and decreasing in the strength of the prior and in the accuracy
of the public signal.
The second possible case is when the beliefs of the underlying state
of the economy are in conflict within the electorate, and the educated
and the non-educated citizens disagree on the optimal policy. Whether
8Similarly, if the incumbent’s private information states that s1 = 0 is the more
likely state, but the electorate believes s1 = 1, the politician panders to the public
opinion by setting x1 = 1 if 1 − πi(0 | σi,σp) + ρ + δ(1 − πi(0 | σi,σp) + ρ) ≥ 12 +
ρ + δπi(0 | σi,σp), which gives ρ ≥ 1+2δδ (πi(0 | σi,σp)−
1
2 ). Since the two cases are
symmetric, I only discuss one of the cases in more detail.
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the incumbent sets the optimal policy or not, depends on the beliefs
of the two subgroups, and on their relative size. Since the incumbent
needs a majority of the electorate to vote for him, whenever αa ≥ βb,
the educated voters form a majority, and thus their vote counts. Recall-
ing that since a < b, the educated voters form a majority either if the
share of the educated citizens a is very close to the share of the non-
educated citizens b, or if the number of voters within the educated
citizens α, is clearly higher than the share of voters within the non-
educated citizens β, i.e. a society where only a relatively small fraction
of the non-educated citizens vote. On the other hand, if βb ≥ αa the
non-educated voters form a majority, which is a case of a society where
the share of non-educated citizens is significantly higher than the share
of educated citizens.
Whenever the majority agrees with the incumbent, the incumbent
sets the optimal policy, and will be re-elected. The condition for this
is essentially the same as described in subsection 4.1.1. Therefore, let
us consider the potential cases when the majority does not agree with
the incumbent to see how the condition to pander to the opinion of
the majority is determined.
First, perhaps the more realistic case is when the educated vot-
ers better understand the state of the economy. The educated voters
and the incumbent believe that the state is s1 = 1, whereas the non-
educated voters believe s1 = 0. If the educated voters form a majority,
incumbent sets the optimal policy and will be re-elected. If, how-
ever, the non-educated voters are a majority, the electoral outcome is
the pandering equilibrium, where the incumbent sets policy x1 = 12 to
please the non-educated majority against his belief that x1 = 1 would
be the optimal policy for high enough office benefits according to con-
dition (19).
II. Now the beliefs are π < 12 , π
p(1 | σp) ≥ 12 , and πi(1 | σp,σi) ≥
1
2 ,
and the condition for the incumbent to pander to the opinion of the
non-educated voters depends on the accuracy of the signals as fol-
lows.
a) For all public and private signals σp = σi = 1, with accuracies of




and πi(1 | 1,1) ≥ 12 . The smaller is π, the stronger is the prior belief
that s1 = 0, and the higher the accuracy for the public signal q has to
be for the public posterior belief for s1 = 1 to be over half. The in-
cumbent’s updated belief is πi(1 | 1,1) = pqπp(q+π−1)+(1−q)(1−π) , and the
required level of office benefits given by (19) for the incumbent to pan-
der to the non-educated voters’ opinion is decreasing in the strength
of the prior belief, and increasing in the accuracy of the public and pri-
vate signals. Now the incumbent’s belief is stronger than in case I.a),
meaning a stronger incumbent; he is willing to pander to the opinion
on the non-educated voters only if office benefits are very high.
b) For a private signal σi = 0, and a public signal σp = 1 with the
accuracy of the private signal strictly lower than the accuracy of the
public signal, p < q, and q ≥ 1 − π, so that the posterior beliefs are
πp(1 | 1) ≥ 12 and πi(1 | 0,1) ≥
1
2 . Now the public and private sig-
nals are in conflict; the private signal for the incumbent indicates that
the economy is indeed in the bad state, however, this signal is too
weak to change his posterior belief. The incumbent’s updated belief
is πi(1 | 0,1) = (1−p)qπp(1−q−π)+qπ , and the RHS of (19) is decreasing in the
prior belief and in his private signal, and increasing in the accuracy
of the public signal. This case can be interpreted to represent a weak
incumbent; he panders to the opinion of the non-educated even for
low level of office benefits. On the other hand, if the signal received
by the educated voters is strong enough, the minimum amount of of-
fice benefits becomes larger and thus may prevent the incumbent from
pandering to the non-educated voters.
Finally, it is possible - although perhaps not so realistic - that the
non-educated voters understand the state of the economy and thus
agree with the incumbent, whereas the educated voters disagree. While
the non-educated voters and the incumbent believe that s1 = 0, the ed-
ucated voters believe s1 = 1. If the non-educated are a majority, optimal
policy will be chosen and incumbent will be re-elected. However, if the
educated voters are a majority, the incumbent panders to the opinion
of the educated voters by setting x1 = 1 against his private belief stat-
ing that x1 = 12 would be the optimal policy, according to condition
(19).
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III) With beliefs π < 12 , π
p(1 | σp) ≥ 12 , and πi(1 | σi,σp) <
1
2 , the
condition for the incumbent to pander to the educated voters’ opinion
depends on the accuracies of signals as follows.
a) For a private signal σi = 0, and a public signal σp = 1 with accuracies
of p,q > 12 , and q ≥ 1− π, so that the posterior beliefs are πp(1 | 1) ≥
1
2 and π
i(1 | 0,1) < 12 . Again, the two signals contradict each other.
The incumbent’s updated belief is πi(1 | 0,1) = (1−p)qπp(1−q−π)+qπ , and the
required level of office benefits in (19) is decreasing in the strength of
the prior belief and in the accuracy of this private signal, whereas it is
increasing in the accuracy of the public signal.
To sum up, there are three cases where the incumbent and the
electorate have conflicting information about the state of the economy.
When the voters use a simple retrospective voting strategy, the be-
haviour of the incumbent depends on who forms the majority.
The condition for the incumbent to pander to the public opinion
while acting against his own information about the optimal policy de-
pends on the strength of the beliefs all the parties possess, and on
the share of the educated and non-educated voters. If the strength of
the incumbent’s posterior belief is interpreted to measure the strength
of his leadership, then the stronger the incumbent is as a leader, the
higher the office benefits have to be for him to stray him from behav-
ing in the optimal way. A weak incumbent, on the other hand, is ready
to pander to the majority’s opinion even for low levels of office ben-
efits. The posterior belief held by the incumbent is the same in cases
I.a) and II.a), the difference being that in the former all of the elec-
torate disagrees with him, whereas in the latter the educated voters
agree with him. When the educated voters agree with him, the ques-
tion is whether the subset of the informed electorate is large enough
to overcome the ignorance by uneducated voters who do not possess
sufficient information to make rational and informed voting decisions,
as discussed in Aidt (2000).
The results furthermore show that even if the majority is not formed
of the educated and informed voters, for signals of high enough accu-
racy the incumbent is stronger in the latter case, meaning that the office
benefits have to be higher for him to deviate from what he thinks is
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the optimal policy. Furthermore, the incumbent’s belief is the same in
cases II.b) and III.a), here the difference being that in the former the
educated voters agree with him, whereas in the latter it is the non-
educated voters that agree with him. The condition to pandering to
the majority’s opinion hinges again on the strength of the beliefs.
4.2 Sophisticated instrumental voting
The question one might ask based on the baseline model of the pre-
vious subsection, is that are voters really so naive or irrational that
they do not understand why the incumbent would choose a policy
that would end his political career unless he was more informed than
the citizens about the state of the economy?
In this subsection I consider the electoral outcomes with a more so-
phisticated electorate. The non-educated voters are assumed to vote as
in the baseline case, i.e. they do not consider why the politician would
choose a policy they think is the wrong one. In a sense they are still
assumed to be irrational. The educated part of the electorate, on the
other hand, reasons that if the incumbent’s policy choice differs from
what they think would be the optimal policy given their belief of the
underlying state of the economy, they understand that this conflict is
because the incumbent politician has more information than the elec-
torate. Let ϕ denote the share of the educated voters that understands
the whole electoral game. This share is known only by the incumbent,
but not by the voters.
If the electorate were fully sophisticated, in the sense that each
voter would understand that the incumbent would only choose the
optimal policy, then the game would become trivial. Also, a perfectly
rational and sophisticated electorate is hardly what we observe in re-
ality. Whether the educated and sophisticated voters have an impact
on the electoral outcome, depends on their relative share. If the non-
educated voters form a majority of the electorate, then depending on
the level of office benefits the incumbent will choose either the true
or the pandering strategy. There is nothing the educated and sophis-
ticated voters can do, but the electoral equilibrium is determined by
the beliefs of the players and the level of office rents. The pandering
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conditions are determined as in the previous case in I) and II) of the
previous subsection.
Therefore, it is of more interest to look at the electoral equilibria,
when the educated voters form a majority. Recall that the sophisticated
voters’ updated belief consists of the public signal and the observed
policy choice, as defined in section 3.6.
First, consider case I) when the electorate as a whole has different
beliefs than the incumbent; both the non-educated and the educated
voters believe s1 = 0 is more likely, and hence that x1 = 12 would be the
optimal policy. The private belief of the incumbent, on the other hand,
states that s1 = 1 is more likely, so that x1 = 1 would be the optimal
policy. The sophisticated voters understand that if the policy choice
they observe is in conflict with the information conveyed by the public
signal, it must be because the incumbent has better information than
them, and in fact x1 = 1 must be the optimal policy. The sophisticated
voters will vote for the incumbent’s re-election. For them to form a
majority of the electorate, it has to hold that ϕαaαa+βb ≥
1
2 , which gives
ϕ ≥ 12 +
βb
αa which shows that the share of the sophisticated voters has
to be greater than half of the educated voters for the incumbent to
gain the support of the majority. Therefore, only if there are enough
educated and sophisticated voters within the electorate, the pandering
equilibria of case I) can be avoided.
Next, let us discuss the case when the beliefs within the electorate
are in conflict. First, consider the case when the non-educated voters
believe the state to be s1 = 0, and hence that x1 = 12 would the optimal
policy, whereas the educated voters believe the state to be s1 = 1, and
that x1 = 1 would be the optimal policy. Now, an interesting result
arises; if the electorate observes policy choice x1 = 1, and the educated
voters are a majority, the sophisticated voters cannot make any further
inferences of the optimality of the policy. Either x1 = 1 is indeed the
optimal policy, or it is not the optimal policy, but due to high enough
office benefits the incumbent wishes to pander to the educated voters’
opinion. This condition is determined in II).
On the other hand, if the electorate observes policy choice x1 = 12 ,
which is against what the educated voters believe is the optimal policy,
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the sophisticated voters can infer that this must be because the incum-
bent has better information than them. Now the incumbent will be re-
elected if the non-educated and the sophisticated voters together form
a majority, if ϕαa+βbαa+βb ≥
1




αa which shows that less than
half of the educated voters that are sophisticated together with the
non-educated minority are enough so that pandering to the opinion of
the educated voters, case III), can be avoided. This last case shows that
even a small share of educated voters who are sophisticated enough,
may be able to have an impact on the electoral outcome.
These last two results are sensitive to the assumption that the so-
phisticated voters know that αa > βb, that is, there is more educated
voters than non-educated voters, but they do not observe the share of
the sophisticated voters, ϕ.
4.3 Expressive voting
In this section, I contrast the results of the baseline case when parts
of the electorate votes expressively. The idea of expressive voting goes
back at least to Fiorina (1976), where expressive voters are used to re-
fer to those who vote, instead of describing of how or whom to vote.
In Jennings (2011) there are rationally irrational and expressive vot-
ers who both are ’emotional’, the difference being that the former are
uninformed, whereas the latter are informed and understand that vot-
ing according to beliefs might produce outcomes that are against their
material utility.
Here, expressive voting is defined as some of the voters possessing
ideological bias on the optimal policy, and voting accordingly. The
biased belief can either be based on misconceptions about effective
economic policies or on some personal beliefs. More specifically, the
expressive voters have ideological reasons to vote for the moderate pol-
icy choice x1 = 12 , despite what their information states about the state
of the economy. Either they can be considered to hold racist views, or
have pessimistic bias about the state of the economy as discussed in
Caplan (2007).9
9Caplan (2007) presents empirical evidence of how people tend to see the current
state of the economy worse than before, and hold pessimistic views about the future.
76
Since the non-educated voters have a pessimistic belief about the
state of the economy, and hence vote for the moderate policy anyway,
it is the share of the educated voters possessing expressive motives
against increasing immigration that is decisive in changing the elec-
toral outcomes. A share µαa of the educated voters vote for the mod-
erate immigration policy regardless of the information they possess.
This is close to Jennings’ classification of voter types, although here
they are named differently. The important difference to the previous
subsections is that that the expressive voters ignore their information
about the state of the economy, but vote according to their personal
belief. Now, let us consider how the electoral outcomes are affected by
the existence of the expressive voters.
First, in case I) when the prior belief states that s1 = 0 and the pub-
lic signal confirms this, then all the voters believe the economy to be
in the bad state, and the expressive voters do not play a role. The in-
cumbent panders to the electorate’s opinion as in case I) of subsection
4.1 according to condition (19).
Second, consider case II) of subsection 4.1 when the non-educated
voters believe the economy to be in the bad state, whereas the educated
voters and the incumbent believe it is in the good state. Furthermore,
let us assume that the educated voters form a majority; if the non-
educated are a majority, they vote for policy x1 = 12 anyway and the
expressive motivations do not play a role. Since the non-educated
vote against policy x1 = 1, the share the expressive educated voters,
i.e. share µαa, are decisive. The critical share of them is given by
µ ≥ 12 −
βb
αa . If there are enough expressive voters within the educated
electorate that vote against policy x1 = 1, and the electoral outcome
is the pandering equilibrium according as in case II). If there are not
enough expressive and educated voters, then the incumbent set the
optimal policy and will be re-elected by the instrumental and educated
voters.
Finally, in case III), when the non-educated voters and the politi-
cian agree on the optimal policy, but the non-educated disagree, the
decisive role of expressive motivations become clear if the educated
form a majority. Now, if µ≥ 12 −
βb
αa there are enough expressive voters
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within the educated electorate that together form a majority to re-elect
the incumbent for setting the optimal policy. However, if µ < 12 −
βb
αa ,
there are not enough expressive and educated voters, but the the elec-
toral outcome is that the incumbent panders to the instrumental and
educated voters’ opinion as in case III) of subsection 4.1.
The results in the simple and sophisticated voting would be sym-
metrical if the prior would state that the economy is in the good state,
whereas the incumbent’s information states the economy is in the bad
state. However, with expressive motivations, the results are not sym-
metric, so let us briefly discuss at least two cases where it plays a role
of who holds the biased belief and towards which policy alternative.
First, I assumed that the expressive voters have a bias against im-
migration, and thus vote for the moderate policy. It would, however,
be realistic to assume that the educated and expressive voters would
instead have a bias for immigration, thus voting for increasing immi-
gration. This would change the outcome in case I, if there were enough
expressive voters.
Secondly, if the electorate would hold the belief that the economy
is in the good state, but the incumbent had information stating that
it is in the bad state, then the role of voters opposing immigration in-
dependent of what their beliefs state, would play a role. Thus, if a
large enough share of voters would vote for the moderate immigra-
tion policy, pandering to the opinion of voters who think increasing
immigration would be the optimal policy could be avoided. However,
since the (uninformed) voters tend to have rather a pessimistic belief
of the state than an optimistic belief, this case is not so realistic, as is
discussed in the next subsection.
4.4 Discussion
In this framework it is never optimal for the incumbent to choose the
wrong policy when the optimal policy would ensure his re-election.
If the incumbent has the majority’s support, he will never choose
the non-optimal policy, and the so-called ’fake leadership’ equilibria
(Canes-Wrone et al., 2001) can be ruled out. In the baseline case of
the simple instrumental voting presented in subsection 4.1 the voters
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do not understand why the politician would choose a policy that is
against what the electorate believes is the optimal policy, and thus re-
place him for setting a policy against their beliefs.
Essentially the condition whether the incumbent panders to the
majority’s opinion or not, depends on the office benefits. As given
by condition (19) the exact amount depends on the strength of the
players’ beliefs and whether the beliefs match or not. The stronger is
the public’s belief, the incumbent panders to the electorate’s opinion
and disregards his own private information even for low office benefits
when all voters disagree with the incumbent’s policy choice; this is a
case of a weak incumbent. On the other hand, the stronger is the
incumbent’s own belief about the optimal policy, the higher the office
benefits have to be for him to pander to the voters’ opinion. If the
beliefs within the electorate are in conflict, then the incumbent chooses
either the true or the pandering strategy, depending on who forms the
majority and what the majority believes.
I have considered a pessimistic electorate; the prior belief states that
the economy is in the bad state. This gives a lot of weight to the role
of educated voters and their motivations. First, in the baseline case
of simple instrumental voting, if the educated voters form a majority,
the pandering equilibrium of cases I and II can be avoided. However,
when the educated voters mistakenly believe the economy to be in
the good state, in case III, the electoral outcome is that the incumbent
panders to the educated voters’ opinion. Furthermore, an important
finding is that even when the educated voters are a minority, their
mere existence affects the incumbent’s incentives to pander to the non-
educated majority’s opinion, as shown in case II.
Next, in subsection 4.2, I considered the possibility that parts of the
educated voters have a higher sophistication. Only if there are enough
sophisticated voters who understand why the incumbent would choose
a policy against what they think is the optimal one, the coordination
problem resulting in the pandering equilibria of cases I and III can be
avoided.
Finally, in subsection 4.3, I introduced voters with biased beliefs
of immigration policy. The main finding is that when the educated
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voters are a majority, but high enough share of them vote expressively
the case of pandering to the educated voters’ opinion of case III can
be avoided. However, while with instrumental voting motivations the
electoral outcome of case II would be to set the optimal policy, with
expressive motivations, the outcome is pandering to the opinion of
the expressive voters. This is an example of expressive voting traps
as discussed in Hillman (2010), where the society ends up with policy
outcomes that the majority would not choose if they voted according
to their material interests.
Since the non-educated voters10 vote according to the prior belief,
in this framework they are always pessimistic and vote for the mod-
erate immigration policy. The assumption of pessimistic voters can be
linked to the idea retrospective voting. Since the true implications of
policies are not necessarily known at the time of the election, the vot-
ers find it hard to evaluate the performance of the incumbent (Bendor
et al., 2011). Especially, in this framework, the true implications of the
immigration policy are not known until the second period, meaning
that the voters have to make inferences of the incumbent performance
based on the private information or ideological beliefs. Since people
tend to have pessimistic bias about the current state of the economy
(Caplan, 2007), it is realistic to assume the non-educated voters to ei-
ther have a pessimistic evaluation of the state of the economy, or to
use personal beliefs about immigration as a basis for voting.
As a final remark, it is important to note, that all the results in
the simple and sophisticated voting would be symmetrical if the prior
would state that the economy is in the good state. The only case, where
results are not symmetric, is that of voters with expressive voting mo-
tivations.
10In the section of the simple instrumental voting rule, the non-educated voters
are assumed to be along the lines of rationally ignorant voters (Downs 1957) who do
not have incentives to acquire information about the optimality of policies due to he
unlikely chance of being the decisive voter. In the section of expressive voting, the
non-educated are more like the rationally irrational but expressive voters (Jennings
2011), who hold beliefs that may run against their instrumental utility.
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has analysed electoral outcomes under different assump-
tions about information, and voting motivations for the electorate. The
electorate votes retrospectively, upon observing the policy choice but
before the true consequence of the policy is unfold. The electorate
is indifferent between the incumbent and a potential challenger, so if
they do not agree with the incumbent’s policy choice, there is a real
threat of being replaced. The focus in this paper has not been on the
competence or the effort of the incumbent politician, but has looked
at electoral outcomes when none of the players possess complete in-
formation. While previous papers on electoral accountability have fo-
cused on incumbent characteristics in explaining populist equilibria,
this paper shows how the incumbent’s tendency to pander to the elec-
torate’s opinion can be analysed even when there is no moral hazard
regarding the incumbent’s competence or ideological congruence with
the electorate.
This paper shows that when the assumption of the representative
voter, or the median voter is dropped, the incumbent’s incentives for
pandering to the public opinion are not so straightforward to analyse.
When the politician cares both about policy outcomes, and holding
office, the condition for him to discard his private information and
pander to the public opinion depends on the level of office benefits.
The incumbent’s ’demand’ for office benefits, in turn, depends on the
accuracy of his private information, the accuracy of the electorate’s in-
formation, and whether there is an agreement or disagreement of the
optimal policy within the electorate. The more accurate the incum-
bent’s own information, the higher the office benefits have to be for
him to discard his private information, and to pander to the public
opinion, whereas the more accurate the electorate’s information is the
incumbent is ready to choose the popular policy over the optimal one
even for low office benefits.
Interestingly, when the electorate disagrees over the optimal policy,
the existence of an educated electorate who understands policy justi-
fications is enough the decrease the incumbent’s incentives to pander
to public opinion - even when the size of the educated electorate is not
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large enough to ensure re-election for the incumbent.
If the incumbent politician in this paper is taken to represent the
incumbent administration at a broader level than just the single policy
maker, the electorate’s incentives to replace the incumbent for policy
choices the majority does not agree with can be related to pandering
tendencies caused by electoral incentives in reality. For instance, the
performance of coalition governments can be affected by (biased) pub-
lic beliefs of the optimal policies, when the voters potentially vote for
opposition parties at the next election. In the U.S. presidential elec-
tions, on the other hand, the electorate expresses their dissatisfaction
towards current administration by voting for the challenger. Incum-
bents are thus weighing policy options against their wish to stay in
power, like in the model presented in this paper.
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Part III
Essay II: Minor party’s political
power and policy outcomes -
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This paper studies the role of a minor party in parliamentary
politics by assessing how changes in its programmatic policy
positions affect its political power, and subsequently ideological
policy outcomes. First, I show the importance of agenda-setting
in a two-dimensional policy framework, where policy outcomes
are determined at the post-election stage. The results show that
while minor parties find it difficult to compete against major par-
ties at agenda-setting on the frontline dimension of overall po-
litical ideology, the inclusion of the secondary dimension helps
them gain political power. Thus the secondary dimension that
defines the minor party, such as environmental policy dimension
for a green party, is of importance regarding their role in coali-
tion politics. Then, I calculate parties’ political power based on
their left-right positions to empirically test the relationship be-
tween green parties’ programmatic positions and environmental
policy outcomes with data from 9 European countries in 1990 to
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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper studies parliamentary policy making in a proportional elec-
toral system, especially the role played by a minor party and its policy
positions on ideological policy outcomes. More specifically, the aim is
to study how a minor party can strategically position itself in relation
to other parliamentary parties, how its political power is determined,
and what is its ability to affect final policy outcomes. Policy mak-
ing takes place in a two-dimensional framework, where the frontline
policy relates to a party’s position on the overall left-right dimension,
whereas the secondary dimension relates to the defining feature of the
minor party, such as environmental issues for green parties or immi-
gration issues for extreme right parties. In this paper the minor party
is a green party, and the ideological dimension is represented by an
environmental policy.
First, this paper presents a theoretical framework where parties first
state their preferences on the two policy dimensions, and once the seat
allocation is realised, parties enter post-electoral coalition formation
stage, the result of which determines policy outcomes. Coalition out-
comes are analysed in two scenarios. In the first, only the frontline
policy dimensions enters into coalition negotiations, while in the sec-
ond case, the secondary policy dimension becomes salient.
The results show that when the negotiations take place only on
the frontline dimension and with symmetrical political conditions, the
minor party finds it difficult to compete against the major parties at
coalition formation. However, with the secondary dimension included,
the political power of the minor party is considerably increased. This
shows the importance of the environmental policy dimension for a
green minor party. Then, the relationship between green parties’ po-
litical power and environmental policy outcomes are tested with data
on European parliaments for the past twenty years.
The existence of a number of different sized parties is typical for
proportional electoral systems, according to the so-called Duverger’s
law (Riker, 1982). The importance of political parties is especially ev-
ident in multidimensional policy problems in allowing compromises
over conflicting policy views as shown by Levy (2004). Previous pa-
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pers analysing two-dimensional policy problems are for instance List
and Sturm (2006), Anesi and de Donder (2011) and Bräuninger (2005).
Despite theoretical interest in explaining the role of parties in multi-
dimensional policy issues, the majority of empirical research starting
from Hibbs (1977) on partisan politics, has however focused on two-
party systems, or grouped parties into blocs or party families in pro-
portional systems to study one-dimensional policy problems. There is
only a very recent strand of empirical literature by Freier and Oden-
dahl (2012), Fiva et al. (2013) and Folke (2014) showing how individ-
ual parties matter at the local level by estimating party effects through
changes in the seat allocation between parties.
These previous results are important contributions in identifying
causality from individual parties to policy outcomes. This paper, how-
ever, argues that especially at the national level, the role of individual
parties is not necessarily as clear and cannot be simply contributed to
individual parties gaining or losing a seat.
The ability to affect policy outcomes comes mainly through a party’s
presence in the governing coalition, which is especially true for pro-
portional systems, where it is not so clear which of the parties enter
the governing coalition. Therefore an analysis focused on changes in
the seat shares may not be able to dissect the true power of parties at
the national level, especially when it comes to minor parties. This pa-
per argues that the main determinant of minor parties’ political power
is driven by their ability to be attractive coalition parties, and through
their presence in the governing coalition they can affect policy out-
comes.
To motivate this paper, the following observations of the environ-
mental politics in Europe can be made. In the past twenty to thirty
years, green parties have established stable minor party roles at na-
tional parliaments in many European countries, during which period
there have been two parallel developments in green politics.
First, party manifestos show that the general trend on the emphasis
the green parties attach to environmental protection has been, with a
few exceptions, mostly downwards (fig. 1 in the Appendix A), while at
the same time the overall left-right positions have been changing quite
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considerably from one electoral term to the next (fig. 2). Secondly, at
the same time as the amount of total environmental taxation has been
steadily increasing, looking at environmental tax revenue as a share
of total revenues from taxes and social contributions, or GDP reveals
significant yearly variation (fig. 3).
With the premise that despite becoming somewhat more main-
stream over the decades,2 the main policy goal for the green parties
is still to affect environmental policy outcomes, and it is therefore of
interest to look at the relationship between the green’s programmatic
positions and environmental policies. This paper shows that the an-
nounced political programmes play a role through determining par-
ties’ real political power, with the secondary policy dimensions being
of importance to minor parties. The idea is that policy positions can
be regarded as strategic choices by parties, however in contrast to List
& Sturm (2006), not to attract votes3, but to increase bargaining power
at the post-electoral stage.
Since the green parties have had relatively small seat shares in na-
tional parliaments, their true impact on national politics in Europe
may have been underestimated.4 The question asked in this paper is
of importance not only due to an increase in the popularity of minor
parties, such as green parties or extreme right parties in many Euro-
pean countries. More importantly, most research on partisan politics
has focused on the traditional left-right dimension, with only few pa-
2An extensive overview of the development of the green movement in the West
from the 1970’s into the 2000’s is provided in Dalton (2009); it started as a self-
proclaimed new ideological orientation, which promoted not only environmental
values but also multiculturalism, women’s rights or foreign policy. In the early days,
this new political dimension was seen as orthogonal to the traditional left-right di-
mension. Over the decades, the greens have however adopted ideologies on the
traditional left-right dimension.
3The argument that shifts in policy positions result in changes in vote shares has
only weak and inconsistent empirical support Adams (2012). In fact, it is unclear if
voters even notice parties’ positional changes
4The European Greens in power has been analysed in a special issue of European
Journal of Political Research, Vol. 45, 2006; the analysis covers time period from the
1970’s until the early 2000’s. The main results are not very convincing that the greens
have been very successful. However, perhaps the most significant years of the green
politics have been left out of the analysis, leaving a need to cover also the first decade
of the 2000’s as well.
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pers focusing on the role of individual parties as already mentioned.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by studying the role of
minor parties at the national level through strategic changes in their
programmatic positions on two policy dimensions.
The organisation of this paper is the following. In section 2, rele-
vant literature is reviewed. Section 3 presents theoretical framework,
and section 4 presents results. Section 5 presents the empirical part
with main results, and section 6 concludes.
2 PREVIOUS LITERATURE
First, this paper relates to very profound issues of policy-making. The
traditional Downsian framework of purely office-motivated candidates
leads to policy convergence into the median voter’s preferred policy
outcome.5 However, with more than one policy dimension, this spatial
model of voting is insufficient. Levy (2004) studies the role of political
parties, and finds that in a unidimensional policy setting the equi-
librium policies are the same regardless of the existence of them; in
a framework of only right-wing or left-wing politicians no party can
win against the median; the median wins even if no parties existed.
However, in a multidimensional policy space, the formation of parties
allows politicians to achieve compromises within parties, for instance
in a case of two conflicting policy choices. The resulting political out-
come therefore differs in the existence of political parties compared to
their absence.
The political power of extremist candidates/parties has been stud-
ied by Bordignon et al. (2010) in a pluralist system by allowing partly
endogenous party formation. They contrast single-round and runoff
elections, and test their model with data on Italian mayoral elections.
They find that a single-round system gives higher bargaining power
to extremist candidates.
Policy making in a two dimensional policy framework is studied
for instance by List and Sturm (2006), Anesi and de Donder (2011), and
5For example, Duggan and Fey (2005) discuss the median voter paradigm, and
some of its central results.
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Bräuninger (2005). List and Sturm (2006) use a two-dimensional policy
framework where the environmental policy is a secondary dimension
to the frontline issue of redistribution, and show that when politicians’
preferences on the environmental policy are not known to citizens,
there is an incentive for some politicians to utilise the existence of the
single-issue voters to secure re-election.
Anesi and de Donder (2011) study electoral competition in a simi-
lar framework, and their somewhat surprising finding is that the emer-
gence of green parties is not due to an increase in the number of green
voters, but is related to a large enough income polarisation compared
to the saliency of environmental issues. I take the existence of parties
as exogenously determined leaving party formation outside of this pa-
per’s scope.
Closest to this paper in its framework is Bräuninger (2005) who
studies budgetary policy-making when partisan actors differ in their
preferences regarding the total amount of public expenditure and its
allocation on different budget items, and estimates the potential for
fiscal policy change in i) a median voter model, and ii) a veto player
model. With data from 19 OECD countries for 1971 to 1999, he finds
that it is not the left-right position but rather the stated policy pref-
erences that matter for policy outcomes. Although his framework is
similar to this paper, the aim here is somewhat different; the interest
here is in how a minor party can utilise its policy positions to be able
to have an impact on the ideological policy outcome.
Literature on coalition formation and electoral bargaining is vast.
Baron and Diermeier (2001) study coalition formation and policy choice
in a two-dimensional model, and Diermeier et al. (2002) and Diermeier
et al. (2003) study how different institutions affect government forma-
tion and dissolution in a coalition bargaining model. Schofield (1993)
shows how different types of coalition governments can be explained
by locating parties in a two-dimensional model into core or periph-
eral parties. For a more thorough survey on the literature of coalition
formation, see Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011, p. 6-9).
Second, from the perspective of empirical research this paper re-
lates to an extensive strand of literature studying partisan effects on
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public policies, which goes back to at least Hibbs (1977), who was
among the first ones to study the relationship between political orien-
tation of governments and their macroeconomic policies. Since Hibbs,
there has been an abundance of studies on partisan effects on budget
politics, see survey e.g. Cusack and Fuchs (2002). The results of this
line of research have been somewhat mixed; some papers find clear
evidence on leftist governments’ policies resulting in excessive deficits
while rightist governments exercise more prudent policies, others find
only modest or no impact of ideological orientation on budget deficits.
Literature on partisan effects on some specific form of taxation
shows that leftist parties tend to promote more taxation than right-
wing parties, such as Osterloh and Debus (2012) on the level of cor-
porate taxes in Europe, or Allers et al. (2001) on local taxation in the
Netherlands. This literature often groups parties into broader blocs
thus ignoring the role of individual parties. However, the existence
of minor parties is characteristic for proportional electoral systems,
whose role has not been very widely addressed in the previous litera-
ture.
More recent empirical assessments of partisan effects on policy out-
comes are by Freier and Odendahl (2012), Fiva et al. (2013), and Folke
(2014) who study specifically the role of individual parties in propor-
tional systems. Freier and Odendahl (2012) study the voting power of
political parties in German municipalities in the state of Bavaria, and
find that individual parties matter on different tax categories. Folke
(2014) applies a modified regression discontinuity design to local pol-
itics in Sweden. His results suggest a positive relationship between
environmental policy and green party, and a negative relationship be-
tween immigration policy and extreme right party. Fiva et al. (2013)
study local politics in Norway, and find e.g. that larger left-wing par-
ties lead to higher property taxation, higher user charges and more
spending on child-care. All these three papers are purely empirical,
and assess the role of individual parties in municipal level. Further-
more, they assume parties to possess fixed policy positions from one
electoral term to the next, as well as between municipalities.
Finally, I briefly discuss the concept of political power, for finding
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an appropriate measure for it is a complex issue. First, the use of
election results is dependent on the electoral system; the number of
votes does not always translate directly into parliament seats, making
cross-country comparisons difficult. The use of seat share is also prob-
lematic, since winning or losing a seat does not necessarily change
coalition options for parties or a party’s vote share remains the same,
but the vote shares for other parties change considerably. Furthermore,
as already discussed, estimating partisan effects based on changes in
the seat allocation may be sufficient at the local level, however at the
national level parties’ true political power is a more complex issue.
A more sophisticated way to approach is to use power indices.
Based on a party’s seat share, the Banzhaf index (BI) calculates the
coalition formation power for each party.6 With n parties, a normalised
Banzhaf index is defined as the number of times party k is pivotal di-




which measures the relative power of party k.
One problem with power indices is that they assume all coalitions
equally likely (Snyder et al., 2005). Moreover, they do not take into
account differences in the actual political power due to a party’s role
as a coalition formateur. Furthermore, the importance of ideological
ties between parties, such as loyalty to other members of the same
party family potentially restricts the actual coalition formation power
of parties, as noted by Stenlund et al. (1985), distinguish formal voting
power from real voting power. The former is related to the capacity of
a party to be decisive (Banzhaf), whereas the latter is restricted by the
realistic opportunities defined by ideology and other circumstances to
actually be a decisive player.
The last issue, related to empirical testing of political power is
that majority of theoretical work uses the concept of voting weight
to calculate the potential coalitions, whereas the empirical literature
has largely relied on the use of seat shares as a measurement for po-
6Another approach to political power is presented in the literature of veto players,
e.g. Tsebelis and Chang (2004).
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litical power. Although the voting weights and seat shares do cor-
relate, the relationship between the two is not completely linear caus-
ing problems when relating theoretical frameworks with empirics (An-
solabehere et al., 2005).
Freier and Odendahl (2012) weigh the normalised Banzhaf index by
the likelihood of coalition formation between parties; coalitions form
more likely between parties that are closer to each other on the left-
right policy space, than between parties holding very different ideo-
logical views. Even if parties at the extreme ends of the left-right di-
mension could form a (winning) coalition, the weight on this coalition
would be zero. In this paper’s theoretical part it is shown how ide-
ological closeness affects parties’ political power at the post-electoral
stage, whereas in the empirical part, following Freier and Odendahl
(2012) a measure for political power is calculated using data on elec-
tion outcomes and parties’ ideological positions. Whereas Freier &
Odendahl assume policy positions to be fixed over time and between
states, here they are allowed to change from one term to the next as
well as between countries.
3 FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY MAKING
This section presents a simplified model of parliamentary policy mak-
ing, where parties state their preferences on two policy dimensions;
the frontline policy dimension relating to the overall political ideology
of a party, and the secondary dimension relating to environmental pol-
icy. Once the seat allocation realises, parties enter the stage of coalition
formation as a result of which policy outcomes are determined. The
problem for a party is to set its political programme prior to elections
by taking into account the belief of the identity of the winner of the
election, the state of the environment, the costs associated to program-
matic adjustments, and the potential utility being in the governing
coalition.
Defining parties’ political power in a framework of post-electoral
coalition formation makes sense, since in proportional electoral sys-
tems, it is not ex ante clear which of the parties enter the governing
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coalition. However the aim is not to provide a full-fledged model
of coalition formation; I do not discuss the allocation of government
posts or the division of surplus between the coalition members, see
e.g. Baron and Diermeier (2001) or Diermeier et al. (2002, 2003) on
this. Instead, the aim is to illustrate the importance of parties’ agenda
setting in the political process.
This paper takes the election results to be exogenous to the model,
in the sense that it does not provide a detailed analysis of voter be-
haviour. Instead, voter preferences are taken into account in the form
of a preference shock shifting the role of the largest party to one of
the major parties on the left-right dimension; furthermore the state of
the environment introduced later can also be interpreted as a shock
representing voter preferences on the environmental dimension.
The main reason for simplifying the role of voters is that as long as
the political power of minor parties comes mainly through their ability
to be potential coalition partners, gaining or losing a seat does not
dramatically change their ability to affect policy outcomes. Instead,
as this paper argues, it is the programmatic positions that matter in
determining minor parties’ real political power at the national level.
Moreover, anticipating voter response is difficult, for instance due to
strategic voting; if voters do not vote for the party closest to their ideal
points, policy outcomes do not reflect policy preferences in a very
accurate way (Baron and Diermeier, 2001). Finally, the link from voter
preferences on parties’ policy positions and back to voting behaviour
is not clear, see survey by Adams 2012; voters do not even necessarily
notice any changes in parties’ policy positions.
3.1 Basic set-up
There are four political parties that are elected into the national parlia-
ment, k = L, R, G, X, with L=Left, R=Right, G=Greens and X=Extreme
right-wing party. The seat shares for the four parties are the following:
S(L) = κ− η, S(R) = κ + η, S(G) = S(X) = κ, with κ− η > κ, κ + η < 12 ,
and κ + κ = 12 i.e. none of the parties has a majority of the seats.
7 L and
R are called major parties, whereas G and X are referred to as minor
7Following Bordignon et al. (2010, p. 4-5).
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parties.
To simplify matters, the seat allocation in the parliament is deter-
mined exogenously. The winner of the election with the largest seat
share is determined by a shock η on voter preferences on the left-right
scale that shifts the role of the largest party to one of the major parties,
L or R. This preference shock can take either a positive or a negative
value, and the realisation is observed at the election day. The largest
party becomes the formateur of the government. Hence, parties do not
know the identity of the coalition formateur when they set their agen-
das, but they have an expectation on the realisation of the shock, so
that with probability P(η < 0) = π the largest party and formateur is
L, whereas with P(η > 0) = 1−π it is R. This prior belief can be based
for instance on opinion polls about a likely shift of voter preferences
on the left-right scale. The prior likelihood can then be interpreted as
the polls suggesting that L is the largest party, whenever π > 12
The seat shares for the minor parties, G and X, on the other hand
are independent of the election results in this simplified setting. Al-
lowing variation in their exact seat shares would add complexity to
the framework without bringing more insight, which is to examine
coalition formation and agenda setting where minor parties’ role in
national politics is driven by their potential to be coalition partners to
the major parties.
Since none of the parties holds a majority of the seats, once the seat
allocation is realised, parties enter the stage of coalition formation.
The largest party is the coalition formateur, and it can form a winning
coalition with the other major party, or with one of the minor parties.
3.2 Policy preferences
The task for the governing coalition is to set a two-dimensional policy.
The frontline policy is to set the total size of the government budget
B, whereas the secondary policy dimension of interest is the environ-
mental policy denoted by be. The parties express their preferences
both on the size of the budget and the ideological importance of the
environmental policy dimension. These stated policy preferences are
what constitute the pre-electoral political manifestos. Let us look more
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closely at these policy positions.
First, each party k = L, R, G, X has a ’true’ initial position on the
left-right scale denoted by Bk. The left-right scale is defined to run
from 0 to 1, so that Bk ∈ [0,1]. The ’true’ political identities for the four
parties are taken as given and are BG = 0, BL = 13 , B
R = 23 and B
X = 1,
so that initially they are evenly distributed on the left-right dimension.
When considering their coalition potential, parties are allowed to
adjust their true frontline positions, based on the anticipation of the
election winner and state of the environment. The ’announced’ policy
position is denoted by βk for each party. The movements from the true
positions are restricted so that the parties’ order on the left-right scale
has to be preserved.
Secondly, parties state their position on the environmental dimen-
sion, given by ek, which denotes the ideological importance of the en-
vironmental dimension for party k. This can be interpreted as the
weight the party puts to environmental issues on its programme, thus
ek ∈ [0,1]. The weight a party assigns to the environmental policy is
assumed to correspond to its environmental policy expertise, and for
simplicity, let us assume that only the environmental party G puts a
positive weight on the environmental dimension, eG > 0; while the
other parties attach a zero weight on it, eL = eR = eX = 0.
3.3 Timing
For each electoral term the timing is the following.
1. State of the environment is determined by an exogenous shock,
E = {0,1}, which is observed by parties. Parties have a prior
belief on the election winner, denoted by π.
2. Based on the observed state of the environment E, and on the
prior belief of the election winner π, parties set their policy posi-
tions on the frontline and secondary policy dimensions: βk and
ek. The order of adjustments is as follows
(a) The expected winner of the election sets its programme first.
If π > 12 , L sets its programme first.
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(b) The other major party observes this and sets its own pro-
gramme.
(c) The minor parties observe the major parties’ programmes
and set their own programmes, with G first and then X.
3. A second exogenous shock (=election) takes place, as a result of
which seat shares are realised and observed by parties.
4. Parties enter post-electoral coalition formation stage. Coalition
formateur makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the party closest to
it on the frontline dimension. Policy outcomes are determined.
Agenda-setting can be regarded as an extensive form game between
parties. Under the expectation on the identity of the coalition forma-
teur, parties assess their coalition potential, and set their policy posi-
tions prior to elections. To clarify the importance of agenda-setting,
the political programmes stated at the pre-electoral state are assumed
to hold at the coalition formation stage.
The formateur proposes a coalition to a party that provides the
largest utility. There are two tie-breaking rules. i) When the formateur
is indifferent to proposing to a major party or to a minor party, it pro-
poses to the minor party. ii) For a party to accept a coalition proposal,
the utility of joining the coalition has to be strictly higher than the util-
ity of being in the opposition, i.e. a party that is indifferent between
the two, chooses opposition.
3.4 Utility of coalition
The problem for each party k is to set its political agenda prior to elec-
tions so that its expected utility is maximised. The parties gain utility
of being in the governing coalition; they have both office motivation
and policy motivation. Coalition membership is thus worth pursuing
for, and in order to increase their chances of being in the coalition, each
party can adjust its position from its ’true’ political ideology. There is,
however, a cost attached to programmatic adjustments on the frontline
dimension.
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The objective function for each party thus comprises of the util-
ity of being in the coalition, the costs associated to programmatic ad-
justments, and the value of the outside option which is to be at the
opposition. Each of these are discussed in the following.
First, recall the distinction between a party’s true overall political
ideology Bk and its announced position βk. A movement from the true
position is costly, according to a cost function
−c(Bk − βk)2 (1)
where c is a cost parameter. The quadratic form of this function means
that a shift on the left-right scale becomes increasingly more costly the
larger is that shift. Note that the movement from the true position
is made before the election, so that these costs become sunk after the
election result realises, since they are independent of whether k makes
it to the coalition. Interpretation for these costs are that in their attempt
to become more coalition eligible the party is making some ideological
sacrifices without any guarantee of coalition membership.
Let us discuss the utility of coalition politics on a general level for
any two parties i, j. The utility for party i of being in the governing
coalition with party j is denoted by vjii where the superscript refers to
the two parties forming the coalition with the formateur listed first.
The utility is defined as
vjii = P
βiβj(1− |βij − Bi|+ eijE) (2)
where Pβ
iβj denotes the weight for the coalition; the first term within
the brackets 1 − |βij − Bi| denotes the utility of the frontline policy,
with βij representing the frontline position taken by the coalition; and
eijE denoting the utility of the environmental policy with eij repre-
senting the combined environmental policy expertise of i and j, and E
denoting the state of the environment. Let us discuss each of these in
more detail.
The utility of the coalition has two components depending on the
ideological closeness of the two coalition parties. First, Pβ
iβj denotes
the weight for the coalition given by the coalition parties’ announced
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positions on the left-right dimension. The ideologically closer the
coalition parties are on the frontline dimension, the higher is the utility
of being in the governing coalition, Pβ
iβj = 1− |βi− βj|. This represents
the fact that once entering the coalition decision-making is easier if the
coalition parties’ announced frontline programmes are close to each
other.
The second component of utility is given by the policy choices
taken by the governing coalition that is represented by the terms within
the brackets in (2). The first term inside the brackets, 1− |βij − Bi|, is
the utility of the frontline policy dimension. The formateur has the
power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the potential coalition part-
ner, which is a convex combination of the announced policy positions
of the coalition parties, βij = aβi + (1 − a)βj, with a ∈ [0,1]. This is
to make programmatic announcements binding; the best policy any
party can offer is restricted by the announcements made before the
election. The further away the left-right position of the coalition is
from i’s true frontline policy position Bi, the less utility i gets from it,
thus 1− |βij − Bi|.
The second term eijE within the brackets in (2) represents the utility
of the environmental policy. To understand the role of the secondary
policy dimension, and the need for the environmental expertise in the
governing coalition, the state of the environment is determined by an
exogenous shock E ∈ {0,1}, with eij representing the sum of environ-
mental expertise of the coalition parties.
The utility of non-governmental parties is not completely discounted,8
so that i’s utility of being left outside of the coalition is given by the
utility of the opposition
vNCi = r < 1 (3)
To make sure a coalition is always formed it has to hold that the
utility of joining the coalition is higher than the utility of the outside
option, even if none of the parties adjusts its position, i.e. for a party
i it has to hold that vNCi < v
ji
i . With parties i and j at their original
positions βi = Bi and βj = Bj, and with j being the formateur proposing
8Kedar (2005, p. 188) discusses this more broadly; opposition parties gain utility
e.g. from proposal making power, or veto power.
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a frontline policy βij = Bj this condition is given by
r ≤ PBiBj(1− | Bj − Bi | +eijE) = PBiBj(PBiBj + eijE) (4)
The final policy outcomes on the two dimensions are determined as
follows. The frontline policy, i.e. the size of the government budget is
determined by the frontline position taken by the coalition; βij, and the
environmental policy outcome is given by the average environmental
position of the coalition parties; be = e
ij
2 .
4 COALITION FORMATION AND POLICY OUT-
COMES
In the following, potential coalitions and policy outcomes are studied
in two scenarios. First in section 4.1, E = 0, the general interest in
environmental issues is very low or non-existent, such as when the
economy is doing bad, unemployment is increasing, etc. In section
4.2, E = 1, the environmental interest is high, for instance due to a
natural disaster, or a break-down of a nuclear power plant, which can
be interpreted as a shift in voter preferences on the importance of the
environmental dimension. The idea is to look at coalition formation
when the greens have policy expertise that can be used strategically in
comparison to other parties who do not possess similar expertise.
4.1 No environment
Before elections take place, parties write down their political mani-
festos. They can adjust their positions based on the prior belief on
the identity of the election winner, by weighing the cost associated to
the programmatic adjustment on the frontline dimension against their
potential of being in the governing coalition. Recall the timing of pro-
grammatic adjustments. First, the expected winner of the election sets
its political programme, followed by the other major party, after which
the minor parties set their agendas. Due to the extensive form of this
game, the agenda-setting by parties can be solved by using backwards
induction.
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Let us consider the case when π > 12 . If L wins, it becomes the coali-
tion formateur with the power to make a take-it-or-leave it offer to one
of the potential coalition partners; to the environmental minor party G,
or to the right-wing major party R. The offer is a convex combination
of the coalition members’ announced frontline positions, denoted by
βLG for the greens and βLR for the right-wing party. Electoral promises
are thus binding.
Proposition 1 When E = 0, 12 < π < 1, and c≥ π(6− 9r), the equilibrium
outcome is the following. Assuming that L announces βL = 13 , the announced
frontline positions for G and R are βG = 0 and βR < 23 . If L wins, LR
coalition forms with frontline policy set at βLR = βL = 13 . If R wins, RL
coalition forms with frontline policy set at βRL = βR < 23 . Environmental
policy be = 0.
The proof for Proposition 1 proceeds as follows. When π > 12 , L is the
expected winner of the election. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed
that L stays at its original position, and announces its true frontline
position βL = BL = 13 . If we allow L to optimise its frontline position,
the outcome of the game is that the political competition is reduced
to agenda-setting between the two major parties, with no role for the
minor parties. Thus this simplifying assumption does not change the
qualitative results. See Appendix B.1 on further details on optimal
agenda-setting by L.
Taking L’s position βL = BL = 13 we consider the rule L uses in
choosing the coalition partner; L knows that both G and R have incen-
tives to adjust their positions closer to L. The choice for the coalition
partner then reduces to a comparison of which of the two parties po-
sitions itself closer to L. Both R and G check what are the maximum
adjustments they are willing to make so that these adjustments will
guarantee a place in the governing coalition. Which of the potential
coalition partners manage to move closer to L depend on the underly-
ing parameters regarding political competition; c, r and π.
The proof ends by showing that there are no parameter values that
allow G to win R on the coalition membership; when the costs of
programmatic adjustments are sufficiently high with c ≥ π(6− 9r), R
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announces a position βR < 23 that is strictly less than its true position,
but greater than the position L announces. In effect, R takes a posi-
tion that just excludes G from the competition. G in turn stays at its
true position βG = 0. The equilibrium outcome is that L and R form
a coalition, and the frontline policy set by the governing coalition is
determined by which of them wins the election.
This equilibrium outcome is due to the extensive form of the game,
the proposal making power of the coalition formateur, and the fact
that R may win the election thus having more power than G who can
never win the election.
Parties know that the weights for coalitions are determined by the
announced frontline policy positions of parties prior to elections; once
the election result realises, the weights are fixed, and none of the par-
ties can affect them any more. Let us note that if all the parties stay
at their true frontline positions with βG = BG = 0 and βL = BL = 13
and βR = BR = 23 , the weights for LG and LR respectively are P
BLBG =
PB
LBR = 23 . To guarantee a coalition to form, the value of the out-
side option is restricted by condition (4), which is now rewritten as
r ≤ (23)2 =
4
9 . Furthermore, note that if all the parties stay at their true
positions, L proposes to G due to the tie-breaking rule. This gives an
incentive for R to consider its optimal position closer to L, which gives
an incentive for G to consider whether it could move even closer to L
than R. Thus, L knows that both potential coalition partners have an
incentive to move towards L.
Proof 1 The condition that L proposes a coalition to G over R is given by
Pβ
LβG(1− |βLG − BL|) ≥ PβLβR(1− |βLR − BL|) (5)
This is a weak inequality due to the tie-breaking rule i). According to condi-
tion (2) the best policy L can propose to any potential coalition partner is its
own announced policy βL. When L announces its true position βL = BL = 13 ,
this is also the policy it proposes to either of the coalition partners; thus
βLG = BL = 13 and β
LR = BL = 13 . Condition (5) then reduces to
PB
LβG ≥ PBLβR (6)
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which can be rewritten as 1− |BL − βG| ≥ 1− |BL − βR|, and
| 1
3
− βG| ≤ |1
3
− βR| (7)
The choice of the coalition partner thus boils down to which of the two parties
move closer to L on the frontline dimension.
Next, let us consider the maximum adjustments for R and G upon ob-
serving βL = BL = 13 . First, the equilibrium path for the right-wing major
party R is given by (see Appendix B.2.1)
πvNCR + (1− π)vRXR < −c(BR − βR)2 + πvLRR + (1− π)vRLR (8)
which can be rewritten as
πr + (1− π)PBRBX(1− |BR − BR|) < −c(BR − βR)2 + πPBLβR(1− |BL − BR|)
+(1− π)PBLβR(1− |βR − BR|)
(9)
This is a strict inequality due to the tie-breaking rule ii). When R moves
towards the political centre by announcing βR < 23 , the weight for the LR
coalition increases. Solving βR from (9) gives
βR >
4c + 3− 5π −
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)
6(c + 1− π) (10)
For the parties’ order to be preserved, βR ≥ 13 , which takes place when c ≥
π(6− 9r).
Second, since G can never be a formateur, its problem is different from
R’s, and is given by (see Appendix B.2.2)
vNCG < −c(BG − βG)2 + πvLGG + (1− π)vNCG (11)
which can be rewritten as
r < −c(BG − βG)2 + πPBLβG(1− |BL − BG|) + (1− π)r (12)
When G moves towards L by setting βG > 0, the weight for LG coalition
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4π2 + (16− 36r)πc
6c
(13)
For the parties’ order to be preserved, βG ≤ 13 , which takes place when c ≥
π(6− 9r).
Having solved the maximum adjustments for R and G, let us return to
condition (7). Since βG ≤ 13 , and βR ≥
1





Plugging (10) into the right-hand side of this inequality, we can solve βG
such that G is closer to L than R
βG ≥ 1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)
6(c + 1− π) (15)
Thus, for LG coalition to form, the frontline position βG that G announces
has to satisfy both (13) and (15), i.e.
1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)





4π2 + (16− 36r)πc
6c
(16)
Now, since condition (16) depends on π, c and r, let us see when it holds.
Since the announced positions have to satisfy 0 ≤ βG ≤ 13 for G, and
1
3 ≤ βR ≤
2
3 for R, we can first consider the case when both parties make the
maximum adjustments, so that their positions match that of L’s with βG = 13
and βR = 13 . Since the left-hand side states the condition when L proposes to G
over R, and is essentially the same as condition (14) above, the left-hand side
clearly holds for βG = 13 and β
R = 13 . The right-hand side states the condition
for G to accept coalition over opposition. For βG = 13 , the right-hand side
holds for sufficiently low values of c, namely c < π(6− 9r).
Due to the timing of the game, if R sets βR = 13 , G observes this and sets
βG = 13 , and due to the tie-breaking rule, LG coalition forms. Knowing this,
R sets βR = BR = 23 , and observing this, G sets β
G = BG = 0, i.e. none of the
parties move when the cost of programmatic adjustment is sufficiently low,
104
and as a result LG coalition forms.
Next, let us check whether there exist such conditions that (16) holds when
both parties take a position strictly away from L’s position with βG < 13 and
βR > 13 . First, with r =
4
9 condition (16) reduces to
1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2






From which c can be solved as
c < 2π (18)
However, as noted above, for the parties’ order to be preserved, βG < 13 and
βR > 13 , the costs have to be sufficiently high according to c ≥ π(6− 9r), so
that with r = 49 , c would have to satisfy c ≥ 2π.
Thus, when r = 49 , there is no such β
G < 13 and β
R > 13 , that condition
(16) holds. Furthermore, the term (16− 36r) is on both sides of (16), which
increases as r decreases with r ≤ 49 . Moreover, since (πc + π − π2) > πc,
it is easy to conclude that condition (16) never holds for any c ≥ π(6− 9r),
and r ≤ 49 .
Since there is no such c that condition (16) holds for any βG < 13 and β
R >
1
3 , LG coalition never forms. The equilibrium outcome is that R announces a
position βR < 23 . In effect, R does not have to make the maximum adjustment
according to (10), instead R makes an adjustment that just excludes G from
competition. As a result, LR coalition forms, with the size of the government
budget determined by which of the two parties win the election. This ends the
proof for Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 thus states that when coalition formation is based only
on the frontline policy dimension, the major parties dominate the po-
litical game, leaving no possibility for minor parties to compete of the
coalition membership. Therefore, for a minor party to have a chance at
the political competition, either the cost of programmatic adjustment,
or the rents of the opposition have to be asymmetric, such that it is
more costly for a major party to adjust its frontline position, or the
rents of the opposition are lower for a major party.
Here I have only considered the case of political competition be-
tween G and R, when L is the formateur. The case would be symmet-
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rical if R would be the formateur, and the political competition would
take place between L and the right-wing minor party X.
4.2 Environment
When E = 1, the environmental policy dimension enters into the coali-
tion negotiations. Recall the assumption that eG > 0, and eL = eR =
eX = 0, i.e. only the green party can credibly offer a political pro-
gramme with environmental emphasis. Since eG represents the weight
for the environmental issues in the party manifesto, it is restricted to
be less than one, eG < 1.
Let us again consider the case when L is the expected winner of
the election, with political competition taking place between G and
R. Now L weighs the utility of forming the coalition with R that is
closer to L on the frontline policy dimension, or with G that brings
environmental policy expertise into the government.
Proposition 2 When E = 1, and 12 < π < 1, the equilibrium outcome is
the following. Assuming that L announces βL = 13 , there exists e
G < 1, so
that the announced frontline positions for G and R are βG = 0 and βR = 23 .
If L wins, LG coalition forms with frontline policy set at βLG = βL = 13 ,
environmental policy be = e
G
2 . If R wins, RL coalition forms with frontline
policy set at βRL = βR = 23 , environmental policy b
e = 0
Proposition 2 states that when the environmental policy dimension en-
ters the coalition negotiations, the green party can always provide such
an environmental programme that when L wins, it will be chosen as a
coalition partner over R, since R does not adjust its frontline position.
With G in the coalition, it can directly affect the environmental policy
outcomes.
With the simplifying assumption that L announces its own frontline
position, the agenda-setting for the major parties is symmetric to the
no-environment case, with the solution to R’s problem given by (10).
The proof for proposition 2 then starts with showing how the inclusion
of the environmental policy dimension changes G’s agenda-setting on
the frontline dimension. Then we consider the rule for L to choose the
coalition partner. The proof concludes by showing that G can always
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provide such an environmental programme eG that in the case of L
winning the election, LG coalition forms.
Proof 2 With the environmental policy dimension, G’s problem (11) is now
written as (see Appendix B.3.1)
r < −c(BG − βG)2 + πPBLβG(1− |BL − BG|+ eGL) + (1− π)r (19)
With eGL = eG, the maximum adjustment on the frontline dimension G is
willing to make can be written in terms of eG as
βG <
(2 + 3eG)π +
√
((2 + 3eG)π)2 + (16 + 24eG − 36r)πc
6c
(20)
Since βG is increasing in eG, G has an advantage in the agenda-setting in
comparison to the one-dimensional case as given by (13).
The condition for L to propose to G due to its environmental expertise is
given by (see Appendix B.3.2)
PB
LβG(1− |BL − BL|+ eGL) ≥ PBLβR(1− |BL − BL | +eLR) (21)
with eLG = eG and eLR = 0 this reduces to
(1 + eG)PB
LβG ≥ PBLβR (22)
and finally to




Plugging in R’s solution βR given by (10), βG can be solved such that G is
closer to L than R
βG≥ 1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)− eG(4c + 4− 4π)
6(c + 1− π)(1 + eG)
(24)
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Conditions (20) and (24) together form the condition that LG coalition forms
1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)− eG(4c + 4− 4π)
6(c + 1− π)(1 + eG)
≤ βG
<
(2 + 3eG)π +
√
((2 + 3eG)π)2 + (16 + 24eG − 36r)πc
6c
(25)
Let us check whether there exists 0 < eG < 1 such that condition (25) holds
for βG = 0, i.e. when G stays in its true frontline position. With βG = 0, the
right-hand side holds for any eG > 0. Left-hand side, on the other hand, reads
as
1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)− 4eG(c + 1− π)
6(c + 1− π)(1 + eG)
≤ 0
Solving eG gives
eG ≥ 1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)
4(c + 1− π) (26)
Recall that eG < 1. Note that the numerator in (26) increases as r decreases,
with the value of the numerator the highest when r = 0. Thus it is sufficient
to check that eG < 1 when r = 0.
1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + 16(πc + π − π2)
4(c + 1− π) < 1
which holds when c > 5π−14
Thus there exists such eG that when G remains in its initial frontline
position with βG = 0 it becomes a more favourable coalition partner to L than
R. G could also adjust its position on the frontline dimension needing to put
less emphasis on the secondary dimension, so that condition (25) is satisfied;
the closer to L on the left-right scale G moves, the less of its environmental
expertise is required for a coalition to form. This ends proof for Proposition 2.
To conclude, while in the one-dimensional case, the minor parties
find it difficult to compete against the major parties at the coalition
formation stage, the inclusion of the environmental dimension helps G
win R by enabling it to set a political programme that is more attractive
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to the formateur L.
Proposition 2 states that when the only restriction on the environ-
mental policy dimension is that the emphasis the green party attaches
to it has to be less than one, eG < 1, then for any frontline position
taken by R, G can always respond by putting enough emphasis on the
environmental dimension, while staying in its initial frontline position,
and win coalition membership.
This section has shown the importance of the secondary policy
dimension for minor parties, like the environmental policy dimen-
sion for green parties in gaining political power in coalition politics
in times when environmental expertise in the governing coalition is
valued. This model has made some simplifying assumptions about
the agenda-setting; only the green party has been assumed to attach a
positive weight to the environmental issues, and the announcements
on the secondary dimension have been assumed to be costless. A more
realistic approach would be to restrict eG to be less than for instance
0.5 or 0.25. Furthermore, imposing a cost also on the secondary di-
mension would restrict G’s willingness to attach a very large weight
on environmental issues. These would make agenda-setting more re-
alistic, since they would require G to adjust also its frontline position.
4.3 Discussion of the framework
This section has analysed how parties’ programmatic positions affect
their coalition potential. The parties weigh the utility of being in the
governing coalition against the cost of adjusting their programmatic
positions from their ’true’ ideological positions. The model thus brings
the comparison of enjoying pure office rents of being in the opposition
to having more direct influence on policy outcomes, but having to
make some ideological sacrifices in the process. Since the final policy
outcomes are affected only by preferences of government parties, as
in Baron and Diermeier (2001), parties have an incentive to be in the
governing coalition.
In the one-dimensional case, the coalition outcome is based on the
parties’ announced left-right positions on the frontline dimension. The
formateur always proposes to the party closest to it, which creates po-
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litical competition to the two potential coalition partners. Which of the
parties wins the competition and forms the coalition with the forma-
teur, depends on the underlying factors defining political competition.
A minor party can be pivotal in the sense that it can never form a gov-
erning coalition alone or with another minor party, but together with a
major party it can turn a coalition into a winning one. The main result
shows that under symmetric conditions for all parties, minor parties
find it difficult to compete against major parties, and thus the political
game is dominated by the major parties.
On the other hand, when the secondary policy dimension in the
form of an environmental (preference) shock is added, it gives a clear
benefit to the green minor party. The ideological dimension can thus
be regarded as a strategic tool for the minor party that the major par-
ties lack that increases their coalition potential at times when environ-
mental expertise is at demand.
To conclude, minor parties need some sort of competitive advan-
tage, either in the form of asymmetric competition, or policy expertise,
to gain more power in comparison to the major parties, and to ulti-
mately have the power to affect policy outcomes. This paper has only
analysed the environmental policy dimension and an environmental
minor party. The framework could however be easily generalised to
other minor parties and policy dimensions as well, such as extreme
right parties and immigration issues, or regionalist parties with their
agendas.
5 EUROPEAN GREEN PARTIES AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICIES
This section tests empirically the role of the green parties’ policy posi-
tions on environmental policy outcomes. I use a sample of 9 European
countries with proportional electoral systems; Austria, Belgium, Fin-
land, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
Sweden. Time period is 1990 to 2010 during which there have been al-
together 55 national parliamentary elections, and in each country there
has been an environmental party (almost) throughout this period.
110
Since it is impossible to measure to what extent parties’ positional
changes can be contributed to strategic agenda-setting, the coalition
formation model presented in the previous section cannot be tested
directly. Instead, I test the relationship between the green parties’ pro-
grammatic positions as they have been announced in their party man-
ifestos, and the environmental policy outcomes. First, adjustments on
the frontline dimension are measured through changes in the green
parties coalition ability, measured as a modified Banzhaf index. The
green parties’ ’greenness’ is measured as the share of their party man-
ifestos dedicated to environmental issues.
5.1 Data
As the indicator for the national environmental policy, environmental
data from Eurostat is used. The dependent variable is the share of
environmental taxation of total revenues from taxes and social contri-
butions (ETR of TSC), since it allows comparison across countries; even
though there might be other objectives to collecting environmental tax
revenue than environmental protection, the availability of an environ-
mental policy measure that would be available for a long period time
and comparable across countries is scarce.
Parliamentary election results and green parties’ policy positions
are from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) database (Volkens
et al., 2013). The CMP data is quantitative content analysis of party
manifestos. There are fifty-six categories that are grouped under seven
major policy areas. Each data entry represents the percentage of quasi-
sentences of the total length of the manifesto.
To capture the front-line policy position of a party this paper uses
CMP category Rile, which is the right-left position of a party as given
in Laver and Budge (1992). This is calculated as a share of sentences
having a right-wing connotation minus the share of sentences having
a left-wing connotation. Since this category can have negative values, I
have normalised it between 0 and 100 so that 0 corresponds to extreme
left-wing party and 100 corresponds to extreme right-wing party. The
secondary policy dimension, a party’s environmental policy position
is captured by the CMP variable Environmental Protection (per 501).
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This includes the following topics in the party manifesto: ’Preservation
of countryside, forests, etc.; general preservation of natural resources
against selfish interests; proper use of national parks; soil banks, etc.;
environmental improvement’.
Papers using CMP data include e.g. Jensen and Spoon (2011), Os-
terloh and Debus (2012), Neumayer (2003a), Neumayer (2003b), and
Bräuninger (2005). The benefit of the CMP data is that it allows com-
parisons across time and space. For instance, social democratic par-
ties in different countries may have different emphasis on certain pol-
icy objectives, or, a party’s stress of policy objectives might change
over time (Osterloh and Debus, 2012). The problem with CMP data is
the reliability of party manifestos in defining parties’ policy positions;
the party elites writing them may have multiple objectives in mind.
However, since the party manifestos are strategically written official
documents, in case of failing to deliver what has been promised in
them party leaders can be held responsible (Budge and Garry 2000).
Furthermore, the party manifestos provide a history of how a party’s
policy positions have changed over time.
As a final remark, it is important to note the difference between
policy emphasis and policy position. Two parties may have different po-
sitions on a policy dimension, but still have the same emphasis on this
policy matter (Budge and Garry 2000). Even though the CMP data is
in terms of policy emphasis, there are some coding categories that deal
more directly with positional issues, such as the category for environ-
mental protection. A party not promoting environmental values does
not put any emphasis on environmental policies in its manifesto - no
party surely puts policy emphasis on the degradation of nature.
The data on the coalition government compositions is gathered
from the Political Data Yearbooks published annually by the European
Journal of Political Research.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable,
and for the green parties in the 9 sample countries. The construction
of the weighted BI will be discussed in the next subsection. Table 2
presents further statistics for the sample countries; the average number
of parties in each legislature, the average number of parties in the
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governing coalition, and the number of occasions the green party has
been in the governing coalition.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics environmental taxation and green parties
in sample countries
N Mean Std. dev. Min Max
ETR % of TSC 184 6.8 1.6 4.0 10.5
Green party vote share 55 6.8 3.2 1.2 21.7
Green party seat share 55 6.2 3.4 0 22.2
Weighted BI 55 6.6 6.7 0 33.6
Share of (%) manifesto sentences on
environmental protection 55 17 10 3 40
Position on the left-right scale
0=left, 100=right 55 42 6 31 60
5.2 Empirical strategy
Estimating party representation effects on policy outcomes is prob-
lematic due to the difficulty of differentiating the underlying voter
preferences from the actual policy choices. When it comes to environ-
mental policy, for instance, it might not be the increased seat share for
the green party that has a positive impact in environmental protection
policies; instead it might be a result of the voters becoming greener
thereby affecting policy choices by all parties, not only environmen-
tal parties. The problems of reverse causality or omitted variables
are more broadly discussed in Folke (2014) and Freier and Odendahl
(2012). To estimate how changes in seat allocation at the municipal
level affect policy outcomes Folke (2011) and Fiva et al. (2013) use a
Table 2: Average no. of parties in parliament (1), average no. of parties
in governing coalition (2), no. of times greens in the government (3).
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Austria 4.5 2.6 0 Ireland 6.2 2.3 1
Belgium 10.2 4.3 1 Luxembourg 5.6 2 0
Finland 8 4.5 3 Netherlands 7 2.6 0
Germany 4.8 2 2 Sweden 7 2.2 0
Iceland 5 2.2 1
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modified regression discontinuity design solve the identification prob-
lem.
The aim in this paper is not to assess how changes in policy out-
comes can be contributed to a certain party gaining or losing a seat
at the parliament, but to analyse the importance of programmatic po-
sitions. To do this, I test the relationship between the green parties’
programmatic positions, and environmental policy outcomes. The de-
pendent variable is the amount of environmental taxation as a share
of total revenue from taxes and social contributions, Etaxi,t in country
i in year t.
The main result in the theoretical section was to show that when it
comes to the green parties’ ability to affect environmental policy out-
comes, it is their attractiveness as coalition partners that matters, since
a presence in the governing coalition enables them to affect policy out-
comes directly. While the theoretical model was very simplified, and
analysed strategic movements only on one of the dimensions, in reality
parties adjust their positions on multiple dimensions.
In this section, to link the data to the theory, I use the following
variables. First, to test the importance of the adjustments on the front-
line policy dimension, I construct a modified Banzhaf index, which
is based on the green parties’ realised seat shares, and their left-right
positions as stated in the party manifestos. The normalised Banzhaf
index is weighed by the probability of coalition formation between
the parliamentary parties. Following Freier and Odendahl (2011), the
political power of green party g is defined as
WBIg = βwg =
ηwg
∑ ηwn
where ηwg is the number of coalitions where party g is pivotal weighted
by the likelihood of coalition formation, i.e. the distance between g and
the other coalition parties.9 The difference to Freier & Odendahl, who
9In practice the WBI calculated as follows. First, based on the realised seat alloca-
tion, all the potential winning coalitions are counted using the simple majority rule.
Then the number of potential coalitions where a party is a critical player is divided
by all the potential winning coalitions (normalised BI). Finally, all these coalitions
are weighed by the probability of coalition formation between the parties. In case
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take parties’ left-right positions to be fixed over time and space10, is
that the overall policy positions are let to change from one electoral
period to the next. This index is then taken to represent the green
parties’ political power at the post-electoral stage. It is expected to be
positively correlated with environmental policy outcomes.
ENVg, is the variable capturing the green party’s environmental
policy position. Finally, I add an interaction term WBI × ENV11, since
a positive effect on the dependent variable might take place if the two
independent variables interact. The basic model to be estimated then
reads as











where µi,t is a country fixed effect. I add country fixed effects to hold
constant potential unobserved country specific characteristics, such as
different attitudes towards environment across the sample countries.
Since government budgets are usually decided in the previous year, I
use the explanatory variables in year t− 1 to predict the impact on the
dependent variable in year t. For example, to see the effect of the green
party’s political power on the environmental policy in year 1990, the
political power it has in 1989 is used. Furthermore, since the budgets
are decided every year, whereas parliamentary elections are held every
three to five years, the political power measure based on the seat share
for every year between two consecutive elections is used.
An underlying assumption in the theoretical section was that only
the green party can credibly provide a political programme with en-
vironmental dimension. However, in reality it is not only parties that
have been classified as environmental parties that may have an inter-
est in environmental policies; in fact, most political parties put some
emphasis on environmental protection issues. Therefore, I test what
of three or more parties, the ideological distance between the two parties that are
ideologically the farthest from each other is used.
10Freier and Odendahl take policy positions for German parties as derived in F.U.
Pappi & G. Eckstein (1998) Public Choice, 97(3).
11Note, the interaction term is based on centred variables WBI and ENV.
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is the role of an environmental party representation in the parliament
and/or in the government, in comparison to parliaments/governing
coalitions formed of only non-environmental parties. To do this, I
calculate an environmental position index, IENV for each legislative
period by weighing the environmental position of each parliamentary
party as stated in party manifestos by their relative seat shares. To the
9 sample countries with green party representation in the parliament, I
add Denmark, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal, where environmental
parties are non-existent or have relatively low seat shares in national
parliaments. The second estimation then reads as
Etaxi,t = α + β1 IENVi,t−1 + β2µi + εi (28)
where µi is a country fixed effect.
5.3 Results
Results of the first regression are presented in table 3. The depen-
dent variable is the share of total environmental tax revenue of total
revenues from taxes and social contributions (ETR % TSC). The first
column (1) presents the results for the regression without the inter-
action term; the coefficient for both WBI and ENV are insignificant.
The second column (2) adds the interaction term. One can see that the
coefficient for WBI is now significant at 1% level. This means that for
a green party with an average environmental position, an increase in
its political power through an adjustment on the frontline dimension
has a positive impact on the amount of environmental taxation. This
result holds when adding a dummy indicating whether the greens
are in the government (3) to (5), and adding a dummy for a govern-
ment with a left-wing party as the head of the government (4), or a
right-wing party as the head of the government (5). Thus, according
to these results, the political power of the green parties, in the form of
the weighed Banzhaf index, has a positive correlation with the amount
of environmental taxation. On the other hand, the ’greenness’ of the
green parties, i.e. how much emphasis they put on the environmen-
tal dimension does not have a statistically significant relationship with
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the dependent variable.
Table 3: Dependent variable=ETR % TSC.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WBI 0.021 ’ 0.036** 0.032* 0.029* 0.032*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
ENV 0.006 0.011 0.013 0.015’ 0.015’
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
WBI*ENV 0.363** 0.367** 0.374** 0.422**
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.135)
Dummy for Greens in gov’t yes yes yes
Dummy for Left lead gov’t yes
Dummy for Right lead gov’t yes
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes
N 179 179 179 179 179
Adj. R-squared 0.788 0.796 0.796 0.799 0.801
Std. error in parenthesis. *** p< 0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ’p<0.10
Next, the results for the relationship between the legislature’s av-
erage environmental position and outcome variable are presented in
table 4. Surprisingly the coefficient for the average environmental po-
sition of the legislature has a negative coefficient. To interpret, the
higher is the average environmental emphasis of the parliamentary
parties, the lower is the amount of environmental taxation. Further-
more, the presence of the green party in the parliament seems to be
negatively correlated with the amount of environmental taxation. The
dummy variable indicating the presence of the greens in the governing
coalition, has however a positive but insignificant sign. The identity of
the largest party in the government, does not change the results.
It is important to note that these results report only correlations
between the political power of environmental parties and the outcome
variable, and does not claim to say anything of the causality. The re-
sults however support the hypothesis that the overall political position
of the green parties matters through determining their coalition abil-
ity, although of course this measure is complementary to changes in
their seat shares. There is a a positive correlation between the political
power of the green parties and the outcome variable. On the other
hand, there is no significant correlation between the greens’ environ-
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Table 4: Dependent variable=ETR as % of TSC.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average env. position -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007***
of the legislature (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy for G in gov’t 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002 (0.002)
Dummy for G in parl -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy for L lead gov’t yes
Dummy for R lead gov’t yes
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 289 289 289 289 289 289
Adj. R-squared 0.789 0.788 0.810 0.809 0.812 0.812
Std. error in parenthesis. *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p<0.05
mental position and environmental taxes. Furthermore, since the aver-
age environmental position of the legislature is negatively correlated
with environmental taxes, it seems that environmental positions of
parties are not crucial in determining environmental policies. Finally,
since the coefficient for the presence of the greens in the parliament
has a negative sign, it supports the assumption of the theoretical part
that only parties in the governing coalition matter when it comes to
policy outcomes.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has studied parliamentary politics from the perspective of
a minor party. In the theoretical part of the paper, I show that in a two-
dimensional policy framework, when the coalition formation is based
only on the frontline dimension, the minor parties find it difficult to
compete against the major parties. When the secondary dimension be-
comes of importance, due to for instance an environmental shock, the
minor party’s secondary policy expertise becomes valuable to other
coalition parties as well. By observing the state of the environment
prior to setting its policy positions, the green party can choose them
strategically to increase its chances of being in the governing coalition.
The framework has been built on the idea that when the parties are
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defining their political programmes, it is mainly done as a strategic
game vis-a-vis to other parliamentary parties. The role of voters and
their voting behaviour have not been formalised here, but the role of
voters have been taken into account in the form of a preference shock
shifting the role of the largest party, as well as a shock on the elec-
torate’s environmental preferences. I believe this simplification man-
ages to describe the reality, since in reality no party can respond to
any single voter’s preferences, but respond to changes in voters’ pref-
erences as a whole, and as a response to programmatic positions of
other parties.
In the empirical part of the paper I test the relationship between
green parties’ programmatic positions and environmental tax revenue
with data from 9 European countries for a twenty year period. When
the adjustments on the left-right dimension are measured through a
modified Banzhaf index, the results show a positive correlation for
the political power of the green parties and environmental policy out-
comes. The correlation between the green party’s environmental pol-
icy position and policy outcomes turns out to be insignificant. When
adding a set of five countries with no (significant) green representation
in the parliament, the results indicate a negative correlation between
the average environmental position of the legislature and the amount
of environmental taxation.
This paper provides one explanation for parties’ changing policy
positions over the years as discussed in the introduction; changes in
the green parties’ overall left-right positions, as well as in the empha-
sis they attach to environmental issues can be regarded as strategic




Figure 1: The share of sentences on environmental protection issues
by green parties in 9 European countries, vertical axis=% (CMP).
Figure 2: Left-right programmatic position of green parties in 9 Euro-
pean countries. 0=left, 1=right (CMP).
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Figure 3: Environmental taxation: ’An environmental tax is a tax
whose tax base is a physical unit (or a proxy of it) of something that
has a proven, specific negative impact on the environment. Total rev-
enues for environmental taxes include taxes on transport, energy, pol-
lution and resources’ (Eurostat).
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B APPENDIX
B.1 Agenda-setting when L adjusts its position
In the main text, it is assumed that L stays at its true position, and thus
announces βL = BL = 13 . Let us consider what the outcome would be if
this assumption was relaxed, so that L would also optimise its position
prior to election.
If there is any uncertainty of the winner of the election, if L is
to change its own position, it is towards R; if L loses the election, it
can still be a member of the coalition with R as the formateur. If L
moves towards G, in the case of losing the election, it will be in the
opposition. Similarly, if R is to change its positions, it is towards L.
Thus, in the following let us denote the announced positions for L and
R as βL = BL + dL and βR = BR − dR, with dL,dR ≥ 0.
First, let us note that it has to hold that βL≤ βR for the parties’ order
on the left-right scale to remain. Since βL = BL + dL and βR = BR − dR
this can be written as 13 + d
L≤ 23 − dR⇒ dL≤
1
3 − dR. Thus, dL + dR≤
1
3 .
The optimal agenda-setting for the major parties can be analysed
as a Stackelberg style of game; L is the leader, with its optimal po-
sition depending on R’s position. Upon observing dL, R announces
dR, which depends on dL. The agenda-setting of the major parties can
be solved by backwards induction. When both parties move closer
to each other, the weight for their coalition increases to Pβ
LβR = 1− |
(13 + d
L)− (23 − dR) |=
2
3 + d
R + dL. First, the optimisation problem for
the follower R can be written as





− dR))2 + π(2
3






+ dL + dR)(1− dR)
Taking a partial derivative with respect to dR and equating it to zero,
we can solve R’s reaction function as
dR(dL) =
1 + π − (3− 6π)dL
6(c + 1− π)
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Now, we see that the R’s reaction function is increasing in dL. While
this might seem counterintuitive, in this model, the parties gain more
utility of the coalition the closer their announced positions are to each
other due to the increased weight for the coalition.
Next, the optimisation problem for the leader L reads as





+ dL))2 + π(
2
3
+ dL + dR(dL))(1− dL)
+(1− π)(2
3




Taking a partial derivative with respect to dL, and solving dL gives
dL∗ =
2πc− 5c− 4c2 + 4πc + 3π2 − 3π
24πc− 18c− 12c2 − 24π2c + 36π3 − 42π2 + 3π − 3
Recall that dL + dR ≤ 13 . Plugging R’s reaction function into the left-
hand side of this inequality, we see that
dL ≤ 2c + 1− 3π
6c + 3
which holds when c ≥ 3π−12 .
Let us consider dL∗ when c = 1. It is easy to see that as π → 1,




Now, allowing L to optimise its position means that the political
competition reduces to agenda-setting between the major parties with
no role for the minor parties; as L and R both move towards the polit-
ical centre, the minor parties have no chance in the competition with
the major parties.
Thus, assuming that L announces its true position is a simplifica-
tion, however, when the political competition between the coalition
partners is such that it allows them to position themselves close to L,
this assumption does not alter the qualitative results of the game.
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B.2 Agenda-setting when E = 0
In this section I provide a more detailed analysis of how the announced
positions are derived for R and G, that constitute the proof for Propo-
sition 1 in the main text, when we assume that L does not adjust its
position, i.e. other parties observe βL = BL = 13 .
In the following, I solve the maximum movements for R in sub-
section B.2.1, and for G in subsection B.2.2. When both parties take a
position towards L, their announced positions as presented in the main
text are given by βR = BR − dR and βG = BG + dG, with dG,dR ≥ 0. In
subsection B.2.3 I present the rule for L to choose the coalition partner,
and check the conditions when this condition holds.
B.2.1 Right-wing major party R
When setting its own agenda, R has observed L’s announced position
βL = BL = 13 . When R announces a position towards L, its adjusted
position is denoted as βR = BR − dR = 23 − dR, with 0 ≤ dR ≤
1
3 . The
problem for R is to solve
πvNCr + (1− π)vRXR < −c(BR − βR)2 + πvLRR + (1− π)vRLR
πr + (1− π)PBRBX(1− |BR − BR|) < −c(BR − βR)2 + πPBLβR(1− |BL − BR|)
+(1− π)PBLβR(1− |βR − BR|)
πr + (1− π) · 2
3




− dR))2 + π(2
3





The left-hand side represents the utility if R stays at its original posi-
tion, and thus announces βR = BR = 23 . With probability π, L wins,
and R is in the opposition enjoying rents r. With probability 1− π,
R wins the election and forms a coalition with the right-wing minor
party X (due to the tie-breaking rule). The weight for RX coalition is
PB
RBX = 23 . R has proposal making power, and it proposes B
R = 23
giving R the full utility of the coalition. The right-hand side rep-
resents the utility of adjusting the frontline position from BR = 23 to
βR = BR − dR = 23 − dR. The first term represents the cost attached to
programmatic adjustment, the second term is the utility of forming the
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coalition with L. The weight for LR coalition after R’s adjustment is
PB
LβR = 23 + d
R. L is the formateur with proposal making power, and
proposing BL = 13 . The last term represents the utility when R itself is
the formateur with proposal making power; however having adjusted
its own position the utility of proposal-making power is reduced by
the size of the movement. Re-arranging terms we have
(c− 1 + π)dR2 − 1 + π
3





1 + π −
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)
6(c + 1− π)
and
dR2 =
1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)
6(c + 1− π)
So that (29) holds for dR1 < d
R < dR2 .
Recall that R’s movement from its true position is restricted to be
0≤ dR ≤ 13 . Note that dR1 > 0 only for r >
4
9 , whereas the analysis in the
main text is restricted to cases when the value of the outside option
is r ≤ 49 . The lower limit for dR thus is zero, with dR2 representing
the upper limit; 0 ≤ dR < dR2 . R’s announced frontline position βR =




− 1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)
6(c + 1− π)
βR >
4c + 3− 5π −
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)
6(c + 1− π)
Furthermore, since R cannot set a programme more leftist that L, it has
to hold that βR ≥ 13 . We can solve the value for c such that the parties’
original order on the left-right scale is preserved
4c + 3− 5π −
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)
6(c + 1− π) ≥
1
3
⇒ c ≥ π(6− 9r)
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B.2.2 Green minor party G
When setting its own programme, G has observed both L and R’s
programmes. When G announces a position towards L, its adjusted
position is denoted as βG = BG + dG = 0 + dG, with 0 ≤ dG ≤ 13 . The
problem for G is different from R’s, since G can never be the formateur
of the coalition with the power to propose the frontline policy. G solves
the following problem
vNCG < −c(BG − βG)2 + πvLGG + (1− π)vNCG
r < −c(BG − βG)2 + πPBLβG(1− |BL − BG|) + (1− π)r
r < −c(0− (0− dG))2 + π(2
3
+ dG) · 2
3
+ (1− π)r
The left-hand side represents the utility of staying in its initial position
and hence being out of the coalition. The first term on the right-hand
represents the cost of changing the front-line position, the second term
the utility of forming a coalition with L. When G moves towards L, the
weight for the LG coalition is PB
LβG = 23 + d
G. The last term represents
the possibility that R wins the election, in which case G will be out


















4π2 + (16− 36r)πc
6c
So that (30) holds for dG1 < d
G < dG2 . Again, G’s movement from its
true position is restricted to be 0≤ dG ≤ 13 . Since dG1 > 0 only for r >
4
9 ,
the lower limit for dG is zero; 0 ≤ dG < dG2 . G’s announced position




4π2 + (16− 36r)πc
6c
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For the parties’ order on the left-right scale to be preserved, we can
solve such c that βG ≤ 13
2π +
√




⇒ c ≥ π(6− 9r)
B.2.3 Condition for LG coalition
L proposes a coalition to G, if the weight of LG coalition is higher than
the weight of LR coalition
PB
LβG ≥ PBLβR
1− |BL − βG| ≥ 1− |BL − βR|
| 1
3
− βG| ≤ |1
3
− βR|
Since βG ≤ 13 and βR ≥
1
3 , this can be rewritten as
1
3





Plugging βR on the right-hand side, βG can be solved as
βG ≥ 1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)
6(c + 1− π)
And thus, the condition for LG coalition to form is given by
1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)





4π2 + (16− 36r)πc
6c
(31)
In the main text I discuss the case when both parties set their pro-
grammes to match that of L’s, with βG = 13 , and β
R = 13 . Let us consider
if (31) holds for any βG < 13 and β
R > 13 , i.e. when both parties set their
programmes strictly away from 13 .
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First, with r = 49 condition (31) reduces to
1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2





c(1 + π) + c
√
(1 + π)2 < 2π(c + 1− π) + (c + 1− π)
√
4π2
c + πc < 2πc + 2π + 2π2
(1− π)c < (1− π)2π
c < 2π
Thus, when r = 49 , condition (31) holds for c < 2π. However, for β
G < 13
and βR > 13 , c has to be sufficiently high according to c≥ π(6− 9r), so
that with r = 49 , c > 2π. Thus, when r =
4
9 , there is no such β
G < 13 and
βR > 13 , that condition (31) holds.
Furthermore, since (16− 36r)(πc + π−π2)> (16− 36r)πc for any
r < 49 it is easy to conclude that condition (31) never holds.
B.3 Agenda-setting when E = 1
B.3.1 Green minor party G
The problem for G with the environmental policy dimension is stated
as
vNCG < −c(BG − βG)2 + πvLGG + (1− π)vNCG
r < −c(0− (0 + βG))2 + πPBLβG(1− |BL − BG|+ eG) + (1− π)r





+ eG) + (1− π)r




4π + 6eGπ − 9rπ
9
Solving dG and recalling that βG = 0 + dG
βG <
(2 + 3eG)π +
√
((2 + 3eG)π)2 + (16 + 24eG − 36r)πc
6c
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B.3.2 Condition for LG coalition
(1 + eG)PB
LβG ≥ PBLβR
(1 + eG)(1− | 1
3
− βG |) ≥ 1− | 1
3
− βR |
(1 + eG)(1− (1
3
− βG)) ≥ 1− (βR − 1
3
)
(1 + eG)βG ≥ 2
3
− βR − 2
3
eG
βG ≥ 2− 3β
R − 2eG
3(1 + eG)
Plugging βR on the right-hand side of this inequality, and rearranging
terms, βG can be solved as
βG ≥ 1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)− 4eG(c + 1− π)
6(c + 1− π)(1 + eG)
With the environmental policy dimension included, the frontline posi-
tion βG has to satisfy the following condition
1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)− 4eG(c + 1− π)
6(c + 1− π)(1 + eG)
≤ βG
<
(2 + 3eG)π +
√
((2 + 3eG)π)2 + (16 + 24eG − 36r)πc
6c
With βG = 0, the left-hand side reads as
1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)− 4eG(c + 1− π)
6(c + 1− π)(1 + eG)
≤ 0
Solving eG gives
eG ≥ 1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + (16− 36r)(πc + π − π2)
4(c + 1− π)
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Let us to check that eG < 1 when r = 0.
1 + π +
√
(1 + π)2 + 16(πc + π − π2)
4(c + 1− π) < 1
2c2 + (3− 7π)c + (5π2 − 6π + 1) > 0
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Abstract
This paper analyses long-term decision making with two alterna-
tive policy-making regimes. Decision making is allocated either
to an elected politician or to an appointed bureaucrat. The in-
cumbent’s task is to finance a long-term public good, and the
policy choice in each period is to set the income tax rate. There
are high and low competence policy makers. An incumbent of
high talent can set a lower tax rate, but he also has incentives to
engage in excessive rent-seeking. The politician and the bureau-
crat are distinguished by having different incentives to perform
well. The aim is to look at how the different accountability mech-
anisms affect policy choices, and the utility of the citizens. The
results show that having different incentives do play a role, when
it comes to finding such conditions that the incumbent can be in-
duced to set a lower tax rate that benefits the citizens. While a
highly competitive private sector can motivate a bureaucrat to
set a low tax rate, a problem emerges if the bureucrat proves to
be of low competence, since the citizens have no means to get
rid of him. Thus, while it may be difficult to motivate a politi-
cian to set a very low tax rate, the direct disciplining mechanism
of public elections is important when there is uncertainty of the
incumbent’s competence.
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One central topic in the literature of political economy is how policy
makers can be held accountable. Accountability relates to how policy
makers’ incentives are being set and monitored; what motivates them
and how are they rewarded or punished for their behaviour. The abil-
ity of a society to hold their policy makers accountable boils down to
choosing institutions that make policy making transparent and enable
monitoring of policy makers’ actions. Knut Wicksell noted already in
1896,2 that improvements in public policy making could be achieved
by shifting focus from alternative policy choices to changing the struc-
ture of political decision making (Buchanan, 1997, p. 24). This paper
takes a similar approach by focusing on the optimality of the institu-
tion the society entrusts with policy choices, instead of assessing the
optimality of the policy choices per se.
This paper analyses the allocation of decision-making authority re-
garding a long-term publicly financed project either to i) an elected
politician or ii) a non-elected (appointed) bureaucrat, whose difference
lies in their accountability mechanisms. The politician is motivated by
his will for re-election, whereas the bureaucrat aspires for a well-paid
private sector job. This paper thus relates to the literature discussing
the incentives of accountable and unaccountable policy makers, and
analysing their performance in public office, such as Maskin and Ti-
role (2004), Alesina and Tabellini (2007), Alesina and Tabellini (2008),
and Borgne and Lockwood (2006).
The importance of an appropriate accountability mechanism is es-
pecially evident when long-term policy choices are in question. The
problems of imperfect commitment and time-inconsistency are rele-
vant in all public policy questions; especially broadly discussed they
have been in the context of monetary policy, where the discussion of
discretion vs. rules has been central for decades.3 It is well accepted
that the lack of commitment to inflation targeting is detrimental to
economic performance. In practise, the commitment problem has been
2Knut Wicksell (1896) Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen.
3See e.g. Taylor (2011) for a recent overview of rules vs. discretion discussion in
economic policy.
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solved in many countries by separating political governments from in-
dependent central banks. According to Blinder (1997), central banks
are more capable of dealing with monetary policy than politicians due
to its technicality and requirement for professional knowledge that
elected politicians may lack. Also, the effects of monetary policy take
time to filter through the economy, whereas politicians’ time horizons
tend to be shorter; the painful part of implementing monetary policies
usually comes well before the gains. Politicians with their eyes on the
next elections may be incapable of implementing strict anti-inflation
policies.
While monetary policy is usually delegated exclusively to indepen-
dent institutions, fiscal policy, on the other hand, is usually decided by
elected politicians and implemented by appointed bureaucrats. How-
ever, recent events for instance in Europe have questioned the optimal-
ity of this arrangement. For example, in Italy, the politically elected
government was replaced by a technocratic government in November
2011 due to the instabilities in the country’s political system. Also, fis-
cal policy committees have been set up in many countries as indepen-
dent policy advisors to political governments.4 Finally, the question
of delegation is related to the prospect of increased integration in the
European Union in the form of a common fiscal policy that has been
discussed in recent years.
If political governments are unable to commit to hard policies in
bad times, why do we not delegate public policies to appointed offi-
cials in the first place? Also, high officials are usually appointed due
to their expertise in policy matters, instead of their popularity or polit-
ical ideology as is the case with politicians. Therefore, it would seem
natural to delegate policy authority to appointed officials. Alesina and
Tabellini (2008, p. 429) write that ”if society could write unrestricted
optimal performance contracts with its policy makers, then the ques-
tion [of optimal delegation] – would be utterly uninteresting: bureau-
cratic delegation under an optimal contract would always dominate
political delegation – [however] this implication does not even come
4Of course, it is not very clear what is the ultimate decision making power of
these independent committees. See discussion in Kopits (2011).
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close to any observed institutional arrangement”.
One important difference between monetary and fiscal policy is
that the latter is closely related to the politically sensitive issue of re-
distribution. However, both forms of economic policy have some com-
mon goals such as economic stability or growth. Furthermore, the
objective of both price stability and fiscal discipline is to be achieved
in the long term, whereas short-term deviations may be desirable in
the face of unexpected shocks (Wyplosz, 2011). This paper does not
aim to suggest that all fiscal policy questions should be delegated ex-
clusively to either type, but to analyse one case of policy delegation to
one of the two alternative policy-making regimes.
This paper analyses how a decision maker’s incentives affect his
performance in office when the task is to provide a predetermined
level of public good each period in an infinite horizon framework.
Once it is decided that a tax funded public good will be introduced,
the incumbent sets the tax rate, collects the tax revenue and after fi-
nancing the public good, takes the rest as private rents for himself.
There are high competence and low competence policy makers un-
der either regime. The higher is the competence of the incumbent,
the lower he can set the tax rate, finance the public good, and still
take some rents for himself. Thus, having a high competence pol-
icy maker in the public office is ex ante preferred from the citizens’
point of view. The problem is that instead of setting a lower tax rate,
the incumbent has incentives to extract more rents for himself. This
rent-seeking behaviour is constrained by the politician’s wish to get
re-elected, whereas the bureaucrat is motivated by the prospect of a
private sector job.
The results of this paper show that the two incentive mechanism
produce different outcomes. When the conditions are such that the
high competence incumbents cannot be distinguished from the low
competence ones, the results suggest the following. When the politi-
cian is the chosen regime, a high competence politician is more mo-
tivated to set a lower tax rate, than a low competence politician who
is more likely to extract the maximum amount of rents despite this
reducing his re-election chances. When bureaucracy is the chosen
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regime, it is the low competence one who would benefit more of the
private sector job, and thus is is the low type that is motivated to set
the lower tax rate, whereas the high competence bureaucrat is more
likely to take full advantage of his public sector job and extract the
maximum private rents.
On the other hand, under the conditions when a high competence
incumbent separates from a low competence one, the findings are the
following. A high competence politician can be induced to reveal his
true competence by setting a tax rate that is lower than what a low
competence politician can set. However, due to the specification of the
game, the signalling lasts only one period. Thus, within this frame-
work, it is difficult to take full advantage of having a high skilled
politician in office, since he cannot be induced to a long-term com-
mitment to a tax rate that reflects his true competence. Moreover, this
outcome is sensitive to the assumption about the electorate’s commit-
ment to the proposed voting rule.
For the bureaucrat, a highly competitive private sector can induce
a high competence bureaucrat to reveal his true competence by set-
ting a tax rate below any tax rate a low competence bureaucrat can
ever set. The difference to the politician is that signalling stage lasts
for several periods, until the bureaucrat receives the private sector job.
Thus, from the citizens’ perspective, a highly skilled bureaucrat in of-
fice who is motivated by a highly competitive private sector job is
preferred. The problem, however, arises if the bureaucrat proves to be
a low competence one, who extracts the maximum amount of rents in
the public sector with the citizens having no way to dismiss him from
office.
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2, the previous lit-
erature is presented. Section 3 presents the model and the players.
Section 4 discusses the case of symmetric information about the in-
cumbent competence, and section 5 adds asymmetric information to
the framework, and discusses the main findings. Section 6 concludes.
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2 PREVIOUS LITERATURE
This paper relates to the literature on policy maker’s incentives. Politi-
cians are directly accountable to citizens, so that bad behaviour can
be disciplined by citizens voting them out of office. Politicians’ hopes
of re-election should motivate them to behave in an socially optimal
way, i.e. to act on the behalf of the public and to avoid engagement
in rent-seeking activities. The literature on elections as a disciplining
mechanism is extensive; it has been discussed e.g. in Rogoff (1990),
Berganza (2000), Maskin and Tirole (2004), Müller (2007), and Smart
and Sturm (2013). On the one hand, the citizens can elect competent
individuals in office (ex ante disciplining), on the other, they can con-
trol the behaviour of the elected officials by the threat of not being
reappointed (ex post disciplining). This paper considers especially the
latter role; the threat of not getting re-elected should act as a disciplin-
ing mechanism for the politician.
The problem with the use of elections as a disciplining mechanism
is that it may result in policy distortions. Rogoff (1990) finds that politi-
cians have stronger incentives to appear competent before up-coming
elections; in pre-election periods, incumbents signal their competence
through specific policy choices and by abstaining from rent-seeking
to show their competence. This kind of strategic behaviour, however,
can either increase or decrease voters’ welfare (Persson and Tabellini,
2000, p. 82). The problem is that elected politicians may resort to pan-
dering to the public before upcoming elections. Instead of committing
to politically unpopular long-term policies, politicians may focus on
maximizing their re-election chances. This is problematic since it is
in conflict with the idea of representative democracy; decision makers
are expected to make better decisions than ordinary citizens (Maskin
and Tirole, 2004). For example, Müller (2007) finds that when long-
term policies are socially optimal, then disciplining politicians with
elections may lead to inefficiencies; politicians may prefer socially in-
efficient short-term policies in the hope of re-election.
Appointed officials, or bureaucrats, are not faced with such re-election
incentives. They are appointed to office due to their competence, and
their motivation is rather based on career concerns; Holmström (1999),
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Dewatripoint et al. (1999), Alesina and Tabellini (2007) and Alesina and
Tabellini (2008). The basic idea of the career concerns model is that if
today’s performance at a job is linked to tomorrow’s wage, this cre-
ates an incentive for the agent to signal his ability to the employer.
This is formalized in Holmström (1999). The key feature is that an
agent with uncertain competence has to exert effort to convince his
employer of his high talent, even in the absence of monetary incen-
tives, since this might translate into good job opportunities later on
(Dewatripoint et al., 1999). The benefit of bureaucratic policy mak-
ing is that appointed policy makers do not need to please the voters,
but can instead commit to long-term policies. The flip-side, however,
is that the public cannot discipline a bureaucrat by ousting him out
of office, which leaves room for misuse of power, like excessive rent-
seeking.
Second, this paper relates to an important strand of literature com-
paring the performance of accountable vs. non-accountable officials;
Maskin and Tirole (2004), Alesina and Tabellini (2007), Alesina and
Tabellini (2008) and Borgne and Lockwood (2006). Maskin and Ti-
role (2004) study the optimal allocation of decision making power in
a two-period model between three types of institutions; direct democ-
racy, representative democracy (accountable officials), or judges (non-
accountable officials). Their focus is on the policy maker’s congru-
ence with the citizens’ preferences, and they find that technical tasks
are best delegated to judges, especially when the electorate is poorly
informed about what is optimal, information is costly, and feedback
about the quality of decisions is slow. The most important decisions,
on the other hand, are best allocated to politicians. Alesina and Tabellini
compare politicians and bureaucrats in a single policy task (2007) and
in multiple policy tasks (2008), in a model of task allocation with dif-
ferent incentives of policy makers. They find (2008) that from a nor-
mative perspective, politicians are preferred especially if flexibility is
valuable. Bureaucrats, on the other hand, are preferred, if time incon-
sistency is a relevant issue, the stakes for organized interest groups are
large, or corruption is not widespread.
Borgne and Lockwood (2006) study the learning motive of elec-
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tions, i.e. how the concern of upcoming elections may motivate in-
cumbents to raise effort to signal their high ability to voters in a two-
period model. Their model features both moral hazard and symmetric
but incomplete information about the incumbent’s ability, and they
compare two institutional settings; an appointed vs. an elected incum-
bent. When ability and effort positively interact, they find that the
incumbent has an incentive to raise effort to signal high ability. They
find that upcoming elections reduce this effect, and in fact, elections
may even demotivate the elected policy makers, and thus in equilib-
rium, appointed officials may welfare-dominate elected ones. This is
because the appointed incumbent has to stay in office regardless of the
project success, and he has to carry the cost of the effort in the follow-
ing periods, whereas an elected policy maker will be replaced in the
event of project failure.
In addition to theoretical literature, there is some empirical re-
search comparing the performance of different policy-making insti-
tutions. The results are however mixed on which of the regimes per-
forms better. Whalley (2010), for instance, finds that when it comes
to cities’ debt management policies in California, appointed city trea-
sures reduce borrowing costs by 13 to 23 % in comparison to elected
city treasurers. Coate and Knight (2011) conversely find per capita
public spending in the U.S. cities to be 9% lower in (elected) mayor-
council run cities than (appointed) council-manager run cities.
As a summary, there is a number of papers studying policy mak-
ers’ incentives, and how policy outcomes differ under alternative in-
stitutions, as well as some empirical support to the claim that policy
making regimes matter on policy outcomes. This paper tries to fill a
gap in the literature by introducing a model where a long-term fis-
cal policy is analysed from the perspective of two alternative policy
makers. The literature on comparing fiscal policy choices of different
institutions and on studying the welfare implications of different ac-
countability mechanisms in the long run is scarce. A similar kind of
principal-agent model is used in Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 4.5),
and Rogoff (1990) to study political business cycles. However, in both
of these papers, the policy choice by the incumbent is different, and
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the policy making is studied only from the perspective of a politician,
with results suggesting that the politician behaves well only in peri-
ods preceding elections. This paper in turn brings the comparison of
alternative institutions with an infinite time horizon into an otherwise
similar fiscal policy framework. Also, the timing is different to Pers-
son and Tabellini (2000, ch. 4.5), in that here the incumbent observes
his own competence before making the policy choice. There are sim-
ilarities also to Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) who discuss public
policies at a more general level. The main difference to Alesina and
Tabellini is in the formulation of policy goals; in Alesina and Tabellini
the politician’s goal is to provide the voter at least a predetermined
threshold level of utility, whereas the bureaucrat’s goal is to maximise
his perceived ability in the eyes of his peers.
3 FRAMEWORK
3.1 Set-up
This paper analyses a political agency problem in an infinite horizon,
discrete time framework. Before the beginning of period one, it is
decided that a new public project will be implemented. The project
is a public good, and it will be equally beneficial to all citizens by
generating utility of g each period, so that G = ∑ βtg, with 0 < β < 1 as
the discount factor. The idea is that once the public good is introduced,
it has to be produced each period with amount g, so each period there
has to be an incumbent financing its production.
The new project will be financed by tax revenue, so the income
tax rate, τ, is introduced. The income tax rate before the reform is
τ0 = 0, and τt after the reform in period t; 0 = τ0 < τt ≤ 1. There is no
alternative way to finance the project except tax revenue.
The motivation for using an infinite-horizon model with no term-
limits is that e.g Persson and Tabellini (2000), Berganza (2000), and
Banks and Sundaram (1998) with finite frameworks show how in the
second and final period the incumbent tends to extract all the possible
rents to himself since there is no incentive not to; in other words if
the incumbent decides upon a policy today but knows for sure that he
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will not be in office in the next period, there is less incentive for him to
act socially optimally. For instance, Alt et al. (2011) find that economic
growth is higher and taxation lower under re-election eligible incum-
bents, than under those who face term-limits. Therefore re-election el-
igible incumbents tend to perform better than term-limited ones. See
review on term limits and term lengths in Smart and Sturm (2013).
3.2 Citizens
In the economy, there are n private utility maximising citizens with
homogeneous policy preferences. Citizen k derives utility both from
the private consumption, ck, and from the new public project, g, so
that uk = ck + g, where ck = (1− τ)yk. The public project generates the
same utility to all citizens, independent of their private incomes. The
utility function for a citizen with private income yk in period t is then














There are two policy makers available for the public office; an elected
politician, i = P, and an appointed bureaucrat, i = B. The politician is
motivated by his desire for re-election, whereas the bureaucrat strives
for a well-paid private sector job. The distinction in the career moti-
vations is purposefully stark to see how the different incentives affect
the performance of the two separate decision-making regimes. Since
only one type of the policy makers can be in power, the performance
of each institution is analysed separately starting from period one.
Since the size of g for each period is fixed, the sole policy choice
for the incumbent is to decide the income tax rate τt, in each period
during his incumbency to finance the public good g. The government
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budget constraint for each t is5
g = θij(τ
i
t yt − rt) (2)
where yt represents the tax base, rt the per period rents for the in-
cumbent, and θij is a parameter representing the incumbent’s compe-
tence. The tax base is the sum of individual citizens’ private incomes,
yt = ∑ ykt . The policy maker i = P, B can be of high or low competence,
j = H, L with θij representing the incumbent’s competence in trans-
forming tax revenue into the public good. θij is given by Nature with
prior probabilities Prob(θiH) = q and Prob(θ
i
L) = 1− q.
The size of g is predetermined, and independent of the policy
maker’s actions, so the full cost of the project is known in advance.
From (2) one can see that in each period the financing of the public
good g depends on the competence of the incumbent θij, and on the
difference between the collected tax revenue τit yt and the amount of
private rents rt the incumbent takes for himself. It is easy to see that a
policy maker with high competence needs less tax revenue to finance
g, and vice versa. Since the incumbent cannot affect his competence,
and g is fixed, the only variables the incumbent can directly affect are
the rate of the income tax and the amount of rents. Re-arranging (2),
we see how the amount of per period rents depends on the policy









The incumbent has full discretion once in power, i.e. there is no pre-
determined tax rate he needs to commit to. Since the tax rate and
the level of rents are associated with the policy maker’s competence,
the incumbent can abuse his power by setting the income tax rate too
high and engaging in excessive rent-seeking. The upper limit for rent-
seeking is the amount of tax revenue, 0≤ rt ≤ r̄t, where r̄t = τit yt.
5Following Persson and Tabellini 2000, ch. 4.5. In their model, however, the tax
rate τ is fixed, and the policy choice is to choose the level of rents r, which in turn
determines the amount of the public good g.
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3.3.1 Politician
Politicians have explicit incentives to perform well, since they can be
disciplined directly by the electorate in elections held after each pe-
riod. For simplicity, I assume that the framework features only career
politicians, whose aspirations lie in doing politics and who wish to
make a career as an elected representative (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008).
Naturally, also elected politicians may aspire for a private sector job.
To keep the two incentive mechanisms clearly separated, this paper
features only career politicians.
The electorate is represented by a median voter, who makes the
voting decision. If the median voter supports the policy made by the
incumbent, then at least half of the electorate supports it too, see e.g.
Persson and Tabellini (2000, p. 51). In this paper, the median voter is
defined to be the citizen with the median income ym.
The politician is of high competence with probability q, or of low
competence with probability 1− q. The electorate cannot observe the
competence, so the the voting decision is based on the observed tax
rate. At the end of each period t, the incumbent politician will be re-
elected for the next period with probability Pt+1 ∈ [0,1]. The fear of
losing re-election should restrict rent-seeking behaviour (Persson and
Tabellini, 2000, p. 69), thus encouraging the incumbent to behave well
each period. The problem for the politician is to choose τPt such that
his expected lifelong utility is maximised
max
τP








where rt(τPt ) is the amount of rents in period t determined by the
chosen tax level, β is the discount factor, and Pk is the probability with
which he is re-elected. The incumbent politician will receive rents in
the first period with certainty. This is represented in the first term in
(4). He is subjected to re-election at the end of each period, so that
probability Pk tells whether the incumbent politician was re-elected
after his performance at k − 1 and is thus in office at period k. The
second term in (4) represents the expected utility of the chosen tax
policy starting in period 2 when he is subjected to re-election. The
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voting rule P is specified below in subsection 3.4.
If the re-election probability is the same each period, P1 = P2 = . . . =







For simplicity, the value of an outside option for the politician is zero.
If he is not re-elected, a challenger from the pool of politicians is
elected to replace him, who is of high competence with probability
q, or of low competence with probability 1− q.
3.3.2 Bureaucrat
Unlike the politically elected policy maker, the bureaucrat does not
have re-election concerns; he can stay in the public office as long as he
manages to finance the public project. His incentives to work diligently
in the public office are driven by his hope of receiving a job offer
from the well-paid private sector at some point of his incumbency. He
is motivated by future career concerns, as formalised in Holmström
(1999).
The setting is different also from the electorate’s point of view;
they do not have a direct mechanism to discipline the bureaucrat by
dismissing him from office. Only in the case extracting too much rents
for himself and failing to finance g at any period a bureaucrat will
also be kicked out of office, and replaced by another one. The exact
condition for this will be defined and discussed in the next subsection
3.4.
The bureaucrat is of high competence with probability q, or of low
competence with probability 1− q. There is a private sector employer
who evaluates the bureaucrat’s performance at period t, and who can
employ him with probability Pt+1 ∈ [0,1). The only task for the private
sector employer is to decide whether to offer the bureaucrat a job or
not. He does not observe the competence of the incumbent, the hiring
decision is based on the observed tax rate. If the private sector em-
ployer decides to employ the bureaucrat, this holds until the end of
the game, so the employment decision is done only once.
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To have incentives to aspire for the private sector job, the private
sector salary has to exceed the amount of rents in office, ρt > rt. The
problem for the bureaucrat is to choose the tax policy such that his
expected lifelong utility is maximised
max
τB






















where rt(τBt ) is the amount of per period rents, β is the discount factor,
and Pk is the probability with which he offered the private sector job,
and ρt is the private sector salary. Again, the incumbent bureaucrat
will get the first period rent with certainty, which is the first term in
(6). After each period in office, the private sector employer evaluates
his performance, with Pk representing the probability with which the
bureaucrat has been offered the private sector job at the end of period
k − 1, and thus enjoying the private sector salary in period k. The
second term in (6) is the discounted stream of public sector rents, if
he is never offered the private sector job. The third and fourth terms
represent his discounted utility when he will be offered the private
sector job at period 2 or later. The private sector hiring rule will be
specified in subsection 3.4.
If the private sector employment probability is constant each pe-








(1− β)(1− β(1− P))ρ (7)
If the bureaucrat gets kicked out of the public office without receiving
the private sector job offer, the value of the outside option for him is
zero. A new bureaucrat will be hired, who is of high competence with
probability q, or of low competence with probability 1− q.
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3.4 Voting rule and hiring rule
Since the politician is disciplined by his will for re-election, whereas
the bureaucrat is motivated by his will for the private sector job, let
us define the voting rule for the politician, and the hiring rule for the
bureaucrat. These both rules are based on the observed tax rate.
First, the voting rule is based on idea that the median voter rewards
the politician for setting a low tax rate, and punishes him for setting













P and τ̄P represent the threshold tax rates that will be defined
shortly. If the observed policy choice is at or below τ
¯
P the median
voter re-elects the incumbent with certainty, P = 1. If the observed tax
rate is higher than τ
¯
P, but lower than or equal to τ̄P, the re-election
probability reduces from certainty to P = π < 1. Finally, if the ob-
served tax rate is higher than τ̄P, the incumbent will be replaced with
certainty, P = 0.
The private sector hiring rule for the bureaucrat is defined as
P =
{




If the observed policy choice is below or at τ
¯
B the bureaucrat will be
hired into the private sector with probability P = σ < 1. The private
sector is interested in a bureaucrat that sets a low tax rate; either it is a
sign of his competence, or at least he is not extracting too much rents
into his own pocket. For any tax rate above τ
¯
B, he will never be hired
in the private sector, P = 0.
Now, let us define the threshold tax rates τ
¯
i and τ̄i, i = P, B that en-
ter the voting and hiring rules. First, the lower tax threshold, denoted
by τ
¯
i. Recall that there are policy makers of high and low compe-
tence, θij, with i = P, B, j = H, L. The lower threshold tax rate has to be
such that even a low competence incumbent under either regime has
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incentives to part of the game.
Let us start by deriving the minimum tax rate for the politician, τ
¯
P.
Since the incumbent has full discretion once in office, we can solve the
minimum amount of rents in the public office the politician has to be
guaranteed, such that he is not tempted to set τP = 1 in the first period,
collect all the tax revenue y in the economy for himself, and get kicked
out of office. Since in the later sections we look at equilibria where the
voting probability P is constant on the equilibrium path, the reduced
form of the politician’s rent-maximising problem (5) can be utilised.
Recalling the definition for per period rents given by (3), and plugging
it into (5), the minimum tax rate τ
¯






According to the voting rule, setting τ
¯
P guarantees re-election with






Similarly for the bureaucrat, we can check the lowest tax rate τ
¯
B
that the bureaucrat does not have an incentive to set the tax rate to
τB = 1, and steal all the tax revenue for himself. For the bureaucrat
the analysis is also restricted to equilibria where the hiring probability
P is constant on the equilibrium path. Thus the reduced form of the










(1− β)(1− β(1− P))ρ (10)
By definition ρ > r, and according to the hiring rule, the bureaucrat
will be hired with probability P = σ if he sets tax policy τ
¯
B. Now, (10)
has to hold for any ρ > r, and any P = σ > 0, even when the hiring
probability is close to zero. Thus, if the inequality holds for P = 0, it
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Now, since (9) and (11) look identical, the minimum tax rate for both
politicians and bureaucrats, denoted by τ
¯





+ (1− β). Now it is clear that this minimum tax rate τ
¯
i de-
pends on the incumbent competence θij, i = P, B, j = H, L, so that the
higher the competence of the incumbent, the lower is the minimum tax
rate. This is especially important in section 5, when incumbent compe-
tence is unobservable; it is important to define lowest tax rate so that
the low competence policy makers have incentives to be part of the
game. Thus, in the following the lower threshold tax rate is defined as
the lowest acceptable tax rate for the low competence incumbent, and






+ (1− β) (12)
It is important to note that this tax rate is naturally not binding for the
incumbent of high competence. We will return to this in more detail
in section 5.
Furthermore, (12) represents the threshold tax rate that both politi-
cians and bureaucrats have incentives to be part of the game. It is clear
from (10) that for the bureaucrat the lower threshold tax rate would be
lower the higher is the private sector salary, ρ. However, since we are
interested in the comparison of the two institutions, having a very high
private sector salary in comparison to the rents in the public sector
would mean that the bureaucrat could always set the tax rate signifi-
cantly lower than the politician, making any comparison between the
two institutions unnecessary. Therefore, throughout the paper, the tax
rate defined by (12) represents the lower threshold tax rate for both
policy making institutions.
Next, the maximum threshold level for τi, denoted by τ̄i can be
solved from the perspective of the median voter. For the electorate to
be willing to have the public good g introduced in the first place, the
discounted expected utility for the median voter after the introduction
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of g has to be at least as high as the discounted expected utility if no
public good is introduced. Thus, it has to hold that
β
1− β((1− τ
i)ym + g) ≥ β
1− βy
m (13)
From (13) the maximum tax rate τ̄i the median voter is willing to





which is independent of the incumbent’s competence.
Note that while the median voter can directly discipline only the
politician, it is important that this maximum tax rate τ̄i concerns both
the politician and the bureaucrat, i = P, B. If the incumbent is a politi-
cian, τ̄P enters into the voting rule, according to which the incumbent
will be re-elected with less than certainty, π < 1 for setting tax rate
τ̄P, and replaced with certainty for setting a tax rate higher than that.
If the incumbent is replaced at the end of the period, there is no cost
to the voter himself. However, the next period incumbent has again
full discretion in setting the tax rate. On the other hand, if the incum-
bent is a bureaucrat, he too can be dismissed from office if he fails the
condition (13); if he sets a tax rate higher than τ̄B and thus fails to
provide the median voter at least the level of pre-reform utility, the in-
cumbent bureaucrat will be replaced, and thus the maximum tax rate
τ̄B concerns also the bureaucrat. It is necessary to have this upper con-
straint on the bureaucrat behaviour, since otherwise there would be no
control over the bureaucrat stealing all the tax revenue each period.
This section has derived the threshold tax rates that enter into the
voting and hiring rules. When setting the tax rate the politician takes
into account the voting rule, and the bureaucrat takes into account the
private sector hiring rule to maximise their lifelong utilities as given by
(5) and (7) respectively. The exact levels for the re-election probability
π for the politician and the hiring probability σ for the bureaucrat that
determine whether the incumbent will set the minimum tax rate τ
¯
i,
or the private rents maximising tax rate τ̄i will be solved in section
4 under symmetric information, and in section 5 under asymmetric
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information about the incumbent’s competence.
3.5 Timing
1. The Nature determines the competence j = H, L of the policy
maker i = P, B, with Prob(θiH) = q and Prob(θ
i
L) = 1− q.
2. The policy maker observes his competence and makes the policy
choice in t = 1; selects the income tax rate τi, which determines
private rents for the incumbent, and the utility for the citizens.
3. The citizens observe the policy choice and their own utility. The
incumbent politician will be re-elected by the median voter with
probability P as defined by the voting rule. The bureaucrat will
receive a job offer from the well-paid private sector with proba-
bility P, as defined by the hiring rule. If the bureaucrat does not
receive the private sector job, he stays in the public office unless
setting a tax rate above the upper threshold tax rate defined in
section 3.4.
4. In the following periods, t = 2, ...,∞, the procedure is similar.
Again, both types of policy makers choose the tax rate in each
period, after which their policy choices are being observed and
they are either rewarded or punished for their behaviour.
In section 4, when symmetric information is considered, step 1 is
omitted; the competence of the policy is common knowledge. In sec-
tion 5, with asymmetric information, step 1 determines the compe-
tence of the incumbent.
4 SYMMETRIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE IN-
CUMBENT TYPE
First, I consider the case when there is no uncertainty of the policy
makers’ competence; it is observable to everyone. The idea is to get a
benchmark case of the decision makers’ performance in office, and the
welfare implications that can later be compared to the case of when
there is asymmetric information on the incumbent competence.
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4.1 Politician
Let us consider the optimal behaviour for a politician, when the elec-
torate has no uncertainty of his competence. Since the competence of




θPy + (1 − β), whereas the maximum tax rate does not
depend on the incumbent competence and is thus as given in section






+ (1− β))y− g
θP












Recall the voting rule defined in section 3.4, according to which
the minimum tax rate τ
¯
P guarantees the incumbent’s re-election with
certainty P = 1, whereas any tax rate above this but less or equal to the
maximum tax rate τ̄P reduces the re-election probability from certainty
to P = π < 1. The expected discounted rents of the two policy choices
are as follows. First, plugging the per period rents of the tax policy τ
¯
P
given by (15) into the politician’s problem (5) with P = 1, the expected










1− β(1− β)y = βy (17)
Second, plugging the per period rents of the policy choice τ̄P given by














Since any tax rate below τ
¯
P does not increase his re-election chances,
whereas any tax rate above τ
¯
P reduces the re-election probability from
certainty to π, if the politician is to deviate from this tax policy, it is
rational to set the tax rate all the way up to the maximum tax rate τ̄P.
Thus, the politician essentially has two policy choices; either he sets
τ
¯
P and stays in office with certainty, or he sets the rent-maximising tax
rate τ̄P but gets re-elected with less than certainty.




it has to hold that E(vP(τ
¯
P)) ≥ E(vP(τ̄p)). The re-election probability
π such that this inequality holds can be solved from (17) and (18) as
(see Appendix A.3.1)






The critical level for re-election that determines whether the politician
extracts the maximum amount of rents by setting τ̄P, or sets the min-
imum tax rate τ
¯
P depends on the two policy choices. Whereas τ̄P is
independent of the incumbent characteristics, the tax rate τ
¯
P depends
on his competence θP, as discussed in section 3.4. The higher is the
competence of the politician, the lower he can set τ
¯
P, which decreases
the value of the numerator in (19). This means that for a politician
with a high competence the condition (19) holds for low values of re-
election probability π.
This gives the first result; the higher is the competence of the in-
cumbent politician, the more likely he is to deviate from τ
¯
P, and to set
the private rents maximising tax rate. To motivate a very high compe-
tence politician to set τ
¯
P, the cost of deviating from it has to be high
enough, i.e. the probability of re-election has to be very low.
4.2 Bureaucrat
Next, let us consider the optimal behaviour for a bureaucrat, when
his competence is known. Similarly as for the politician, when the
competence of the incumbent is observable, the lower threshold tax
rate for the bureaucrat can be written as τ
¯
B = g
θBy + (1− β), and again
the maximum tax rate is given by τ̄B = gym . The per period rents of






+ (1− β))y− g
θB












According to the hiring rule defined in section 3.4, if the bureaucrat
sets the tax policy τ
¯
B, he will be rewarded with a private sector job




never receive the private sector job offer, P = 0. Note, however, that
while the bureaucrat’s career in the public sector is not directly in the
hands of the median voter, he will be dismissed from the office if he
sets a tax rate higher than τ̄B. Thus, τ̄B represents the maximum tax
rate for the bureaucrat.
The expected private rents of the two policy choices τ
¯
B and τ̄B can
be written as follows. First, plugging the per period rents of tax policy
τ
¯
B given by (20), into the bureaucrat’s problem (7) with P = σ, the










(1− β)(1− β(1− σ))ρ
=
β
1− β(1− σ)(1− β)y +
β2σ
(1− β)(1− β(1− σ))ρ
(22)
Second, plugging the per period rents of the maximum tax rate τ̄B,














For the bureaucrat setting any tax rate above τ
¯
B results in the pri-
vate sector job with probability zero. Similarly for the politician, if he
is to deviate from this tax policy, it is rational to set the tax rate up to
τ̄B. Thus, there are again essentially two policy choices; τ
¯
B and τ̄B.
For the bureaucrat to be motivated to set τ
¯
B, it has to hold that
E(vB(τ
¯
B)) ≥ E(vB(τ̄B)). This inequality holds for high enough values
of the private sector hiring probability, and σ can be solved from (22)
and (23) as (see Appendix A.3.2)




β(ρy − τ̄B + ϕB)
(24)
where ϕB = g
θBy < τ¯
B. The bureaucrat finds the job opportunity tempt-
ing enough to behave well in the public office and sets τ
¯
B, whenever
the private sector employment probability is sufficiently high satisfy-
ing (24). For employment probability lower than this he will extract
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the maximum amount of rents in the public office by setting τ̄B.
As is the case with the politician, the tax rate τ
¯
B is lower, the higher
is the policy maker’s competence. The value of the numerator in (24)
increases in the incumbent’s competence, meaning that the higher is
the bureaucrat’s competence, the higher the probability of the private
sector job has to be for him to set the τ
¯
B.
Furthermore, the denominator at the right-hand side of (24) shows
how the bureaucrat’s willingness to aspire for the private sector job
depends on the wage-gap between the private and the public sectors;




ρ − rB(τ̄B). By definition, the private sector salary is larger than the
rents in the public office, ρ > rB(τ̄B). Thus, the second result states that
the higher is the competence of the bureaucrat, the higher the private
sector salary has to be, or the probability with which he will get the
job, for the bureaucrat to have incentives to set τ
¯
B in the public sector.
5 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE IN-
CUMBENT TYPE
This section extends the model to include uncertainty of the policy
maker’s competence, θij. The policy maker i = P, B can be either of
high or low competence j = H, L. The policy maker knows his own
competence. The citizens know the two types, but cannot observe
which type the incumbent is.
The idea is to look at conditions under which policy makers choose
the alternative policy choices, and whether there are such conditions
that the high competence decision makers can be induced to reveal
their true competence in the benefit of the citizens.
5.1 Politician
In this section we first consider the existence of such equilibria where
the politician of either competence sets the same tax rate. Since the
citizens cannot detect the competence of the incumbent based on the
observed tax rate at any of the pooling equilibria, we then consider the
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existence of such separating equilibrium where the types are revealed.
5.1.1 Pooling equilibria
Recall that the lower tax rate for the politician as defined in section 3.4
represents the lowest acceptable tax rate that induces the low compe-






+ (1− β) (25)
It is important to note that this tax rate is not binding for the high
competence politician; he could set tax rate below τ
¯
P, and still extract
some rents.
The upper threshold tax rate, as defined in section 3.4 is indepen-






The per period rents rPj for a politician of talent j when choosing
tax policy τP are denoted by rPj (τ
P) and can be written for the two






















P) = (1− β)y (30)
It is clear that the private rents are always higher for the high com-
petence type at each tax rate. Especially, policy choice τ
¯
P generates
higher per period rents for the high type, the larger is the gap between
the competences of the high and the low type.
Based on the politician’s policy choice, the median voter updates
his belief of the incumbent’s true type. The equilibrium consists of the
politician’s strategy τPj , the median voter’s strategy P, and the updated
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beliefs of the competence of the politician.
In the following I consider two pooling equilibria; i) both types
choose the minimum tax rate, τ
¯
P; or ii) both choose the maximum tax
rate, τ̄P. Recall that according to the voting rule defined in section 3.4,
a politician who sets tax policy τ
¯
P will be re-elected with certainty;
P = 1, whereas a politician setting tax policy τ̄P , will be re-elected
with less than certainty, P = π < 1. For either of these two policy
choices to constitute an equilibrium, the re-election probability has to
be on a such a level that neither type has an incentive to deviate from
the equilibrium policy.
Pooling 1 for politician
Let us start with the tax rate τ
¯
P, which guarantees re-election with
probability P = 1. First, note that the high competence politician could
choose a tax rate lower than τ
¯
P due to his higher competence. How-
ever, a lower tax rate would lower his private per period rents without
increasing his re-election probability, so it cannot be a rational strategy
for him.
Therefore, it is sufficient to consider such a re-election probability
π that neither type has an incentive to deviate from τ
¯
P by setting a
higher tax rate. According to the voting rule, any tax rate above τ
¯
P
will decrease the re-election probability from certainty to P = π < 1.
Thus, if the politician of either competence is to deviate from τ
¯
P by
setting a higher tax rate, it is rational to set the maximum tax rate, i.e.
τ̄P, since this generates the largest per period private rents.
Recall that due to his higher talent, the high competence politician
receives a ’premium’ of playing τ
¯
P as defined in (28), and is thus less
inclined to deviate from it and risk his re-election chances, than the
low competence politician.
Therefore, to prove that τ
¯
P is an equilibrium strategy for both
types, it is sufficient to consider such re-election probability π that set-
ting τ
¯
P is an equilibrium strategy for the low competence politician.











On the left-hand side are the low type’s discounted stream of pri-
vate rents of playing strategy τ
¯
P, and on the right-hand side are his
discounted rents if he deviates from this strategy, which lowers his re-
election probability from certainty to π. Solving the re-election proba-
bility such that inequality (31) holds (see Appendix A.4.1), and denot-
ing it by πp1 gives






When the re-election probability after a deviation from τ
¯
P is suffi-
ciently low according to (32) the low type has no incentive to deviate
from τ
¯
P. Since the high type has no incentive to deviate either, we
have thus proved that τ
¯
P is an equilibrium strategy for both types
when π ≤ πp1 .
Since the competence of the incumbent cannot be detected based
on his policy choice, the median voter’s updated belief of the true type
remains unchanged, as long as he observes τ
¯
P. If the observed policy
choice is something else than τ
¯
P, the incumbent is believed to be of
low competence. The pooling equilibrium 1 can be summed up as
P1: τP(θPH) = τ
P(θPL ) = τ¯
P; P(τP = τ
¯
P) = 1; Pr(θPH | τ¯
P) = q, Pr(θPL |
τ
¯
P) = 1− q, Pr(θPL | τP 6= τ¯
P) = 1.
Pooling 2 for politician
Second, let us consider the condition when both types choose the
private rents maximising tax rate τ̄P. Setting this policy reduces re-
election probability from certainty to π.
As already noted, the high competence politician is more likely
to set the minimum tax policy τ
¯
P, due to the ’premium’ of this tax
policy. Therefore, to prove that the maximum tax rate the median voter
accepts τ̄P is an equilibrium strategy for both types, we can consider
such a re-election probability that setting τ̄P is an equilibrium strategy











On the left-hand side is the high type’s discounted stream of private
rents when playing τ̄P, which reduces his re-election probability to π,
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and the right-hand side are his rents when playing τ
¯
P throughout his
career. Solving the condition such that the inequality holds gives (see
Appendix A.4.1)
π ≥ πp2 =
τ
¯










P. When the re-election probability is sufficiently
high according to (34), the high type sets the rents-maximising tax
policy τ̄P throughout his career. Since it is an optimal strategy for the
low type as well, we have proved that τ̄P is an equilibrium strategy for
both types when π ≥ πp2 .
Again, the median voter cannot detect the competence of the in-
cumbent politician, as long as he observes tax policy τ̄P, and thus the
updated belief of the true type remain unchanged. If the observed
policy choice is something else than τ̄P, the incumbent is believed to
be of high competence. The pooling equilibrium 2 can be summed up
as
P2: τP(θPH) = τ
P(θPL ) = τ̄
P; P(τP = τ̄P) ≥ πp2 ; Pr(θPH | τ̄P) = q, Pr(θPL |
τ̄P) = 1− q, Pr(θPH | τP 6= τ̄P) = 1.
Let us discuss the two pooling equilibria. In the pooling equilibrium
1, both types choose τ
¯
P, when the punishment of deviating from this
minimum tax policy is hard enough. This takes place for a sufficiently
low re-election probability π ≤ πp1 , and is represented as area I in fig-
ure 1. In the pooling equilibrium 2, both types choose the private rents
maximising tax rate τ̄P, when the re-election probability is sufficiently
high with π ≥ πp2 . This is represented as area II in figure 1.
Figure 1: Pooling equilibria for politician
Since essentially πp1 denotes the condition for the low type, and
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πp2 for the high type to deviate from the minimum tax rate τ
¯
P, with
πp1 < πp2 for all θPH > θ
P
L , this means that the low competence politician
needs less certainty of being re-elected to be willing to risk his political
career than the high competence politician. This result is in contrast
with the result of section 4.1. Now, the higher is the competence of the
high type, the less likely he is to risk his political career by choosing
the tax policy that does not guarantee re-election. This is because of
the premium for the high competence politician of playing τ
¯
P that
is defined as the lowest acceptable tax rate for the low type. This
premium is the larger the higher is the competence gap between the
two types.
5.1.2 Separating equilibrium
Since the electorate cannot detect the true competence of the incum-
bent politician in either of the two pooling equilibria discussed above,
let us consider the existence of such an equilibrium, where the two
types of politicians are induced to play tax policies that reveal their
true types to the electorate. Let us denote a type-specific signalling
policy by τP∗ (θPj ).
One separating equilibrium where the competence of the incum-
bent is revealed is the following. The signalling takes place in the first
period with the high competence politician signalling his competence
by setting a first period tax rate below τ
¯
P, i.e. τP∗ (θPH)< τ¯
P, after which
he switches to setting τ
¯
P for the rest of his incumbency. The low com-
petence politician, on the other hand, signals his type by the tax policy
τP∗ (θ
P
L ) = τ̄
P, and continues setting τ̄P throughout his incumbency.
For such strategies to constitute an equilibrium, the voting rule
has to be modified a bit. For the high competence politician to have




P, the first period voting rule has to be the following: P1 =
1 when the electorate observes τP∗ (θPH) < τ¯
P, and P1 = π < 1 when
the electorate observes a tax rate higher than τP∗ (θPH) but τ̄
P at the
highest. From the second period onwards the voting rule is as defined
in section 3.4.
Let us start the proof for this equilibrium by stating the equilibrium
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conditions for the two types. For the high competence politician we
need the following three conditions. First, the condition that the high
















Second, to rule out an incentive to set the tax rate to one and take all










P) ≥ βy (36)
Third, the condition for the high type not to deviate from his equilib-











Next, the conditions for the low competence politician are the fol-
lowing. First, the condition for the low type not to have an incentive











To rule out the incentive to set the tax rate to one and take all the tax





P) ≥ βy (39)
And finally, the condition for the low competence politician not to











Now, for the separating equilibrium to exist, we need to solve the
signalling policy τP∗ (θPH) < τ¯
P for the high type, and the re-election
probability π such that the above conditions (35) to (40) hold at the
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same time. (See Appendix A.4.1 for details for this proof.)
Let us start by solving the signalling policy τP∗ (θPH) from the low
type’s condition (38). The left-hand side represents his rents if he sets
the private rents maximising tax rate τ̄P throughout his incumbency.
The first term on the right-hand side in (38) represents the first period
rents if the low type sets the high type’s signalling policy, τP∗ (θPH). Now
since τP∗ (θPH)< τ¯
P, and as defined by (25), τ
¯
P represents the lowest tax
rate the low type is willing to set each period instead of setting the tax
rate to one and taking all the tax revenue for himself. Therefore, if the
low type sets a tax rate below τ
¯
P in the first period, in the following
periods the tax rate has to be above τ
¯
P to have the condition (9) to hold
for the low type. According to the voting rule, any tax rate above τ
¯
P
decreases the re-election probability from certainty to π, and thus after
the signalling stage the low type would switch to setting τ̄P for the rest
of his career. This is the second term on the left-hand side. Solving
τP∗ (θ
P




(1− β)τ̄P + (1− π) βg
θPL y
1− βπ (41)
Thus, the signalling policy for the high type has to satisfy condition
(41) so that the low type has no incentive to try to mimic the high type
in the first period.
One candidate for such a signalling policy is the lowest tax rate
the low type can set; plugging r = 0 into (3) and solving the lowest
possible tax rate for the low type gives τP = g
θPL y








(1− β)τ̄P + (1− π) βg
θPL y
1− βπ (42)





Next, let us consider condition (35) for the high competence politi-
cian. The first term on the left-hand side represents the rents of the
first period signalling policy, and the second term represents the rents
after switching to tax policy τ
¯
P. Note that signalling takes place only
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for one period, because once the competence of the politician is re-
vealed, there is no incentive for him to continue setting the lower tax
rate due to how the voting rule is defined in this section. After the
first period, he switches to setting τ
¯
P for the rest of his career. The
right-hand side represents the rents if the high type deviates from the
signalling strategy and sets the private rents maximising tax rate τ̄P.












Plugging the first period rents into (35), and solving the re-election
probability π such that the inequality holds gives
π ≤ πs =
τ
¯
P − (1− β)τ̄P − βϕPH − (1− β)2
β(τ
¯







P. To prevent the high type from deviating from
his equilibrium strategy, the re-election probability after the deviation
has to be sufficiently low with π ≤ πs.




such that the low type has no incentive to deviate in the first period
from his equilibrium strategy given by (38), and that for a sufficiently
low re-election probability π ≤ πs the high type has no incentive to
deviate in the first period from his equilibrium strategy given by (35)
either.
Next, let us consider the conditions (36) and (39) guaranteeing that
neither type has an incentive to set the tax rate to one, and collect all






≥ (1− β)2 · y
g
(44)
For the low type, on the other hand, condition (39) is essentially the
same as condition (31) in pooling equilibrium 1, but with the direction
of the inequality changed, so that when π > πp1 the low type is willing
to participate in the game. Let us check when πs > πp1
τ
¯
P − (1− β)τ̄P − βϕPH − (1− β)2
β(τ
¯
P − ϕPH + (1− β)2))
>







Similarly for the politician, we consider the existence of both such
equilibria the bureaucrats pool to set the same tax rate, and thus their
true competence cannot be observed. Then we consider the existence
of such separating equilibrium where the types are revealed.
5.2.1 Pooling equilibria
The threshold tax rates when there are two types of bureaucrats can













B is defined according to the competence of the low compe-
tence bureaucrat. Recall that this tax rate is derived from the condition
that the bureaucrat does not have an incentive to set the tax rate to one
and take all the tax revenue for himself, as given by condition (10) in
section 3.4. It is clear that for a positive hiring probability and suf-
ficiently high private sector salary ρ, this tax rate is not binding to
either type of the bureaucrat; however, to simplify the analysis and to
be able to compare the results with the politician, this lower threshold
tax rate is used for the bureaucrat as well when analysing the pooling
equilibria.
The per period rents rBj for a bureaucrat of competence j when
choosing tax policy τB are denoted by rBj (τ
B) and can be written for






















B) = (1− β)y (53)
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Separating equilibrium t = 1: τP∗ (θPH) =
g
θPL y
, τP∗ (θPL ) = τ̄
P , P(τP =
τP∗ (θ
P
H)) = 1, P(τ
P = τ̄P) ≤ πs ;Pr(θPH | τB∗ (θPH))=1 and Pr(θPL | τ̄B) = 1
t≥ 2: τP(θPH) = τ¯
P, τP(θPL ) = τ̄
P, P(τP = τ
¯
P) = 1, P(τP = τ̄P)∈ (πp1 ,πs].
This equilibrium is based on the voting rule given in section 3.4. that
the voters reward for setting a lower tax rate, and punish for setting
a higher tax rate, with the modification for the first period. Since the
signalling policy for the high type politician in this separating equilib-
rium is strictly lower than the lowest acceptable tax rate for the low
competence politician, this raises the problem of moral hazard on the
electorate’s perspective; if the high competence politician sets a lower
tax rate in the first period, after which he switches to setting a higher
tax rate for the rest of his incumbency, there is an incentive for the elec-
torate to replace the high type after the first period, since the newly
elected incumbent (if high talent) would again set a lower tax rate,
and so on. Then this would be an equilibrium only if the share of low
type politicians is very high. The voters have no incentive to replace
the high type incumbent after the first period if the probability with
which the challenger will be a low type is high enough.
On the other hand, if the game was specified so that in the case of
being replaced after the first period signalling stage, the newly elected
politician of any type would switch to pooling strategy of setting the
private rents-maximising tax policy. Then the voters would not have
incentives to replace the high competence politician.
Note that this section has proved the existence of one separating
equilibrium with the underlying voting rule. Another candidate for a
separating equilibrium would be such that each period the high type
would set the signalling polic y τP∗ (θPH) < τ¯
P, but this would require
changing the voting rule for each period, so that the high type could
be induced to set a tax rate below τ
¯
P each period. In this case there
would be no risk of the voter’s moral hazard.
To conclude, the existence of such a separating equilibrium, where
the high competence politician can be induced to set a tax policy that
reflects his true talent, is sensitive to the specifications of the game.
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5.2 Bureaucrat
Similarly for the politician, we consider the existence of both such
equilibria the bureaucrats pool to set the same tax rate, and thus their
true competence cannot be observed. Then we consider the existence
of such separating equilibrium where the types are revealed.
5.2.1 Pooling equilibria
The threshold tax rates when there are two types of bureaucrats can













B is again defined according to the competence of the low
competence bureaucrat. Recall that this tax rate is derived from the
condition that the bureaucrat does not have an incentive to set the tax
rate to one and take all the tax revenue for himself, as given by condi-
tion (10) in section 3.4. It is clear that for a positive hiring probability
and sufficiently high private sector salary ρ, this tax rate is not bind-
ing to either type of the bureaucrat; however, to simplify the analysis
and to be able to compare the results with the politician, this lower
threshold tax rate is used for the bureaucrat as well when analysing
the pooling equilibria.
The per period rents rBj for a bureaucrat of competence j when
choosing tax policy τB are denoted by rBj (τ
B) and can be written for






















B) = (1− β)y (53)
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Again, the rents for the high competence bureaucrat are higher
than for the low competence bureaucrat at either policy choice. Fur-
thermore, note that since according to the definition ρ > r, it is the low
competence bureaucrat who benefits more of the private sector job,
since it always holds that ρ > rBH(τ
B) > rBL(τ
B).
Observing the bureaucrat’s policy choice, the private sector makes
the hiring decision, according to the hiring rule presented in section
3.4. The equilibrium consists of the bureaucrat’s policy choice τBj , the
hiring rule P, and the updated beliefs of the competence of the bu-
reaucrat.
Similarly to the case of the politician, I consider two pooling equi-
libria for the bureaucrat; i) τ
¯
B and ii) τ̄B. Recall the private sector
hiring rule, according to which setting tax policy τ
¯
B results in a pri-
vate sector job with probability P = σ < 1. If a bureaucrat sets any
tax rate above τ
¯
B, the probability of receiving the private sector job is
P = 0. Thus, the condition when either of these policy choices consti-
tute an equilibrium, the hiring probability σ has to be on such a level
that neither type of a bureaucrat has an incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium policy.
Pooling 1 for bureaucrat
Let us start with the tax rate τ
¯
B. This tax policy results in a private
sector job with probability σ < 1. Either type could set the income tax
rate even below τ
¯
B, but since it would not increase the probability of




Recall that the high competence bureaucrat can extract more rents
in the public sector job than the low competence bureaucrat, as defined
in (50) to (53), and thus it is the low competence bureaucrat that is
more motivated by the private sector job. Therefore, to prove that τ
¯
B
is an equilibrium strategy for both types, it is sufficient to consider
such a hiring probability σ that τ
¯
B is an equilibrium strategy for the















Where the first term on the left-hand side are his rents in the public
office he when sets τ
¯
B. The private sector employer will note this, and
offer him a job with probability σ with salary ρ which he will receive
each period for the rest of his life. This is represented by the second
term. On the right-hand side are the high competence bureaucrat’s
private rents if he extracts the maximum amount of rents each period
and never receives the private sector job offer. Solving the hiring prob-
ability such that (54) holds, and denoting it by σp1 gives (see Appendix
A.4.2)









. When the probability of the private sector job is
sufficiently high according to condition (55), the high competence bu-
reaucrat has no incentive to deviate from tax policy τ
¯
B. Since the low
type cannot have an incentive to deviate either, we have thus proved
that the equilibrium strategy for both types is τ
¯
B, when σ ≥ σp1 .
The private sector employer cannot identify the competence of the
incumbent bureaucrat; his updated beliefs of the true type remain the
same as the prior beliefs, and the bureaucrat who sets τ
¯
B will be of-
fered a job with probability σp1 . If the employer observes any other
tax rate than τ
¯
B, the incumbent is believed to be of high competence.
The pooling equilibrium 1 for the bureaucrat can be summed up as
P1: τB(θBH) = τ
B(θBL ) = τ¯
B; P(τB = τ
¯
B) = σp1 ; Pr(θBH | τ¯
B) = q, Pr(θBL |
τ
¯
B) = 1− q, Pr(θBH | τB 6= τ¯
B)=1.
Pooling 2 for bureaucrat
In the second pooling equilibrium both types choose the private rents
maximising tax rate τ̄B. As there are no other restrictions on the bu-
reaucrat behaviour than losing a job opportunity, the private rents
maximising tax policy τ̄B is an equilibrium strategy, if the private sec-
tor employment probability is so low that neither type sees the private
sector job worth pursuing for.
Since the low type would benefit more from the private sector job,
to prove that τ̄B is an equilibrium strategy for both types, it is sufficient
to consider such hiring probability that the rents maximising tax rate
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τ̄B is an equilibrium strategy for the low competence bureacrat. For











(1− β)(1− β(1− σ))ρ (56)
On the left-hand side are the low competence bureaucrat’s discounted
lifelong rents if he extracts the maximum amount of rents each period
by setting τ̄B and stays in the public office. On the right-hand side
the first term is the low type’s rents when sets τ
¯
B, after which he
receives the private sector job offer with probability σ. Solving the
hiring probability from inequality (56), and denoting it by σp2 gives
(see Appendix A.4.2)









. When the probability of being employed in the pri-
vate sector is sufficiently low according to (57), the low competence
bureaucrat has no incentive to deviate from τ̄B. Since the high type
has no incentive to deviate either, we have proved that τ̄B is an equi-
librium strategy for both types, when σ ≤ σp2.
Again, the employer cannot detect the competence of the bureau-
crat, and the updated belief of the type remains unchanged. If the em-
ployer observes any other tax rate than τ̄B he believes the incumbent
to be of low competence. The pooling equilibrium 2 for the bureaucrat
can be summed up as
P2: τB(θBH) = τ
B(θBL ) = τ̄
B; P(τB = τ̄B) = 0; Pr(θBH | τ¯
B) = q, Pr(θBL |
τ
¯
B) = 1− q, Pr(θBL | τB 6= τ¯
B) = 1 .
Let us discuss the two pooling equilibria. In pooling equilibrium 1,
both types choose τ
¯
B, when the probability of the private sector job
is high enough, σ ≥ σp1 . This is represented in area I in figure 2. In
pooling equilibrium 2, both types choose the private rents maximising
tax policy τ̄B and stay in the public sector, when the probability of the
private sector job is sufficiently low with σ ≤ σp2. This is represented
in area II in figure 2.
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Figure 2: Pooling equilibria for bureaucrat
Now, σp1 denotes the condition for the high type, and σp2 for the
low type to deviate from the minimum tax rate τ
¯
B, with σp1 > σp2 . This
means that the since the low competence bureaucrat would benefit
from the private sector job more than the high competence bureaucrat,
he is willing to set the minimum tax rate for lower probability of the
private sector job than the high competence bureaucrat.
Essentially, the two conditions (55) and (57) tell us about the com-
petitiveness of the private sector vs. the public sector. Similarly to the
symmetric information case, this can be noted by looking at the de-
nominators in both conditions (see Appendix A.4.2). First, in (55), the
denominator depends on the wage gap between the private sector and
what the high competence type can extract at maximum at the public
sector. The higher is the competence of the bureaucrat, the smaller
this wage gap is, meaning a higher σp1 . So, if the competence of the
bureaucrat is very high, then either the private sector salary has to be
very high, or the probability of receiving the private sector job offer
has to be very high for him to have incentives to set τ
¯
B. If these two
are interpreted to represent a highly competitive private sector, then
the higher the competence of the bureaucrat, the more competitive the
private sector has to be for any type of bureaucrat to set τ
¯
B, as given
by condition (55). Otherwise he stays in the public sector and employs
his high talent to extract more rents for himself.
In (57), on the other hand, the denominator represents the wage
gap between the private sector salary and the maximum rents for the
low type bureaucrat at the public sector. The lower is the low type’s
competence, then lower is σp2 , meaning that only when the private
sector is very uncompetitive in comparison to the public sector, either
because the private sector salary is not very high, or because the prob-
ability of receiving the job is very low, then no type of bureaucrat is
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interested in aspiring for the private sector job, but stays at the pub-
lic office and extracts the maximum amount of rents each period by
setting τ̄B.
5.2.2 Separating equilibrium
Let us consider the existence of an equilibrium, where the two types
of bureaucrats play such strategies that their true types are revealed
to the private sector employer. Again let us denote the type-specific
signalling policy by τB∗ (θBj ).
One separating equilibrium where the types are revealed is when
the high competence bureaucrat signals his competence by setting a
tax rate τB∗ (θBH) that is strictly lower than what the low competence
bureaucrat is capable of. This is because the low type would always
benefit more of the private sector job than the high type. The high
type will be rewarded with the private sector job with probability σ.
The low competence type, on the other hand, plays the private rents
maximising tax rate τB∗ (θBL ) = τ̄
B throughout his career and stays in
the public sector job.
For these strategies to constitute an equilibrium, the hiring rule has
to be modified such that upon observing a signalling policy from the
high competence bureaucrat, τB∗ (θBH), the bureaucrat will hired into
the private sector with probability P = σ, whereas any tax rate above
τB∗ (θ
B
H) will result in never receiving the private sector job offer, P = 0.
Let us start the proof for this equilibrium by stating the equilibrium
conditions for the two types. First, the high competence bureaucrat
does not have an incentive to mimic the low type and set the private

















The low competence bureaucrat, on the other hand, does not have
an incentive to mimic the high type and set the high type’s signalling
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(1− β)(1− β(1− σ))ρ
(59)
It is fairly obvious to note that at either of these conditions, we can
rule out that either type would have an incentive to set the tax rate
to one, and take all the tax revenue for himself; if (58) holds, then
holds also that β1−βr
B
H(τ̄






Thus, for there to exist a separating equilibrium we need to solve
such a signalling policy τB∗ (θBH) and hiring probability σ that condi-
tions (58) and (59) hold at the same time. Let us start with the sig-
nalling policy τB∗ (θBH). Recall the condition defining the lowest accept-







(1− β)(1− β(1− P))ρ
It is important to note that this condition is satisfied for either type
j = L, H even for zero public office rents, when P > 0 and for a high
enough private sector salary ρ. Furthermore, since ρ> rBH(τ
B)> rBL(τ
B),
it is the low competence bureaucrat who benefits more of the private
sector job.
Thus, for a sufficiently high private sector salary, the low type is
willing to even tolerate zero rents in the public sector, and therefore
for the high competence bureaucrat to be able to distinguish himself
from the low type, the high type’s signalling policy τB∗ (θBH) has to be
strictly below any tax rate the low type can set. The lowest possible
tax rate for the low competence bureaucrat can be solved by plugging
r = 0 into (3) and solving the tax rate as τB = g
θBL y
.
The signalling policy for the high type thus has to satisfy τB∗ (θBH)<
g
θBL y
. One candidate for the signalling policy is the lowest possible tax
rate for the high competence bureaucrat. Similarly as for the low type,
this can be solved by plugging r = 0 into (3) and solving the tax rate




Since the low type can never set a tax rate this low, the equilibrium
condition for the low type (59) is satisfied; the low type sets the private
rents maximising tax rate τB∗ (θBL ) = τ̄
B throughout his incumbency.
Now, it is sufficient to consider the equilibrium condition for the
high type (58). The first term on the left-hand side in (58) are the public
office rents for the high type when he is signalling his competence to
the employer by the policy choice τB∗ (θBH). The second term is his
private sector salary he enjoys for the rest of this life if he gets the job
offer, which takes place with probability σ. On the right-hand side are
the high competence bureaucrat’s private rents if he mimics the low
type and extracts the maximum amount of rents each period and never
receives the private sector job offer, P = 0. Plugging in the suggested
signalling policy τB∗ (θBH) =
g
θBHy
and solving the private sector hiring
probability σ gives (see Appendix A.4.2)
σ ≥ σs =
(1− β)(τ̄B − ϕBH)
β(ρy − τ̄B + ϕBH)
(60)
Thus we have proved that there exists a separating equilibrium for




sector and will be hired into the private sector with probability σ≥ σs.
The low type sets the private rents maximising tax rate throughout
his incumbency, τB∗ (θBL ) = τ̄
B, and will be never hired into the private
sector. The equilibrium can be summed up as
Separating equilibrium: τB∗ (θBH) =
g
θBHy
and τB∗ (θBL ) = τ̄




s, P(τB = τ̄B) = 0; Pr(θBH | τB∗ )=1 and Pr(θBL | τ̄B) = 1.
Note that σs > σP1 , meaning that since the high competence bureaucrat
is sacrificing all his rents in the public sector job to signal his compe-
tence to the private sector employer, the probability with which he
will be awarded the private sector job has to be higher than in the case
where he sets τ
¯
B and gets private rents every period.
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5.3 Discussion
In this framework, the policy choice for the incumbent is to set the
income tax rate to finance a public good. A high competence policy
maker can set the tax rate lower than a low competence policy maker.
The policy maker has discretion in setting the tax rate so that he can
set a tax rate that is higher than what is needed to finance the public
good, and take the rest of the tax revenue as private rents for himself.
While the politician is constrained by his re-election wishes, the
bureaucrat aspires for a private sector job. Both the simplified voting
rule, and the hiring rule used throughout the paper have been based
on the idea that the incumbent of either type is rewarded for a lower
tax rate, and punished for setting a higher tax rate. Due to the defini-
tion of the voting and hiring rules, the choice of the optimal strategy
reduces to either setting the minimum tax rate τ
¯
i, or the maximum tax
rate τ̄i.
Let us first consider the utility at each policy choice for voter k with
private income yk are
uk(τ̄i) = (1− g
ym






i) = (1− ( g
θiLy




First, the upper limit for the tax policy τ̄i is always redistributive; all
voters whose private income is below the median voter’s income yk <
ym, always benefit from the introduction of the income taxation and
the public project, whereas voters whose income is higher than the
median income yk > ym, are worse off as a result of the project, as
shown in (61). If the position of the median changes, then also changes
the share of citizens who are either better or worse off. Tax policy τ
¯
i,
on the other hand is not as strongly redistributive; it does provide g
more to the poorer citizens than the richer citizens, as shown in (62),
but it does not depend on the position of the median voter, but on the
incumbent competence, so that the higher is the competence of the low
type, the higher is the citizen’s utility. Thus, it is clear that the citizens
would benefit of having a high competence policy maker in office who
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could be induced to set a lower tax rate. This paper has considered the
conditions when this takes place.
In section 4, the competence of the incumbent is observable. The
higher is the competence of the incumbent politician, the lower he can
set τ
¯
P, but also the higher is the gap in the private rents produced
by the two policy choices. Thus the punishment from the deviation
from τ
¯
P has to be harder (a lower re-election probability), the higher
is the competence of the incumbent. For the bureaucrat, the higher is
the competence of the incumbent, the smaller is the gap between the
private sector salary, and the public sector rents. Thus the higher is the
incumbent’s competence, the higher the private sector job probability
has to be for him to have incentives to set τ
¯
B
In section 5, the competence of the incumbent is no longer observ-
able. Now the lower threshold tax rate for the policy maker τ
¯
i is de-
fined as the lowest acceptable tax rate for the low competence policy
maker. The lower is the low type’s competence, the higher is τ
¯
i, mean-
ing that the high type always benefits more from his public sector job
than the low type. When the incumbent is the politician, it is the high
competence politician who is less likely to deviate from the lower tax
policy τ
¯
P. For the bureaucrat, on the other hand, it is the high compe-
tence one that is more likely to extract the maximum amount of rents.
This reflects the different accountability mechanisms, and the different
result they produce.
In any of the equilibria, where policy makers under either regime
pool to choose the same tax policy, the citizens cannot infer the true
competence of the incumbent, and there is no difference in the voter
utility, whether the incumbent is of low or high quality. Therefore, the
benefit of having a high competence policy maker is not realised, since
the high competence incumbent is using his competence to extract
more rents to himself, instead of employing his talent to produce more
utility to the citizens.
Therefore, I have considered the existence of such equilibria, where
the types play tax policies that reveal their true competence. More
specifically, I have considered such equilibria, where the high compe-




means a higher utility for the citizens, and less rents for the incumbent.
For the politician, there exists a separating equilibrium where the
high competence type signals his competence by setting a tax rate be-
low τ
¯
P, however, this signalling stage lasts for only one period. Fur-
thermore, the separating equilibrium presented in this paper is sensi-
tive to the problem of moral hazard on the voter side, and can therefore
hold only when the share of high competence politicians is very low.
For the bureaucrat, on the other hand, there exists such a sepa-
rating equilibrium, where the high competence type can be induced
to set a tax policy that is below any tax rate the low competence bu-
reaucrat is capable of for several periods. Since it is always the low
type that benefits more of the private sector job, this takes place if the
prospect of the private sector job is good enough and/or the private
sector salary is high enough. Thus a long-term commitment to a tax
rate that reflects the bureaucrat’s true competence is possible under
bureaucracy. However, since the citizens have no means to get rid of a
low type bureaucrat, there is a chance of getting stuck with low com-
petence bureaucrat, who extracts the maximum amount of rents each
period.
Even though the career incentives for the two types have been very
simplified, we can still relate them to reality. This framework suggests
that having a high competence bureaucrat in office results in the high-
est utility to the citizens, however the risk is that the bureaucrat in
office is proven to be of low competence, in which case there is no way
for the citizens to get rid of him. On the other hand, it is difficult to
provide the politician with sufficient incentives to do their best if the
reward of re-election is not motivating enough.
The answer to the question of which of the two regimes is the pre-
ferred one, depends on the share of high and low competence policy
makers. If the share of high competence policy makers is high, then
bureaucracy would be preferred. On the other hand, if the share of
high competence policy makers is very low, then the politically elected
policy maker would be the preferred institution, since in the case of
having a low competence politician in office, the citizens always have
the option of replacing the incumbent.
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Essentially, this paper has been about delegation. Even though the
policy framework analysed has been very simplified, it has addressed
an important issue since today not only are citizens delegating author-
ity to politicians, but nation states are delegating authority to supra-
national organisations, such as the EU. This paper has studied tax
policy choices in an infinite setting with two kinds of policy makers
with different accountability mechanisms. A politician cares about re-
election, whereas a bureaucrat is motivated by a private sector job. I
have looked at the behaviour of two types of policy making regimes
with two levels of competence. The idea has been to analyse the rent-
seeking behaviour of each of these, and the implications on the elec-
torate’s utility.
This paper has extended the framework of Persson and Tabellini
(2000, ch. 4) by altering the assumptions regarding the timing and the
information, and by introducing two policy-making regimes. The role
for the decision maker is very simplified; there are no ideological bias
or pre-electoral promises he needs to fulfil. Instead, with a prede-
termined policy goal, the only question is in setting the rule of the
game such that taking full advantage of the authority over the public
finances is restricted. It is clear from the formulation of the objec-
tive functions for the two policy-making regimes that their incentives
are very different; while the politician is punished if not acting well
enough, the bureaucrat is rewarded for acting well enough.
When considering conditions when the high competence policy
makers are induced to reveal their true competence, the results show
that the highest utility to the citizens can be achieved under bureau-
cracy. This takes place when the private sector is very competitive in
comparison to the public sector, and the bureaucrat is of high com-
petence. However, since the citizens do not have any direct control
over the bureaucrat, the risk is that when bureaucracy is the chosen
regime, the citizens may be stuck with a low competence bureaucrat,
whose only interest is to extract the maximum amount of private rents
for himself. On the other hand, when the elected politician is the
chosen regime, the welfare of the citizens is not as high as under the
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bureaucracy, but in the case of a low competence politician, the citi-
zens always have the option of voting him out of office. Therefore, the




A.1 Politician’s expected utility
With a constant re-election probability across periods, P1 = P2 = . . . =
P, the politician’s expected utility








can be rewritten as









A.2 Bureaucrat’s expected utility
With a constant private sector employment probability across periods
P1 = P2 = . . . = P, the bureaucrat’s expected utility




















can be restated as
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A.3 Symmetric information
The lower threshold tax rate is defined as τ
¯
i = g
θiy + 1 − β, and the
upper threshold tax rate as τ̄i = gym . In the symmetric information case
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and τ̄i = gym , and the associated per period rents for a policy maker of
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¯
P < τ̄P.












































. πp2 < 1 for all τ
¯
P < τ̄P.
Separating equilibrium: Taking the equilibrium condition for the
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Condition (39) for the low type is satisfied, when πs > πp1 , i.e.
τ
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P − (1− β)τ̄P − βϕPH − (1− β)2
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P − ϕPH + (1− β)2))
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Comparing the two conditions, it is easy to see that
(1− β)









> (1− β)2 · y
g
⇒ θPH > θPL
To conclude the proof, πs has to be such that neither type has an
incentive to deviate from the second period onwards. For the high
type this is given by (37). As discussed in the main text, (37) holds
when πs < πp2 , i.e.
τ
¯
P − (1− β)τ̄P − βϕPH − (1− β)2
β(τ
¯








which holds for 0 < (1− β)3τ̄P. Thus πs < πp2 is always satisfied. For
the low type, on the other hand, condition (40) holds when πs > πp1 .
The condition when this holds has already been solved above.
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A.4.2 Bureaucrat
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B. The second line shows how the denominator
depends on wage gap between the private sector and the maximum
rents for the high type. σp1 < 1 when τ̄B + β(τ
¯
B − ϕBH) <
βρ
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and ϕBH < ϕ
B
L < τ¯
B, so that σP1 > σP2 . Again, by look-
ing at the second line, we see that condition depends on the wage gap
between the private sector and the maximum amount of rents for the
low type. σp2 < 1 when τ̄B − τ
¯
B + β(1− β) < βρy
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